Concept
Settlement and Contribution
Effect of judgment, release, and satisfaction on other tortfeasors
Settlement and Contribution
Joint and several liability lets a plaintiff collect a judgment from one defendant or from any combination of them, so long as total collections stay within the damages.1 A defendant who pays more than its share then looks to the others for contribution, which in most jurisdictions allocates the loss among them by degree of fault once a judgment has been paid.2 Settlement before judgment complicates that picture, because cases and statutes divide on whether the defendants who stay in the case may seek contribution from the one who settled.3 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which the examples below assume together with joint and several liability, answers with two provisions that close the settlor's books.4
The first provision shields the settlor. A release or covenant discharges the tortfeasor who receives it from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.5 That is the rule of § 4 of the 1955 Act, on which the Massachusetts statute is based and which Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23, comment i (2000), endorses; it protects a settlement made in good faith.6 The second provision keeps the settlor from reaching back. Under § 1(d), a tortfeasor who settles with the claimant cannot recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability the settlement did not extinguish.7 A settlor who buys only its own release is therefore neither exposed to the defendants who stay in the case nor able to reach them.
Suppose Twain, the plaintiff, settles with Nash for $16,000 and gives Nash a release of his liability. The jury in Twain's suit against Benchley later assesses Twain's damages at $20,000. Benchley receives a dollar credit for Nash's settlement under § 4(a) and pays Twain only $4,000. Nash has paid $6,000 more than half of the verdict, yet § 1(d) denies him contribution from Benchley, whose liability the release left standing.8 Nash may still count himself ahead. He saved the expense of trial and avoided the risk that the jury would award, say, $100,000. Had that happened, he would have paid at least $50,000, and the whole $100,000 if Benchley were insolvent.9
The Dunne example shows why the shield works as a settlement device: it gives the settling defendant finality. A tortfeasor who pays a settlement in a shielding jurisdiction is sure that its exposure to liability is extinguished.10 The nonsettling defendant bears the cost of that certainty. A defendant who persuades the plaintiff to take less than half of the likely damages avoids paying his full share, and the others cannot make him pay more.11 Many states accept the trade even though denying contribution from the settlor may leave an allocation of liability disproportionate to fault.12
Because the shield protects a settlement made in good faith, a nonsettling defendant who wants contribution from the settlor must challenge that good faith. Courts divide on what the inquiry covers: some ask only whether the parties colluded, and others also ask whether the amount was adequate.13 A low price alone seldom carries the challenge. Parties value claims differently for subjective reasons, such as the risk that the settlor's negligence cannot be proved at trial or the effect of having a sympathetic defendant before the court, so a court is unlikely to find bad faith merely because the settlor paid less than its pro rata share.14
Not every jurisdiction shields the settlor. The 1939 Uniform Act, § 4, lets a nonsettling defendant seek contribution from the settling one, a position that discourages settlement because the settlor cannot be sure its payment ends its exposure.15 Lavoie v. Celotex Corp., a Maine decision, states the competing concern: encouraging settlement matters, but not to the detriment of nonsettling defendants.16 Where no shield exists, a settlement may include the plaintiff's agreement to indemnify the settling defendant if the other potential defendants seek contribution.17
Federal maritime law protects the settlor in much the same way. In Reliable Transfer the Supreme Court endorsed a contribution shortcut under which a settling tortfeasor cannot seek contribution from a nonsettling one, and settling defendants are off the hook.18 AmClyde reiterated joint and several liability, so a nonsettling defendant pays only its proportionate share but still bears the risk of an insolvent or uncollectable co-tortfeasor.19 That risk is a strong reason for every defendant to settle.