Concept
Suing Multiple Tortfeasors
Effect of judgment, release, and satisfaction on other tortfeasors
Judgment, Release, and Satisfaction
Suing Multiple Tortfeasors
When two wrongdoers injure the same plaintiff, the plaintiff has one injury worth one sum of money, however many people helped cause it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 882 turns that fact into a procedural rule: if each of two or more persons is subject to liability for the full amount of damages allowed for a single harm resulting from their tortious conduct, the injured person can properly maintain a single action against one, some, or all of them.1 The plaintiff holds several routes to payment for a single loss and chooses which to take.
The rest of this chapter asks what happens to the claim against one tortfeasor when something happens with another: a judgment, a release, a payment. Each answer rests on the same two commitments. The plaintiff may pursue everyone liable for the harm, and the plaintiff may be made whole only once. Two procedural questions come first: whom the plaintiff may sue when several people are liable for the same harm, and what a court may do when the defendants joined in one action come out differently.
One Action, Several Defendants
Section 882 sets two conditions. The harm must be a single one, and each defendant must owe the full amount of it rather than a share.2 When both hold, the plaintiff has several complete claims for one loss and decides which to bring and whether to bring them together.
Each tortfeasor owes the whole sum because of how tort law treats causation. If the negligence of each of two actors was a but-for cause of a fire, each caused the plaintiff’s entire loss, and each is liable for all of it.3 Nothing in that reasoning requires the actors to have cooperated. A passenger hurt when two negligently driven cars collide, with each driver’s negligence a but-for cause of the crash, has been injured by two independent actors, and each answers for the whole. Courts call such defendants joint tortfeasors. The label means that each is liable for the full amount of the damages and may be sued either alone or alongside the others.4
Concert of action reaches the same result by a different route. In the highway-racing case Bierczynski v. Rogers, the court reasoned that all parties engaged in a motor vehicle race on the highway are wrongdoers acting in concert, and that each participant is liable for harm to a third person arising from the other’s tortious conduct, because he has induced and encouraged the tort.5 Concert once governed procedure as well. Under older rules, defendants could be joined in a single tort action only if they had acted in concert, either by each committing a tortious act under a common plan or by one answering for another’s act through conspiracy or joint enterprise.6 Today a plaintiff commonly sues independent tortfeasors together, and § 882 states the rule that permits it.
Because every defendant owes the whole, the plaintiff’s choice of targets does not change what any one of them owes. Under pure joint and several liability, the plaintiff ordinarily may sue any one of the tortfeasors, some, or all, obtain a judgment for the full damages against as many as the plaintiff can reach, and collect from one or any combination, as the plaintiff chooses.7 With three liable defendants and $100,000 in damages, the plaintiff gets a $100,000 judgment against each. Collection stops at $100,000 in all, because no plaintiff is entitled to more than one satisfaction, but an unsatisfied judgment against one defendant does not bar a later action against another.8
A defendant who thinks someone else belongs in the case cannot make the plaintiff sue that person, but the defendant can bring the person in through third-party practice under Rule 14. The plaintiff may then assert against the new party any claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, at any reasonable time, by amending the complaint or serving a new pleading.9 Apportioning the loss among the wrongdoers is their business and not the plaintiff’s. Fairness dictates that the “wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress,” while “[t]he wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment.”10
The same principle assigns the risk that a defendant cannot pay. If a co-defendant is insolvent, immune, or beyond the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff still collects the entire judgment, and the consequences fall on the remaining defendants.11 Take a plaintiff with $27,000 in damages and two liable defendants, one of them insolvent. If each defendant were liable for only half, the plaintiff would collect $13,500 from the solvent defendant and nothing from the other. Under joint and several liability, the solvent defendant pays all $27,000 and bears the risk of the other’s insolvency.12
Many states have narrowed this rule. A minority of jurisdictions (eight at this writing) still recognize joint and several liability in its original form. About 16 states have adopted several liability, some with exceptions, so that each defendant pays only its proportional share of the fault. Most states use hybrid systems whose terms vary too widely for one description.13 Comparative fault drove much of the change, because a negligent plaintiff can now recover damages. The traditional rule remains the baseline that the Restatement sections in this unit assume, and the variations return when this chapter measures credits.
The rule rests on a premise that can fail: each defendant must have caused the whole of one indivisible harm. Suppose two hunters in separate hunting parties each negligently fire at the same time, one wounding the plaintiff’s arm and the other the plaintiff’s leg. Absent concert of action, each hunter answers only for the harm traceable to that hunter.14 The case is essentially a problem of proof of causation. Ranking the defendants’ fault does not make a divisible harm out of an indivisible one: that it may be possible to put a percentage on one negligent defendant’s culpability compared with another’s does not show that each defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury.15
Judgment for One, Against Another
Section 883 answers the question that arises when defendants joined for the same harm come out differently. Judgment can properly be entered against one and in favor of the other, except when the judgment is entered after trial on the merits and the liability of one cannot exist without the liability of the other.18 The section states a default and one exception. The exception requires both a trial on the merits and a dependency between the defendants’ liabilities, so it reaches a narrow class of cases, chiefly those in which one defendant answers for another’s tort.
The default follows from § 882. Joining two defendants puts them in one lawsuit, but each owes the whole harm only if the plaintiff proves that defendant’s own tortious conduct. A jury may credit the evidence against one defendant and doubt the evidence against the other, and a rule that forced one result on both would let a weak case against one sink a strong case against the other.
The exception covers defendants whose liabilities are linked. The standard example is an employer sued under respondeat superior, a liability described as derivative in nature because it grows out of the employee’s wrong.19 When a jury decides after a full trial that the employee committed no tort, the wrong the employer would be paying for never happened, and a judgment against the employer would contradict the verdict. Section 883 bars that inconsistent result.20 Agency law arrives at the same place: a prior judgment in favor of either the principal or the agent bars a later action against the other, unless the judgment is the result of a personal defense.21 The requirement of a trial on the merits confines the exception to judgments that actually decide whether the underlying wrong occurred.
Does the employer escape whenever the employee does? It depends on why the employee won. In Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., an employee driving on his employer’s business injured his wife. Intra-family tort immunity protected the employee, and when the wife sued the employer, the employer argued that the employee’s immunity gave it a defense because respondeat superior liability is derivative. The court rejected the defense, stating that the employer “is not exonerated when the [employee] has . . . escaped liability upon grounds not inconsistent with the commission of a wrong unreleased and unrequited.”22 Immunity excuses a particular person from being held to account and says nothing about whether the driver was careful. The wrong still exists, so the employer’s liability still has something to attach to. A merits finding of no negligence denies the wrong itself. That difference, between denying the tort and excusing the tortfeasor, separates the delivery company in the hypothetical from the employer in Schubert.
The same line of authority answers an objection based on indemnity. Indemnity does not rest on subrogation to the victim’s claim; it rests on breach of an independent duty owed to the employer, and if the principles of immunity and indemnity collided, intrafamily immunity would give way as an anomalous exception to the responsibility to act with due care.23
Joint obligations in contract once ran the other way. At common law only a joint judgment could be entered against joint obligors, so a plaintiff who lost to one lost to all, and many statutes now provide that a judgment against one joint promisor does not bar an action against the others.24