Concept
Limits on Contribution
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Limits on Contribution
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(1) gives a right of contribution to two or more persons who become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them, but the grant carries a qualification: it applies “except as stated in Subsections (2), (3) and (4).”1 Subsection (2) confines the right to a tortfeasor who has paid more than an equitable share, the assumption behind the earlier sections, and it returns below.2 Subsection (3) bars the tortfeasor who intentionally caused the harm.3 Subsection (4) removes contribution between two tortfeasors when one has a right of indemnity against the other, a limit that becomes clear once indemnity has been introduced.4
A contribution claim can fail on one of these limits after it has cleared every requirement from the earlier sections. The defendants may be liable to the same plaintiff for one indivisible harm, and one of them may have paid the entire judgment, yet no right arises. Each limit removes a different element of the claim. The intentional-tortfeasor bar disqualifies the claimant. The liability requirement disqualifies a contribution defendant who owed the plaintiff nothing. Several liability, by making each defendant pay only its own share, leaves no excess payment to reimburse. Because each of these limits defeats a claim that would otherwise succeed, a problem with several tortfeasors calls for checking all three before any share is computed.
Intentional Tortfeasors
Section 886A(3) states the first limit in a single sentence: there is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused the harm.5 Statutory language runs parallel. One formulation withholds contribution from a tortfeasor who “has intentionally . . . caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death,” and so reaches one who intentionally contributed to an injury as well as one who inflicted it alone.6 The general statement in the secondary literature is the same: intentional tortfeasors generally have no right to contribution.7
The bar sits on top of every requirement taught earlier. Two defendants may share liability for one harm, and one may have paid more than an equitable share, yet the claim fails when the payer intentionally caused the harm. The bar looks to the claimant’s own conduct, so a claimant whose fault was only carelessness remains within the general right of subsection (1).
The commentators’ case for contribution was framed around the unintentional wrongdoer. The early twentieth-century writers who attacked the no-contribution rule urged contribution at least when the claimant was not an intentional wrongdoer, because it is unfair to saddle the entire burden of a loss for which two are responsible upon one alone while the other goes scot free.8 A critic described the same unfairness as a rule that lets the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were “equally, unintentionally responsible,” fall on one of them according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, or the plaintiff’s whim, spite, or collusion with the other wrongdoer.9 Nash and Benchley, the two careless actors in the bicycle example, fit that description: Twain could sue either of them, and either could be made to pay the whole.10 The argument stopped short of the intentional wrongdoer, and the traditional rule that contribution is not permitted among intentional wrongdoers has persisted, with little inclination to change it. Many jurisdictions have codified it.11
The bar leaves the plaintiff’s position untouched. Joint and several liability is the norm for intentional joint tortfeasors, whatever scheme the jurisdiction uses for nonintentional torts, so the plaintiff may collect the whole judgment from whichever wrongdoer she chooses.12 What the bar changes is the aftermath: the wrongdoer from whom she happens to collect carries the entire loss.
Does the bar apply whenever an intentional wrong appears anywhere in the case? It does not, because subsection (3) speaks of the tortfeasor who is asking for the money. The bar runs against an intentional tortfeasor as claimant, and it gives no shelter to an intentional co-defendant who is sued for contribution by someone whose own fault was only negligence.
Because the sources describe the bar as the general rule and not as a universal one, a problem that states a different governing rule controls. A problem that states none should be answered under the bar.
Tortfeasors Without Liability
Section 886A(1) gives contribution to persons who have become “liable in tort to the same person for the same harm.”14 The earlier sections stressed same harm; here the weight falls on liable. A payer who satisfies the plaintiff also lifts the debt of every other person who owed the plaintiff for that harm, and contribution asks those persons to bear their share of the relief. If a defendant owed the plaintiff nothing, the payment relieved that defendant of nothing, and the payer has simply paid its own debt. The claim is therefore derivative: it succeeds only if the contribution defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the same harm.15
The Rogers litigation shows the consequence. Dunne, the only defendant Rogers sued, would be entitled to $21,000 from Thurber after paying the $42,000 judgment, but only if he proved that Thurber was also liable to Rogers for negligently causing the fire. Thurber had never been adjudged liable.16 Rogers’s choice to sue only Dunne neither frees Thurber nor helps Dunne. The right of contribution exists “even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them,”17 and a judgment against Dunne would not have barred a suit against Thurber while it remained unpaid.18 A complaint can likewise place two defendants in one case without making both of them liable: the plaintiffs in Bierczynski v. Rogers alleged concurrent negligence by two motorists said to have been racing, and an allegation of that kind is only the start of the inquiry into each driver’s liability.19
The cleanest case is a defendant who was simply not negligent. Such a defendant is not a tortfeasor at all, so no common liability exists for the payer to share, however much the payer paid.
