Concept
Applying the Test
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Applying the Test
A superseding-cause problem arrives whole: a negligent defendant, an injured plaintiff, and some later event in between. The Restatement (Second) of Torts says that whether an intervening force's active operation prevents the defendant's antecedent negligence from being a legal cause is determined by the rules of §§ 442 through 453.1 Section 442 lists the considerations of importance in making that determination.2 The questions below put those rules in an order, because each answer narrows what the next must settle. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. carries the example: its facts invite the label 'superseding cause,' and the label turns out to do no analytical work.
Start with the defendant. A superseding cause relieves only a defendant whose antecedent negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, so the analysis takes negligence and substantial-factor causation as given and asks whether something later cancels the liability that would otherwise follow.3 In Derdiarian, Felix, a contractor working in an excavation in the traveled roadway, failed to erect a barrier to protect workers from traffic, and the jury could find that Felix had negligently failed to safeguard the site.4 Dickens, an epileptic who had failed to take his medication, then suffered a seizure, lost control of his car, and careened into the excavation, throwing Derdiarian into the air, where his body ignited from a kettle of hot enamel in use for the repairs.5 Felix's real argument was that Dickens's negligent driving without his medication, and the bizarre sequence it engendered, should cut off Felix's liability and put the loss on the later actor.6
Second, confirm that the later force began after the negligence. An intervening force is one that actively operates in producing harm after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed.7 Dickens's seizure and the car's entry into the work area came after Felix left the site unprotected, so both are intervening forces. That label only places the event in the sequence. Whether the force supersedes remains open.
Third, and decisive in most cases, ask what risk made the defendant's conduct negligent and whether the harm falls within it. The Derdiarian court named the risk: a prime hazard of failing to safeguard the excavation is that a driver will negligently enter the site and injure a worker.8 A worker hit by a car entering the improperly protected area suffered the harm that hazard describes, and an intervening act cannot supersede where the risk of that act is the very risk that renders the actor negligent.9 The Restatement states the same principle as a rule of liability: when the actor's negligence creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm through another force's intervention and is a substantial factor in the harm, the intervention is not a superseding cause.10 It admits one exception, for harm that a third person causes intentionally and outside the scope of the risk the actor created.11 The logic is easy to trace. If a car's entry could excuse the contractor, the duty to protect the site would guard against nothing, because the contractor would escape liability in the very cases the duty exists to cover.
Once the answer lies in the risk, the strangeness of the route loses its force. That Dickens lost control through a negligent failure to take medication, and not through a driving mistake, was not decisive, because the precise manner of the event need not be anticipated.12 Students lose this issue by following the odd facts when the question concerns the kind of harm the defendant's carelessness invited. The finder of fact could conclude that injury to a worker by a car entering the improperly protected area was the foreseeable, normal, and natural result of the risk Felix created.13
The same question can end the analysis the other way. Ace Taxi Service negligently fails to send a car to Costas, who is waiting at a park, and a tornado strikes the park and injures him. The dangers that make failing to send a car careless do not include tornadoes, so a court would very likely call the storm a superseding cause.14 That result comes at the risk question, with nothing weighed, which is why the risk question comes before the considerations.
Fourth, when the risk question gives no clear answer, test the force against the normal-consequence rule and weigh the § 442 considerations. The intervention of a force that is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligence is not a superseding cause.15 If the force is not a normal consequence, the court weighs the listed considerations together: whether the force brings harm different in kind, whether it appears extraordinary in hindsight, whether it operates independently of the situation the negligence created, whether a third person's act or omission sets it in motion, and how culpable that person's wrongful act is.16 No single consideration decides the question alone. Derdiarian did not need this step, because the risk comparison carried the decision. A problem with several later forces shows how the steps combine.
The last question is who answers the others. In Derdiarian, the court could not say as a matter of law that Dickens's negligence was a superseding cause interrupting the link between Felix's negligence and the worker's injuries, so the question belonged to the jury.17 A court may decide the other way when, after the event and looking back from the harm to the negligent conduct, it appears highly extraordinary that the conduct brought the harm about.18 In Yun v. Ford Motor Co., the court applied that standard to a passenger whose van had come safely to rest at the side of a parkway. His crossing of the parkway in both directions to retrieve parts was, the court said, highly extraordinary, an activity that could be described as nothing short of extraordinarily dangerous, if not suicidal.19 The two cases show what the court measures: how ordinary or extraordinary the later act looks in hindsight, set against the risk the defendant created.
That allocation sets each side's task. The defendant must persuade the court that the later event is so extraordinary, or so far outside the risk, that the court can say so as a matter of law. The plaintiff, as in Derdiarian, aims to show that a jury could find the harm to be the foreseeable, normal, and natural result of the risk the defendant created.
An answer that leaps from the later event to the conclusion that the chain was broken skips every step above. The definition of a superseding cause presupposes that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in the harm, so calling the later actor the real cause contradicts nothing and proves nothing.20 The instinct also echoes the old last-wrongdoer rule, under which only the second actor's negligence was a proximate cause. That rule disappeared long ago, but some residue of its second rationale, that the first actor should not answer for the second actor's negligence, still lingers in intervention cases.21 What an answer needs is the comparison between the harm and the risk that made the conduct negligent.