Concept
Intervening Forces Defined
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Intervening and Superseding Causes
Intervening Forces Defined
A defendant who acts negligently is rarely the last link before the plaintiff is hurt. Between the careless act and the injury, another driver may arrive, lightning may strike, a physician may treat the wound, or the plaintiff may make a choice. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives those later events a name: an intervening force is one that actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed.1
The definition sets two conditions. The force must begin to operate after the negligent act or omission, and it must itself be at work producing the harm rather than merely lying in the background. Ordinary legal usage describes the same event from the other side: an intervening cause comes between the initial event in a sequence and the end result, and it alters the natural course of events that might have connected a wrongful act to an injury.2
The definition covers more kinds of force than students expect. Suppose a defendant negligently maintains a rotten telephone pole. The danger the defendant created is that the pole will fall over of its own accord and injure a pedestrian. Instead, a negligent driver strikes the pole and knocks it onto the plaintiff. The driver's act came after the defendant's negligence and itself produced the harm, so it is an intervening force. Nature qualifies as well. When explosive gas is negligently allowed to accumulate in an oil barge and lightning ignites it, the lightning intervenes. In both illustrations the defendant is held liable, even though the intervening cause was unforeseeable, because the result fell within the foreseeable risk for which the defendant is responsible.3 High winds played the weather role in Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., where the defendant pointed to the wind after a roof section fell.
Later human conduct is not limited to strangers who happen by. Subsequent negligent medical care intervenes between the original wrong and the final harm; in Looney v. Davis the court treated such care as foreseeable and therefore not as a superseding cause of the injury.4 The plaintiff's own conduct can also be the intervening force. In Mesick v. State of New York the plaintiff swung from a rope tied to a tree branch out over a water hole and fell onto jagged rocks, and the court held that his conduct was not a superseding cause of his injuries.5
The timing condition does the sorting at the boundary. A force already operating when the defendant acted does not come 'after' the negligent act, so it falls outside the definition. It belongs to the setting in which the defendant acted, not to the later events that follow.
Sorting a force into the intervening category settles only where it falls in the sequence. It does not decide whether the defendant is excused. The category is broad because it asks only about timing and activity, while a superseding cause is the narrower group of intervening causes strong enough to relieve the wrongdoer of any liability.6 The examples above show the gap. The negligent driver and the lightning both intervened, yet the defendants stayed liable. Negligent medical care intervenes in Looney without superseding, while a different court concluded that a third person's failure to prevent harm originated by another's antecedent negligence was superseding.7 The sections that follow supply the test for telling the two apart.