A jurisdiction’s rule for comparing fault can also leave a defendant owing the plaintiff nothing. Under the “modified” form of comparative negligence, a plaintiff recovers only if her negligence either does not exceed or is less than the defendant’s, depending on the jurisdiction.20 Vary the Flite example: she is 20 percent at fault, her jurisdiction measures that fault against each defendant separately, and Murdstone is only 10 percent at fault. Flite recovers nothing from Murdstone. If a codefendant then pays Flite’s judgment and seeks contribution from Murdstone, the claim meets the same fact: Murdstone is not liable to Flite for the harm, so he shares no common liability with the payer. Most cases so hold, and in Horton v. Orbeth, Inc. (Minn. 1984) the court refused contribution on similar facts because there was no “common liability.”21 Otis Elevator Co. v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons (Me. 1983) goes the other way, allowing contribution from the less negligent tortfeasor on grounds of fairness even though the plaintiff could not recover.22 The majority position follows from the derivative character of the claim, and Otis shows what a court reaches when it treats contribution as a question of fairness between defendants.
An immunity shields a particular person from tort liability that would otherwise exist, even though that person’s conduct met every element of the tort. The usual holding is that a defense available only to the contribution defendant against the injured person, such as intrafamily immunity or a privilege, bars contribution.23 The reason follows from what an immunity decides. The law has said that this person should not pay damages for this injury, and if a codefendant could recover through contribution, the immune person would pay part of the plaintiff’s damages by an indirect route. The immunity would then yield whenever the plaintiff sued someone else.
Maritime cases show the same principle at work with statutory immunities. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., a shipowner sued by an injured longshoreman could not obtain contribution from the longshoreman’s employer, the stevedore, because a statute exempted the stevedore from negligence liability to its own employee. In California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, the court read the Jones Act as not permitting seamen employees to sue each other for negligence, and it concluded that “allowing employer indemnity suits against their employees would also defeat the purposes of the Jones Act.”24
The absence of a duty works the same way, because a person who owed the plaintiff no duty of care cannot be liable to the plaintiff for the harm. In Breen v. Law Office of Bruce A. Barket, P.C., a woman sued her own lawyers for malpractice in her divorce, and those lawyers sought contribution or indemnification from her former husband’s lawyer. The New York court rejected the claims because no theory gave the husband’s lawyer a duty of care to her or to her lawyers, so he was not a joint tortfeasor as to the harm her own lawyers caused. A New Jersey appellate court, by contrast, held that a contribution claim was validly stated against a lawyer who served as co-counsel, even though he was not admitted to practice in the state and had not been named as a defendant in the malpractice action.25 That the malpractice plaintiff never sued him did not defeat the claim, which fits the Rogers point that the right depends on liability and not on who was named.
Some authority departs from the immunity rule and allows contribution even though an immunity would have defeated the plaintiff’s own claim against the contribution defendant.26 Because jurisdictions divide, a problem that states the governing rule controls. A problem that does not is safest answered under the majority view, with the minority noted.
A defense that goes only to the plaintiff’s remedy does not carry over to the contribution claim. The expiration of the plaintiff’s limitations period against the contribution defendant is no defense to an action for contribution.27 The line between this defense and an immunity is whether the defense says the defendant never owed the plaintiff for this harm. An immunity or the absence of a duty says exactly that, so no common liability ever existed. A limitations period says only that the plaintiff waited too long to sue a defendant who was liable, so the common liability existed when the payer paid. A problem that mentions an expired limitations period for the plaintiff therefore leaves the payer’s claim intact unless some other defense applies.
