Concept
The Section 442 Considerations
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
The Section 442 Considerations
Section 442 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists six considerations for deciding whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another.1 The operative word is considerations. Courts weigh the six; they do not tick them off. The Restatement offers the list as an attempt to sort the factors that influence a decision to treat a later event as superseding, and Buckley v. Bell quoted the whole list before turning to the rule on negligent intervening acts.2
The causes that can follow a defendant's negligence are virtually without limit in number and kind, so courts ask one question of all of them: is the intervening cause so closely connected with the defendant's negligent conduct that responsibility should not end?3 A list serves that question better than a formula, because each item describes one way a later force can stand nearer to or farther from the risk the defendant created. Foreseeability is the core of the inquiry but not the whole of it. Courts find ways to avoid liability for unforeseeable injuries, yet it does not follow that a defendant must pay whenever she causes foreseeable harm; for reasons of policy, courts sometimes refuse liability even for injuries that could be foreseen.4
No item is an element, and none suffices alone. The items can also pull in opposite directions: a third person's act may be a normal result of the defendant's situation and still be grossly blameworthy. Weighing of that kind rests on inferences about which reasonable people differ, so the question ordinarily goes to the jury.5 An answer that recites the six items as a checklist and demands that every one be met misreads the section.
The six considerations measure one thing from different angles, namely how closely the later force connects to the defendant's negligent conduct, and that shared target explains their overlap. An event that looks extraordinary in hindsight often operates independently of anything the defendant did, and a third person's crime bears on both the wrongfulness of the act and the degree of the actor's culpability. One set of facts will therefore implicate several considerations at once, and the cases below count the same event under more than one heading. The subsections follow the Restatement's lettering, (a) through (f), beginning with whether the intervening force produced harm different in kind from the harm the defendant's negligence would otherwise have caused.
Harm Different in Kind
Section 442(a) names the first consideration: whether the intervening force “brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence.”6 The factor compares two injuries. One is the injury the defendant's carelessness would ordinarily have produced had nothing unusual happened afterward. The other is the injury the later force actually caused. When the second differs in character from the first, the intervening force has substituted one kind of harm for another, and the factor weighs toward superseding cause. When the second is the first reached by an odd route or in a larger amount, the factor gives the defendant nothing.
The comparison follows from what makes conduct negligent. Conduct is negligent because it involves a foreseeable and unreasonable risk that it will cause harm, and the harm that actually results may differ in kind or degree from the harm that was or should have been foreseen.7 A precaution aimed at the original risk would not have prevented a harm of a different kind, so holding the defendant liable for it would punish a danger the duty of care never covered. Courts accordingly decline to hold a negligent party liable when bizarre, unforeseeable events give rise to a risk different from the one the defendant should have anticipated.8 The factor is the scope-of-the-risk idea from the foreseeability test, applied along a single dimension.
That dimension is kind, and the narrowness is deliberate. Defendants rarely foresee the exact sequence of events, and harm often exceeds expectations, so a factor triggered by differences of manner or extent would fit nearly every accident and excuse nearly every defendant. Unusual facts tempt the argument that the oddity of the sequence breaks the chain of causation. The factor answers that argument only when the oddity changed the character of the injury, and the line is clearest in a case where strange facts failed to cross it.
In Derdiarian, a contractor working in an excavation in a traveled roadway failed to erect a barrier, such as a truck or concrete blocks, to protect workers from traffic. Dickens, an epileptic who had not taken his medication, suffered a seizure, lost control of his car, and careened into the excavation, throwing Derdiarian into the air, where his body ignited from a kettle of hot enamel in use for the repairs.9 The New York court refused to hold as a matter of law that the driver's act superseded the contractor's negligence. A prime hazard of leaving a work site unprotected is that a driver will negligently enter it and injure a worker. That the driver was negligent, or even reckless, does not insulate the contractor, and it is not decisive that he lost control through a negligent failure to take medication instead of a driving mistake.10 The kettle fared no better as an argument. Its placement could affect how the accident occurred and how badly the worker was hurt, but a defendant's inability to anticipate the precise manner of the accident or the exact extent of injuries does not preclude liability where the general risk and character of the injuries are foreseeable.11 Every odd detail went to manner or extent. The kind of harm, a worker struck when a vehicle crashes into the site, was the harm a barrier exists to prevent.
