Concept
The Right to Contribution
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
The Right to Contribution
The Restatement (Second) of Torts builds the right of contribution in two steps. Section 886A(1) creates it: when two or more persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, they have a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.1 Section 886A(2) then confines it. The right exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his equitable share of the common liability; his recovery is limited to the amount he paid beyond that share; and no tortfeasor can be required to contribute beyond his own equitable share.2
A contribution claim must clear two gates. The first asks whether the defendants share a common liability, meaning whether they answer to the same plaintiff for the same harm. The second asks whether the claimant has carried more than a fair part of that liability. A tortfeasor who has paid only its own share has no excess to shift, and shifting any of it would make another tortfeasor pay beyond that tortfeasor's own share, which the rule forbids.
Suppose Twain recovers a $20,000 judgment for an injury that Nash and Benchley both negligently caused, and Nash pays all of it. Both gates are open. The two tortfeasors share one liability, and Nash has paid $10,000 more than his pro rata half, so he may recover $10,000 from Benchley.3 The subsections below take the gates in turn and then turn to enforcement: what counts as a common liability for one harm, what it means to pay more than a share, and how a claimant collects, whether in the plaintiff's suit or in a later one.
Common Liability for One Harm
The first gate concerns the injury, not the lawsuit. Contribution reallocates a liability that the defendants share, so the opening question is whether they answer to the plaintiff for one harm or for several. When the answer is one, the right exists under § 886A(1) whether or not the plaintiff sued every defendant, and whether or not the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the one from whom reimbursement is sought.4
Independent wrongdoers can share a harm. Suppose a jury finds Joule and Edison both liable for Fermi's broken collar bone and sets her damages at $27,000. The court enters judgment against both for $27,000.5 Neither agreed with the other to do anything, and the collar bone cannot be assigned to one of them, so each is liable for the full amount, although Fermi may receive only one satisfaction.6 If Joule pays the judgment, he can look to Edison for the excess over his own share, which on equal shares is $13,500.7 Bierczynski v. Rogers shows the same pattern in litigation. The plaintiffs sued two teenage motorists, alleging that they were racing on a public highway and were concurrently negligent in violating speed statutes and other rules of the road and in failing to keep a proper lookout and control of their vehicles.8
Courts customarily call everyone liable to one plaintiff for the same harm a joint tortfeasor, even when each acted independently, and whether or not they were sued in the same action, or at all.9 The label is loose, because only their liability is potentially joint, and “concurrent tortfeasors” describes them more accurately.10 It should not be confused with the narrower case of true joint tortfeasors, who agree to engage in a course of tortious conduct. If Kelvin and Curie go looking for Marconi to beat him up and Curie breaks his jaw, both are liable to Marconi, even though Curie alone struck the blow.11 Concert of action is one way to make each actor answer for the whole. It is not a condition of contribution, which reaches independent actors like Joule and Edison as well.12
Nor must the acts be simultaneous. Successive acts of negligence by two or more tortfeasors generally make them co-tortfeasors under statutes calling for contribution.13 Suppose a physician negligently misdiagnoses a patient, a second physician later fails to catch the error, and the patient's condition worsens. When both physicians are liable for the worsened condition, they are co-tortfeasors for contribution purposes.
Contribution stops where the harm divides. Two hunters in separate parties negligently fire at the same moment; one wounds the plaintiff's arm and the other wounds his leg. Absent concert of action, each is liable only for the harm traceable to him, and the question is essentially one of proof of causation.14 Because each wound can be assigned to one shooter, neither hunter pays more than the harm he caused, no common liability exists, and nothing remains to reallocate. Fermi's single collar bone, by contrast, cannot be split between Joule and Edison, and that difference is what opens the right.
Because the right follows the injury, it does not depend on whom the plaintiff chose to sue. Where joint and several liability applies, the plaintiff may collect a judgment from any one defendant, or from several in any proportion, so the defendant who ends up paying more than a fair share may owe that fate to the luck of the collection process. Contribution corrects that result. Until recently the general rule denied contribution altogether, but judicial decisions and statutes, many patterned on the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, have largely overthrown it.15 Suppose Rogers wins a $42,000 judgment against Dunne and Thurber for a fire, and Thurber pays all of it. White also negligently contributed to the fire, but Rogers never sued him. White is still a tortfeasor liable for the same harm, so he is counted when pro rata shares are computed: three shares of $14,000 each, rather than the $21,000 halves that two tortfeasors would produce.16 Thurber may therefore claim $14,000 from Dunne and $14,000 from White, but he must prove White's negligence in the contribution action, because no court has adjudged White liable for the fire.17
Paying More Than Your Share
Section 886A(2) gives the right an owner and a size. It belongs only to a tortfeasor who has discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than that tortfeasor's equitable share of the common liability; the recovery is limited to the amount paid in excess of that share; and no tortfeasor can be required to contribute beyond its own share.19 Four limits follow. The claimant must have paid, the Restatement asks that the payment discharge the whole claim, the recovery is capped at the excess, and no one pays another's share.
Contribution reimburses a burden actually carried, and an unpaid judgment moves no money. Take Rogers's $42,000 judgment against Dunne for a fire that Thurber also negligently helped cause. Until Dunne pays, he has been held liable but has paid nothing, and he has nothing to recover. Once he pays the $42,000, he has a right to pro rata contribution of $21,000 from Thurber, provided he proves in the contribution action that Thurber was also liable to Rogers. Rogers sued only Dunne, so no court has adjudged Thurber liable for the fire.20
The Restatement adds that the payment must discharge the entire claim. If Dunne pays only $34,000 of the $42,000 judgment, $8,000 of Rogers's claim remains open, and by the Restatement's wording Dunne has not yet discharged the entire claim and cannot yet claim contribution. A rule that asks only whether the claimant has paid more than a pro rata share would let him proceed at once, so the first step in any problem is to identify which formulation governs.
