Concept
Concert of Action
Joint and several liability versus apportionment of harm to causes
Concert of Action
Defendants who set out together to commit a tortious act are each liable for everything that act produces. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 states the rule: two or more persons who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, further it by cooperation or request, lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify or adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the resulting tort.1 Each participant can be sued together with the others for the plaintiff's whole loss, each is individually liable for the full amount of the damages, and the plaintiff may collect up to that amount from any one of them or any group of them.2
Kelvin and Curie go looking for Marconi, planning to beat him up. They find him, and Curie breaks his jaw. Kelvin never lands a blow, yet both are liable to Marconi, because Kelvin encouraged and participated in the common scheme to injure him.3 Tort law has traditionally held, and still holds, actors engaged in joint conduct liable for the acts of either, much as conspirators are criminally responsible for the acts of other conspirators.4
Concert changes the question a court asks. For independent actors, the question is what each defendant caused. Take two hunters in separate hunting parties who negligently fire at the same moment, one wounding the plaintiff's arm and the other his leg. Absent concert, each is liable only for the harm traceable to him, and the dispute is essentially one of proof of causation.5 Once defendants act in concert, the question becomes what each did to further the plan, and the answer carries liability for the whole tort.
Smithson v. Garth shows the consequence. Three defendants, acting in concert, set upon the plaintiff. One held him, which was false imprisonment; another battered him; the third stole his silver buttons. All three were held liable for the entire damages.6 Had the three been strangers whose acts happened to coincide, each would have answered, like the hunters, only for the harm traceable to his own act. Concert removed that limit.
Two drivers who agree to race on a public highway are both jointly and severally liable if one of them injures the driver of a third car.7 Bierczynski v. Rogers gives the reason: all parties engaged in a motor vehicle race on the highway are wrongdoers acting in concert, and each participant is liable for harm to a third person arising from the tortious conduct of the other, because he has induced and encouraged the tort.8 Two points follow. The racer whose car never touched the third driver is liable anyway, because his liability rests on his own encouragement of the other's driving, not on contact. And the racers' design was a race, not an injury, yet the rule still reaches the injury that results.
A participant need not strike a blow, because encouragement and assistance suffice. In Thompson v. Johnson, the assailant's brother took no part in the attack but encouraged him to carry it out and prevented the plaintiff's wife from trying to help him.9 Encouragement is one of the forms of participation the rule names, and blocking the plaintiff's would-be helper lends aid to the wrongdoer, so the brother is liable for the attack.
Presence alone does not make an observer a participant. Had the brother merely stood by and approved, doing nothing active, he would not be liable as if he had joined in.10 Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N.W. 539 (1883), draws the line: all who encouraged or incited the assailant would be liable, but not those merely present.11 The line tracks the verbs of the rule. Liability attaches to those who take part, cooperate, request, aid, or encourage, and silent approval is none of these.
The shared plan must itself be a plan to commit a tortious act. Suppose Whiting and Hahn agree that Whiting will cut the power at a junction box before Hahn begins wiring, Whiting forgets, and a worker is hurt. They agreed on how to divide ordinary work, and nothing in that agreement planned a tort. Hahn, who acted carefully, took no part in a tortious design under the rule.12 The racing drivers differ because their common design was itself the tortious conduct.
Concert is not the only way a defendant who struck no blow ends up liable for another's tort. Liability can also rest on a relationship between the parties. Joint and several liability arises in a second situation when defendants fail to perform a common duty to the plaintiff, a category that includes the liability of a master for a servant's acts, of an employer for an employee's, and of a seller for a defect in a product made by someone else.13 Employer and employee are jointly and severally liable, the employee directly for personal tortious conduct and the employer vicariously, and the plaintiff may sue either or both.14 What separates these cases from concert is the basis of liability: a relationship in one, a shared plan in the other.
Reform statutes that abolish or limit joint and several liability are aimed at the more common case of independent actors whose conduct combines. There, each tortfeasor owes only his comparative fault share of an indivisible injury, so the plaintiff's recovery turns directly on how many actors' fault can be counted.15 Concert is a different and older rule, and the rule that actors in a joint course of conduct answer for the acts of either is one that tort law still holds.16 The casebook pairs these principles with Navarrete v. Meyer, on concert where the shared conduct is negligent, and Woods v. Cole, on concert after a statute has limited joint and several liability. Later sections take up reform and release in detail. On release, the common law rule barred a plaintiff who released one party from suing any other party on the same claim.17