A rental-car case sits on the other side of the line. A rental company negligently supplied a car with a defective trunk. The renter pulled into a parking space at the curb and was shutting the trunk when another car, parked several car lengths behind, jumped ahead and severely injured him.12 The company's negligence undoubtedly placed the renter at the site, but the intervening act was divorced from the foreseeable risk of the original negligence, and the injuries differed in kind from those a defective trunk would normally cause. The negligence merely furnished the occasion for an unrelated act to cause injuries not ordinarily anticipated.13
In both cases a moving car struck a person, so the intervening driver's negligence cannot be what separates them, and Derdiarian says as much by holding that the driver's negligence, even recklessness, does not insulate the contractor.14 The difference lies in how the harm relates to the defendant's carelessness. An unprotected excavation is dangerous because vehicles may enter it, so a worker struck by a vehicle suffers the injury the carelessness made likely. A faulty trunk is dangerous because of what the trunk itself does, and a passing car's lunge forward has no connection to that defect.
The factor is one signal among several and decides nothing alone. Section 442 lists it as a consideration to be weighed. The same idea reappears elsewhere as a liability rule: where negligent conduct creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing it, the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor, except where a third person intentionally causes the harm and it falls outside the scope of the risk the actor's conduct created.15 The temptation under time pressure is to react to the strangeness of the facts and ignore the character of the injury, so run the comparison in order.
Extraordinary Operation
Section 442(b) supplies the second consideration: whether the intervening force's operation, or its consequences, appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation.17 Two phrases carry the factor. After the event fixes the vantage point as a look backward from the harm with the whole story in hand. The circumstances existing at the time of operation fix the baseline: the court compares the force with the setting in which it acted, so a gale that is commonplace on an exposed coast may be extraordinary in a sheltered valley. The question is whether the later force falls inside or outside the range of what ordinarily happens in situations like that one.
Judging in hindsight solves a real problem. If a defendant escaped unless she had actually predicted the later event, nearly every careless actor would escape, because the specific chain of events almost never occurs to anyone beforehand. If every later event counted against her, she would insure the whole unpredictable world. Hindsight steers between those results by asking what falls within the ordinary range of human and natural behavior, which a careful actor can be expected to allow for. Courts accordingly treat an intervening cause as foreseeable when it was not abnormal, even if no one had it in mind beforehand.18
The word extraordinary sets a high bar. It describes an event that is abnormal, unpredictable, or highly improbable, and an event that merely went unanticipated falls short. Highly improbable and extraordinary intervening forces are generally found superseding and preclude liability.19 A defendant who negligently requires a traveler to make a detour, for example, is not liable when a tree falls on the traveler's car, when an unexpected flood arrives, or when a robber attacks, so long as the defendant had no reason to know the detour exposed the traveler to an increased risk of such an attack.20 None of those events is part of what made imposing a detour careless.
The factor helps a defendant little when the force realizes the very risk that made the conduct negligent. Explosive gas negligently permitted to accumulate in an oil barge remains the defendant's responsibility when lightning unforeseeably ignites it, because the result was within the foreseeable risk.21 Extraordinary operation is one weight on the scale, and a close connection between the harm and the reason for the carelessness can outweigh it.
Natural forces test the factor most often. Foreseeable events include forces of nature such as wind, rain, lightning, and freezing temperatures, as well as human conduct.22 In Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., a section of a negligently maintained roof fell and killed the plaintiff's decedent. The defendant blamed extremely high winds, and the court held that a person who fails to remedy a dangerous condition is liable even though the immediate cause of the injury is the wind.23 Wind is the weather a roof must withstand. The Restatement goes further, providing that the actor is liable even for the result of an extraordinary force of nature if the risks of that force were risks against which the actor should have taken adequate precautions.24
The two storms differ in what the defendant's carelessness had to anticipate. The hurricane lay outside the ordinary range of weather and produced a harm unrelated to termites. The wind in Kimble lay inside the range a roof owner must guard against and produced the very harm a failing roof threatens. The factor therefore helped the dealer and gave the roof owner nothing.
Human conduct is harder to sort, and Yun v. Ford Motor Co. shows how contested the judgment becomes. The spare-tire assembly of a van fell off onto a roadway, and the van came safely to rest at the side of New Jersey's Garden State Parkway. The passenger crossed the Parkway in both directions to retrieve the parts and was struck as he returned from the middle of the road.25 The intermediate appellate court ruled for the defendant on proximate cause. Because the van had come safely to rest, it called the passenger's conduct “highly extraordinary” and described the crossings as “extraordinarily dangerous, if not suicidal.”26 A majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned that ruling, holding it foreseeable that someone would try to retrieve a defective wheel assembly once it detached from a vehicle.27
Two courts looked at the same facts and reached opposite conclusions, and the disagreement turned on how the event was described. Described as a passenger deciding to run across a busy highway at night, the act looks senseless. Described as a person trying to retrieve a part that has just fallen off a vehicle, it looks like ordinary behavior after a mishap. Neither description is wrong, and choosing between them is a judgment about normal behavior on which reasonable minds differ. That elasticity explains why the question ordinarily goes to a jury and why a judge who resolves it against the plaintiff on summary judgment risks reversal. An answer that calls the plaintiff's act senseless and stops there has asserted a conclusion without the analysis.