Under either formulation, the recovery is capped at the excess over the claimant's own share, and the excess is not half of whatever the claimant paid. Dunne's pro rata share of $42,000 is $21,000.21 If he paid $34,000 under a rule that lets him proceed, he recovers $13,000, the amount above his share.22 Half of his payment, $17,000, would leave Thurber paying $17,000 to Dunne and still owing Rogers the unpaid $8,000. Thurber would then pay $25,000 in all, which is $4,000 more than his own share, and Dunne would bear only $17,000, which is $4,000 less than his. The cap exists to leave each tortfeasor bearing exactly its own share. With the $13,000 recovery, Dunne bears $21,000, and Thurber bears $13,000 to Dunne plus $8,000 to Rogers, which is also $21,000. The same arithmetic holds when shares are unequal. If damages are $100,000, A's share is $60,000 and B's is $40,000, and A pays the whole judgment, A may call on B for the $40,000 that B owes.23
The rule's last sentence caps what any one contribution defendant owes. Nash pays Twain's $20,000 judgment, and four tortfeasors share the liability equally, so each share is $5,000. Nash may recover only $5,000 from Benchley, because Section 1(b) of the Uniform Act limits each tortfeasor's liability for contribution to his pro rata share, and he must pursue the other two tortfeasors for theirs. If all three pay, Nash collects $15,000 and bears his own $5,000.24 With only two tortfeasors, the same judgment would yield $10,000 from Benchley. The cap on the claimant's total recovery and the cap on each defendant's liability thus work together.
None of this reduces what the plaintiff can demand. Where joint and several liability applies, the plaintiff may collect a judgment from any one tortfeasor, or from several in any proportion, and contribution is only an after-the-fact reimbursement of whoever paid too much.25 Dunne may pay Rogers $42,000 and seek $21,000 from Thurber, but he may not pay $21,000 and force Rogers to chase Thurber for the balance. That would convert joint and several liability into several liability, and the very purpose of joint and several liability is to assure the plaintiff of collecting in full from any one tortfeasor.26 The payer carries the plaintiff's whole claim first and sorts out shares afterward.
Enforcing the Right
Section 886A(1) gives a tortfeasor a right of contribution even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of the tortfeasors, and that clause leaves the claimant with procedural choices.28 The plaintiff alone decides whom to sue, so a defendant who believes someone else shares the blame has two ways to put that person in play: implead the co-tortfeasor in the plaintiff's suit, or sue separately after paying. Local procedure determines which routes a given jurisdiction offers, so confirm it before choosing. This subsection takes up each route, then what the claimant must prove, and then how long the claimant has to act.
Impleader is the more economical route. Federal Rule 14(a)(1) lets a defendant such as Wellington bring in a nonparty such as Robespierre who may be liable to the defendant for part of any damages the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff, Napoleon.29 Suppose Nash, sued by Twain, impleads Benchley. One trial then decides whether Nash and Benchley are each liable for Twain's injury, which spares the parties a second round of proof. If both are found liable and Nash pays the judgment, he remains fully liable to Twain under joint and several liability, and he then moves in the original suit for contribution from Benchley, which Section 3(b) of the Uniform Act authorizes by motion upon notice to all parties.30 Impleader settles liability but not payment, so the requirement that the claimant pay more than its share still applies before the motion.
A separate action serves the claimant who did not, or could not, implead. After paying, the claimant files a new suit in which the payer is the plaintiff, the co-tortfeasor is the defendant, and the claim is for the co-tortfeasor's pro rata share of what the payer paid.31 The Uniform Act authorizes that suit whether or not judgment was entered in the original case.32
Whichever route is taken, the claimant must prove the contribution defendant's liability to the plaintiff when no court has already decided it. Suppose Nash paid Twain's $20,000 judgment in a suit that never included Benchley. No one has determined that Benchley is liable to Twain, so Nash cannot simply demand $10,000. He must allege and prove that Benchley's negligence also caused Twain's injury, along with the other requirements: that Twain sued him and held him liable for the same injury, that he paid more than his pro rata share, and that he is entitled to pro rata contribution.33 Contribution rests on the co-tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff, so a claimant with no judgment establishing that liability must establish it himself. Impleader largely removes the burden, because the original trial answers the question, and where a judgment is entered against several defendants, the Uniform Act makes it binding among them in fixing their rights to contribution.34
A contribution claim also runs on a clock of its own, and the Uniform Act supplies one example of such a period. A claimant against whom judgment was entered must begin a separate contribution action within one year after the judgment becomes final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.35 Where no judgment was entered against the claimant, the Act bars the claim unless the claimant paid the common liability within the limitations period that applied to the plaintiff's action against him and sued within one year after payment. The same result follows if, while an action was pending against him, he agreed to discharge the liability, paid within one year after the agreement, and sued within that year.36 Because the contribution period begins with the claimant's own loss, it can outlast the plaintiff's direct claim. Suppose Allen sues only Porter, and Porter loses and pays. Porter may sue Simon for contribution within one year after losing to Allen, even long after Allen herself could still have sued Simon directly. The rule is necessary because otherwise a plaintiff could defeat a tortfeasor's right to contribution simply by deciding whom to sue and when.37
The same clock binds a claimant who lets it run.
The other driver's liability to the plaintiff could have been proven, and the payment was real, yet the claim fails because the contribution period expired. Two periods therefore run in a multi-defendant case, the plaintiff's period for the direct claim and the claimant's period for contribution, and each is measured on its own terms.