Concept
The Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
The Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
A negligent actor pays for the whole injury even when the plaintiff's body was more fragile than anyone could have known. Section 461 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says so directly: the actor is liable although a physical condition of the other, neither known nor knowable to the actor, makes the injury greater than the actor, as a reasonable person, should have foreseen as a probable result of the conduct.1 Section 435(1) reaches the same place from the other side. An actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm remains liable even though the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen its extent.2 Courts compress the two provisions into a maxim, that the defendant takes the plaintiff as the defendant finds that plaintiff, and for physical injury every state follows it.3
The preceding subsections showed that detail beyond the defendant's foresight does not defeat liability. This section isolates the application of that idea that exams test most often: the victim whose body or mind is more fragile than the defendant could have known.
The Threshold the Plaintiff Must Cross
The rule operates only after the plaintiff crosses a threshold. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent toward this plaintiff and that the negligence caused some foreseeable injury. From that point the defendant answers for the full extent of the injury, including the part no reasonable person would have predicted.4
That structure explains why the rule sits comfortably beside Palsgraf. Plaintiff unforeseeability matters a great deal, while unforeseeability of the extent or manner of harm does not.5 A plaintiff outside the range of foreseeable risk cannot recover for negligence toward someone else. A foreseeable plaintiff with an unforeseeably frail body recovers for the whole result, because the thin-skull rule governs the extent of harm to a plaintiff who was already inside the risk. Tort liability tracks the foreseeable type or category of harm and leaves the exact amount of injury to the facts of the victim.6
How Courts Apply It
The decided examples cover a wide range of conditions. In Fuller v. Merten, a collision fractured the plaintiff's neck because osteoporosis had made her bones brittle and more susceptible to injury, and the rule made the defendant answerable for the fracture.7 The same reasoning carried liability for death from inflammation of the heart after a sprained ankle in Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co., and for loss of hair from fright in Ominsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co.8 In Thompson v. Lupone, the plaintiff's obesity stretched a normal two-week recovery into eight months, and the court said the defendants took her as they found her.9 The textbook version is the hemophiliac who dies from a wound that would be minor for almost anyone else, and the defendant is liable for the death.10
Damages follow the same logic. A plaintiff's lost income is measured by actual earnings even though the defendant had no reason to foresee a large income. A defendant who disables a day laborer and one who disables a senior executive for six months each pay the wages that person actually lost.11
Why the Rule Exists
Three reasons support the rule, and each answers a different objection to it. The first is administrative. If a foreseeable plaintiff could not recover for injury of unforeseeable severity, every plaintiff would have to prove what a normal amount of injury would have been. Almost everyone carries some weakness that could count as a thin skull, so juries would have to sort normal frailties from abnormal ones, probably with expert help, in case after case.12 The second is fairness between the parties. The defendant committed a wrong by risking foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did nothing wrong, and as between the two it is just that the wrongdoer carry the risk that the harm turned out larger than expected.13 The third is incentive. People vary enormously in how fragile they are, so an actor who can foresee injury to a class of plaintiffs knows, in a statistical sense, that some member of the class is frail, and liability for unforeseen severity can therefore still shape how carefully the actor behaves.14
Reconciling the Rule With Foreseeability
The rule fits awkwardly with the foreseeability test taught earlier, and seeing why sharpens an exam answer. It imposes liability for harm that was unforeseeable but direct, which is the territory of the direct-consequences test, and every jurisdiction uses directness for this purpose even where foreseeability governs everywhere else.15 The Third Restatement concedes that the rule is hard to reconcile with a foreseeability limit and defends it as administratively convenient, since it avoids an uncertain inquiry into whether the extent of harm was foreseeable.16
A tidier account assigns the two tests to different phases of the case. Foreseeability decides whether the defendant is liable for a foreseeable injury at all, and directness decides how much of the plaintiff's actual damage the defendant pays. The logic runs in both directions, because damages equal the harm that actually occurred, and a hardy plaintiff who is hurt less than expected recovers less. A rule that let only the defendant benefit from unforeseeable variation would favor one side.17
Fragile Bodies and Fragile Minds
Section 461 speaks of a physical condition, and a few courts have read it literally. The Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law in Munn v. Algee, said the rule reached only pre-existing physical conditions and declined to extend it to a plaintiff's religious beliefs, which had kept her from undergoing a blood transfusion.18 Most courts include the fragile psyche as well as the fragile skull. In Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., the Second Circuit, applying New York law, applied the rule to schizophrenia triggered by a car accident, and an English court observed that "there is no difference in principle between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality."19 The three reasons above carry over without change. A defendant cannot see a hidden psychological condition any better than a hidden skeletal one, and a jury would find it no easier to sort normal fragility from abnormal fragility in a psyche.
The Third Restatement states the rule for harm that is greater in magnitude or different in type than expected because of a preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristic of the person.20 Even under that wider wording the rule starts from conduct that was negligent toward this plaintiff and foreseeably caused some injury. It enlarges the consequences of that injury and leaves the class of plaintiffs where it was.
What the Rule Does Not Do
The rule decides how much the defendant owes and has no bearing on whether the defendant was negligent. Breach is judged by the ordinary person, because an actor can adjust behavior only to what a reasonable person could perceive, and a condition that is neither known nor knowable is invisible to that standard. The rule therefore belongs to proximate cause and leaves untouched the determination of reasonable care in a negligence case or of defect in a strict liability case.21 One federal court put it this way: "The tortfeasor's duty of care is measured by the ordinary person, but the plaintiff's injuries may not be."22
On an exam, reciting the rule is a mistake when the stem never establishes breach, because the hidden condition cannot supply the missing negligence.
The rule also stops at the plaintiff's own conduct. A negligent plaintiff either loses the claim or sees the award reduced under comparative fault, and even a blameless plaintiff must take reasonable steps after the injury to mitigate the loss.23 Neither doctrine yields to the maxim that the defendant takes the plaintiff as found. It is fairer for a plaintiff who contributed to the loss to bear that share than for the defendant to answer for it as though liability were strict.24
Claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress mark the other boundary. There the eggshell rule does not govern whether the distress is compensable at all, and an objective test applies instead. Unless the defendant actually knew of the plaintiff's special hypersensitivity, the defendant is liable only if persons of ordinary sensitivity could be expected to suffer serious distress from the event.25 The reason follows from the structure of the claim. In a physical injury case some injury already exists and the rule adjusts its size, whereas in this tort the serious distress is itself the injury that makes out the claim. The objective test supplies the assurance that the harm is genuine and keeps liability proportionate to the risk.26 The exception is narrow. The modern view lets a plaintiff recover for all the harm caused, even if it is worse because of a predisposition or special vulnerability, so long as the stimulus would have caused a reasonable person serious emotional distress.27