Independent or Normal Result
Section 442(c) supplies the third consideration: whether the intervening force operates independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation.29 The clause asks two questions at once. The first concerns origin: did the later force grow out of the situation the defendant created, or come from somewhere else entirely? The second concerns expectation: if it did grow out of that situation, is it the sort of development such a situation ordinarily produces?
Two labels mark the ends of the origin question. A dependent force exists only because of the situation the defendant's negligence created, so a careful defendant would never have faced it. An independent force has an origin of its own: it would have occurred anyway and merely combined with the defendant's negligence to produce the harm. Courts and commentators speak of dependent and independent intervening causes for this reason.30
The difference matters because of what each label says about the defendant's control. A dependent force is the defendant's situation continuing to work. The defendant controlled the original risk, and a careful actor sizing it up would have asked how it was likely to develop, including how people caught in it would react. Dependent forces therefore tend to be more foreseeable and less likely to supersede. An independent force is a coincidence: no precaution against the original risk would have addressed it, and the defendant merely put the plaintiff where an unrelated force could reach. Origin is one way to measure the closeness of connection the foreseeability test asks about, namely whether the later cause is so closely connected with the defendant's negligent conduct that responsibility should not end.31
The crash has nothing to do with what makes rear-ending a car careless. The collision supplied only the occasion, a change in the commuter's schedule, and the harm came from a source the driver's carefulness could never have controlled.
The two scenes differ in where the harmful force came from. In the first, the force was already out in the world and met the plaintiff because of a delay. In the second, the collision itself generated the force, and loss of control after a near miss is among the developments that make sideswiping dangerous in the first place.
Neither label is conclusive, and treating either as a verdict is the usual error. A force can be independent of the situation the defendant created and still fall within the risk that made the conduct negligent. Spilling a large quantity of gasoline is negligent because of the risk that it will ignite, so the defendant is not relieved when the ignition comes from the independent act of another person.32 Forces of nature work the same way: wind, rain, lightning, and freezing temperatures are foreseeable events that would have occurred regardless of the defendant's conduct, and they do not supersede when they realize the danger the defendant created.33 The converse also holds. The text asks whether a force is or is not a normal result of the situation, which leaves room for a dependent force to be so irrational or freakish a response that it still weighs toward superseding cause. Section 443 converts the normal-result half of this factor into a rule: the intervention of a force that is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause.34
Act or Omission of a Third Person
Section 442(d) makes it a consideration whether the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to act.36 The Restatement lists the two together, but they do not weigh alike, and the reason lies in what each does to the danger the defendant created. An act brings a new force into the situation, one that may redirect events in ways the defendant never controlled. An omission brings nothing new: the hazard sits where the defendant left it, and the omission means only that no one removed it. Because the defendant's negligence remains the source of the danger when the harm arrives, a later omission seldom persuades a court that responsibility has moved elsewhere.
A subsequent omission, even a negligent one, usually does not break the chain of causation, and only occasionally does an omission do so.37 A driver who causes a collision remains liable for the victim's loss of blood or exposure to bad weather, even though someone else could have stopped to render aid before those consequences developed.38 The reasoning is structural. Each passing motorist is one more person who could have averted the harm, and if every such omission superseded, the wrongdoer's liability would shrink as the bystanders multiplied. The creator of a danger would benefit from the failure of others to clean up after it.