Several Liability States
Section 886A(2) confines contribution to a tortfeasor who has paid more than an equitable share of the common liability, and it adds that no tortfeasor can be required to contribute beyond that share.29 Both limits assume that a defendant can be made to pay more than its share, which is exactly what joint and several liability allows. A jurisdiction that replaces it with several liability removes the assumption: each defendant answers to the plaintiff only for the percentage of damages that matches its own share of fault, so no defendant pays an excess, and contribution is neither necessary nor permitted.30
Pure joint and several liability shows what several liability removes. Each tortfeasor is liable for the entire harm, and the plaintiff may sue any of them, win judgment against as many as she can, and collect from one or any combination, though she is entitled to only one satisfaction.31 That freedom is the source of the unfairness contribution repairs: when collection falls unevenly, the defendant who pays more than a proportionate share may seek reimbursement from the others.32
Nell’s case shows the contrast in numbers. She was 20 percent at fault, Fagan 70 percent, and Twist 10 percent, and her adjusted damages are $80,000. Under joint and several liability each defendant owes her the whole $80,000, and the allocation between them waits for a second proceeding. Under several liability Fagan owes $70,000 (70/80ths) and Twist owes $10,000 (10/80ths); Nell recovers the same $80,000 if both pay, but each defendant is “severally” liable only for his own portion.33 Because neither defendant pays more than his portion, neither has anything to claim from the other. Proportional contribution, by comparison, keeps joint and several liability and changes only how the loss is reallocated once one tortfeasor has paid, so it still requires two steps: the plaintiff’s suit, then a second action or a motion for contribution.34 Several liability needs only the first.
The plaintiff absorbs part of the burden that disappears. In the Flite example from the discussion of comparative shares, a plaintiff in a several liability state must do the collecting from each defendant; she cannot collect the full judgment from one and leave him to seek contribution from the others. Because collecting judgments can be arduous and expensive in itself, this is a significant shift in the burden on the parties.35
A simple $100,000 case with two defendants shows how the risk moves. Suppose defendant A is 60 percent at fault and defendant B 40 percent. Joint and several liability makes each liable for the full $100,000, subject to one satisfaction, and if the plaintiff collects everything from A, A may call on B for contribution for the $40,000 B owes.36 Under several liability the plaintiff may call on A for $60,000 and on B for $40,000, and if either cannot pay, the plaintiff bears the uncompensated loss.37 The percentages do work in both systems, but different work. Under joint and several liability they fix who finally bears the loss after the plaintiff has been paid; under several liability they cap what she can collect from each defendant in the first place.
The Washington Supreme Court applied the same logic to a settlement in Kottler v. State of Washington. A passenger sued a driver and the driver’s employer and settled with both, and the settling defendants then sought contribution from the State on the theory that its negligent road maintenance had also contributed to the accident. Washington had limited joint and several liability by statute, and the liability that remained joint did not reach this situation. The settling defendants had therefore “settled in the eyes of the law only for their proportionate shares of total liability,” and absent joint and several liability they had “no claim for contribution under the statute.”38 They had paid for their own shares and nothing more, so there was no excess to shift. Tennessee’s Supreme Court reached a similar structure by decision when McIntyre v. Balentine adopted comparative fault and abolished joint and several liability.
Every liability system must place an uncollectible share somewhere. Joint and several liability places it on the other defendants, who can be made to pay the whole judgment and must then pursue the insolvent defendant for contribution. Several liability places it on the plaintiff. If Fagan cannot pay, Nell collects only Twist’s $10,000 of her $80,000 judgment, whereas under joint and several liability Twist would owe her the entire judgment although he was only 10 percent at fault.39 Reallocation systems split the difference. Take a case in which the plaintiff is 30 percent at fault, one defendant is 60 percent at fault and insolvent, and the other defendant is 10 percent at fault. American Motorcycle placed 70 percent of the loss on the 10 percent defendant. Evangelatos divides the insolvent defendant’s 60 percent between plaintiff and solvent defendant according to their responsibility, so the plaintiff recovers only 25 percent of her loss from the solvent defendant: his own 10 percent plus one-quarter (10 divided by 40) of the remaining 60 percent, or 15 percent.40
Most jurisdictions fall between the pure systems. With the advent of comparative fault, pure joint and several liability is now the minority rule, and about half of the jurisdictions use some hybrid of joint and several liability and several liability, in many variations.41 Under a threshold design, for example, a tortfeasor whose percentage of responsibility exceeds a specified figure is jointly and severally liable, while one below it is only severally liable, and the risk of an uncollectible share falls on the plaintiff as to the tortfeasors below the threshold.42 Contribution survives in a hybrid exactly as far as joint liability does, because contribution is needed wherever a defendant can be made to pay more than its share and nowhere else; Kottler shows the principle at work.43