Cases apply that logic even when the person who failed to act owed the plaintiff a duty to act. In Wiley v. West Jersey R. Co., a defendant negligently set a grass fire burning toward the plaintiff's building, and another person's failure to put it out did not relieve the defendant, even though that person was obliged to extinguish the fire and would be liable to the plaintiff for not doing so.39 In Diehl v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co., Metropolitan negligently discharged steam onto the sidewalk in front of a building owned by Fidelity, where it condensed and froze into a coating of invisible ice. Fidelity had notice of the condition and a duty to clear it, yet did nothing, and a pedestrian slipped and was hurt. Fidelity's failure did not relieve Metropolitan, and both were held liable.40 The duty gave the pedestrian a second defendant to sue. It did not release the first, because the ice was still the product of Metropolitan's steam and Fidelity had done nothing to change it. Professional negligence follows the same rule: a lawyer who inadvertently omits a critical residuary clause from a will may be found to have proximately caused harm to the intended beneficiaries, even though the client reviewed the will before signing and had a chance to detect the omission.41
One narrow situation reverses the usual result, and it is built from the same idea read in the other direction. A defendant's danger remains the defendant's only while no one else has taken charge of it. When a third person discovers the danger and has a duty to act, or takes control of it, and then fails to deal with it, the intervening omission can be strong and independent enough to shift responsibility and exonerate the original wrongdoer.42 Two groups of cases show the shift. In the first, a defendant lets a dangerous object such as dynamite caps or a loaded gun reach a child, and a parent finds the danger and takes the object away but fails to keep the child from getting it again.43 In the second, a retailer learns that bottles marked kerosene actually contain dangerous amounts of gasoline and goes on selling them without any warning.44 In each, the original risk is still alive, but another person has taken control of it or knowingly kept it in circulation, so it is no longer simply the defendant's.45
Kimminau v. City of Hastings shows the shift on a modern road. A truck driver negligently spilled corn mash on a highway. A state trooper closed that stretch and called for help, and the fire department moved the mash off the traveled lanes into the shoulder and ditch. The driver was not asked to help, and after the cleanup the trooper cited the driver, sent the driver on the way, and reopened the road. The next day the plaintiff lost control of a car on the same stretch because of mash still on the road, and the court held the driver not liable, because control of the risk had passed to the fire department that did the cleanup and the trooper who reopened the road.46 A referring physician who misdiagnoses a child and sends the child to a specialist is in a similar position when the specialist's own malpractice causes the injury, unless the referring physician had reason to know the specialist was incompetent; Spicer v. Osunkoya, a Delaware case, treated responsibility as having passed to the specialist.47
Laid beside Diehl, Kimminau shows what carries the exception. In Diehl, knowledge and a duty to act yielded only a second defendant, because Fidelity did nothing that took the hazard out of Metropolitan's hands and the ice lay untouched. The officials in Kimminau undertook to handle the spill and then declared the road open by reopening it, which put the risk in their charge. The cases in which responsibility shifts therefore add something to knowledge: the third person took control of the danger or knowingly left it in circulation.
The usual mistake is to treat the existence of another responsible party as enough. A fact pattern that mentions a landlord, a city, or a coworker who should have fixed the hazard has supplied a second defendant, and the question for the first defendant is whether that person actually discovered the danger and took control of it. The point also connects to the later section on negligent third-party conduct. Section 302A makes an act or omission negligent if the actor should realize it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other or a third person.48 When the likelihood that others would fail to guard against the danger is part of what made the defendant careless, their failure falls within the risk and cannot supersede.
Wrongful Act Toward the Plaintiff
Section 442(e) asks whether the intervening force is due to a third person's act that is wrongful toward the plaintiff and as such subjects the third person to liability to the plaintiff.50 Two conditions travel together: the act must breach a duty owed to this plaintiff, and the plaintiff must therefore hold a claim against the actor. When both are present, the defendant has an appealing argument. The plaintiff has someone else to sue, so the loss belongs with the wrongdoer who acted last. The Restatement records that instinct as one weight among several, and standing alone it weighs very little, for reasons that follow from what an intervening wrongdoer usually is.
A third person whose tort combines with the defendant's negligence to produce one injury is a concurrent tortfeasor, one of two or more wrongdoers whose conduct together causes a single harm. Traditionally, courts held concurrent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's entire harm. Now they normally answer for a proportionate share under comparative fault and apportionment, though each may remain responsible for at least some portion of the damages.51 As one treatise observes in the product-defect setting, a third party whose tortious conduct joins with the defect to cause the injury is normally liable to the plaintiff anyway, so the “intervening cause” label is superfluous unless something else is added to the mix.52 The second wrongdoer's liability is present in nearly every case with a negligent intervening actor, so it cannot be what separates superseding forces from ordinary ones.
Treating that liability as decisive would also revive the last-wrongdoer rule. Early courts held that only the second actor's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm, partly on the premise that the first actor should not answer for the second actor's negligence. The rule disappeared long ago, but some residue of that premise still lingers in intervention cases.53
Freeing the manager would add nothing to the pedestrian's remedies. The claim against the operator already exists and apportionment already divides the loss, so excusing the manager would only shift to the pedestrian the risk that the operator cannot pay or cannot be found.
Derdiarian makes the same point on decided facts. A contractor failed to safeguard an excavation in a roadway, and a driver who had negligently failed to take medication lost control of his car and entered the work area. The driver was liable for his own negligence, and the court still refused to hold as a matter of law that his act superseded the contractor's. A prime hazard of an unprotected work site is that a driver will negligently enter it and injure someone, so the driver's negligence, or even recklessness, does not insulate the contractor.54 The steam-and-ice case from the preceding section runs the same way. Fidelity had notice of the ice and a duty to clear it, and would have been liable to the pedestrian for failing to do so, yet Metropolitan stayed liable and both were held answerable.55 An answer that stops at the observation that the other party is also liable has skipped the analysis, because that fact explains where the plaintiff may collect and says nothing about whether the defendant's responsibility ended.
The factor once did more work than it does now. Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & Railroad Co. is the standard gasoline illustration: a railroad negligently spilled gasoline in a street, and a third person's match set it off. An older rule treated an intervening cause consisting of a third party's intentional or criminal wrongdoing as superseding, although courts do not always follow it today.56 If the match was thrown deliberately, the older rule would have ended the railroad's liability, since the match thrower was fully answerable to the plaintiff. The modern rule looks instead to the scope of the risk. Where negligent conduct creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing it, the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor, except where a third person intentionally causes the harm and it falls outside the scope of the risk the actor created.57 Spilling a large quantity of gasoline is negligent because of the risk that it will ignite, so the defendant is not relieved when the ignition comes from the independent act of another.58 On that view the match thrower's liability matters little, and the question is whether ignition lies within the scope of the risk that made the spill careless.
The factor therefore earns real weight only in a narrow band of cases, those in which the third party's wrong places the whole responsibility on the wrongdoer. Ordinary negligence like the driver's in Derdiarian does not reach that band, since another person's carelessness is among the commonest ways a created risk comes to pass. What moves a case into the band is the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability, which § 442(f) takes up next, so the two considerations are best read together.59
Culpability of the Third Person
Section 442(f) completes the list with a measure of fault: the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force in motion.61 Culpability means blameworthiness, the seriousness of a person's departure from the conduct the law expects. The preceding consideration asked whether the third person's act exposed that person to liability to the plaintiff, and the answer is yes in nearly every case with a negligent intervenor, so it settles little. This consideration asks how wrongful the act was. The word degree points to a scale that runs from ordinary negligence at the bottom, through gross negligence and recklessness, to intentional and criminal conduct at the top. The higher the third person's conduct sits on that scale, the more it weighs toward treating the intervening force as superseding.
Ordinary negligence sits at the bottom and carries almost no weight, because it is among the commonest ways a created danger comes to pass. Usually, intervening causes that consist of a third party's negligence are regarded as foreseeable and therefore not superseding. The negligent driver who causes an automobile accident is liable not only for the victim's broken leg but also for the amputated leg resulting from the attending physician's negligence.62 The mechanism is foreseeability. Careless conduct is so common that a careful actor sizing up a situation must allow for the chance that others will be careless in dealing with it, and when that chance is part of the risk, the later negligence is foreseeable and the original defendant's responsibility survives it.
The weight grows higher on the scale, for two reasons that reinforce each other. The first concerns anticipation: subsequent intentional acts may cut off liability in some cases, though other intentional acts are entirely foreseeable.63 The second concerns responsibility. The more deliberate the third person's choice, the more naturally the harm is attributed to that person's free decision, and the less sensible it is to hold an earlier, merely careless actor accountable for failing to prevent it. In Cole v. German Savings & Loan Society, a building owner let a child trespasser inside, and the child maliciously ushered a visitor into an unguarded elevator shaft. The case is a standard example of a deliberate act that cut off the owner's liability, because hardly anyone would anticipate so twisted a prank.64
Culpability remains only a weight because of what it measures. It tracks foreseeability, and foreseeability is measured against the risk that made the defendant's conduct negligent. When that risk was the third person's wrongdoing, the blameworthiness of the wrongdoing cannot excuse the defendant, since the wrongdoing is the very thing the defendant should have guarded against. A landlord who leaves the lock on an apartment building's street door broken for weeks, in a neighborhood plagued by break-ins, is careless in large part because intruders are the risk. When an intruder enters and assaults a tenant, the intruder's criminal culpability does not relieve the landlord, because the crime is the hazard the repair would have prevented. The Restatement writes the same limit into its rules. An act or omission may be negligent if the actor should realize it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through a third person's conduct intended to cause harm, even though that conduct is criminal.65 And an intervening force relieves the actor only where a third person intentionally causes the harm and the harm falls outside the scope of the risk the actor's conduct created.66
Courts remain cautious about how far the risk reaches. An owner who negligently facilitates the theft of a car is generally held not liable to a victim of the thief's negligent driving unless the owner should have foreseen a greater than normal risk of such harm.67 An answer that labels the act criminal and stops has asserted a conclusion, because a high culpability score only opens the question whether the crime lay within the risk.