Concept
Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability versus apportionment of harm to causes
Joint Liability and Apportionment
Joint and Several Liability
Some injuries cannot be divided among their causes. For any harm that is neither distinct nor reasonably divisible, the Restatement (Second) of Torts says, damages cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.1 Someone must still pay the whole loss, and the traditional answer is joint and several liability. “Joint” means that the tortfeasors can be sued together for the plaintiff’s loss. “Several” means that each is also individually liable for the full amount.2 The plaintiff may collect from any one of them, or from any group of them, up to her full damages.
The rule attaches when several tortfeasors contribute to one indivisible injury. Fermi, a passenger in Joule’s car, breaks her collar bone when the car collides with a truck driven by Edison, and both drivers were negligent.3 Joule and Edison did not act together, probably did not know each other, and may not have known of the other’s presence. Each driver’s negligence was nonetheless a but-for cause of the one injury, so the law does not treat either as the cause of half of it: “if two people kill a third, it is not the case that each has half-killed him.”4
Courts call defendants in this position joint tortfeasors, but “joint” describes the injury, not the defendants’ conduct. The drivers acted separately and without agreement. What is joint is the single, indivisible injury, to which each contributed and for which each is fully liable.5 Because only the liability is shared, the label applies whether or not the defendants are sued in the same action, or sued at all, and “concurrent tortfeasors” would be the more accurate term.6 Whiting’s failure to cut off the power and Shattuck’s swing of a ladder into a junction box show the pattern. Their separate negligent acts concurred to cause one fire and one indivisible harm to Pringle, and both are liable to her.7 Defendants who act in concert reach full liability by a different route, covered in the concert-of-action section below.
Once the rule attaches, the judgment runs against each defendant for the full amount, and the plaintiff decides whom to collect from. If the jury sets Fermi’s damages at $27,000, the court enters a $27,000 judgment against Joule and a $27,000 judgment against Edison.8 Fermi could instead have sued only one of them, and that defendant could not, over her objection, compel the joinder of the other.9 She is entitled to only one satisfaction, but an unsatisfied judgment against one defendant does not bar a later action against another. With three defendants and $100,000 in damages, the plaintiff holds three $100,000 judgments and may collect from one defendant or from any combination of them in any amounts, so long as her total collections do not exceed $100,000.10
The early rule gave the defendant who paid no recourse. In Merryweather v. Nixan (K.B. 1799), the first common law case to endorse joint liability, the headnote announced that when a plaintiff recovers in tort against two defendants and levies the whole damages on one, that one cannot recover a moiety from the other for contribution.11 Most states have since created a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, by statute or by decision, and many of the statutes follow the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955.12 A defendant who pays the whole $100,000 judgment can now seek the other defendant’s share from that defendant. The plaintiff’s freedom to choose therefore need not leave one defendant with the entire loss for good.
Two justifications support the rule, one causal and one practical. The causal justification is that a second tortfeasor’s presence reduces neither fault nor harm. Suppose A and B separately set fire to a house, and either fire alone would have burned it down. Neither one’s fault or causal impact is any less because the other also acted, and no logic suggests why the second arsonist should hand the first a windfall.13 The practical justification allocates the risk of a missing defendant. Even if a co-defendant is insolvent, immune, or beyond the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff collects her entire judgment. The risk of that inability to pay falls on the remaining co-defendants, not on the plaintiff.14 A plaintiff holding a $60,000 judgment against two such defendants could therefore collect all of it from either one, though once it is satisfied she has no further rights against either.15
A harm that the evidence can divide falls outside the rule. Suppose the experts agree that the negligence of both Joshua and Jessica combined to contribute to Alyssa’s broken hip. Traditionally, Joshua and Jessica are jointly and severally liable for that one injury. But if Joshua’s car struck Alyssa’s right arm at the same time that Jessica’s car struck her left leg, the injury is not indivisible. Joshua then answers only for the damages to the arm, and Jessica only for the damages to the leg.16 The negligence is the same in both versions. The structure of the injury decides the outcome.
The traditional rule no longer governs everywhere. A minority of jurisdictions, eight at this writing, still recognize joint and several liability in its original form. Most states have treated comparative fault, which lets a negligent plaintiff recover, as a policy change that justifies a different rule. About sixteen have adopted several liability, some with exceptions, so that each defendant pays only its proportional share of the fault, and most states use hybrid systems whose terms vary too widely for simple description.17 Where a state has abolished or partly abolished joint and several liability, each tortfeasor is liable for its comparative fault share of an indivisible injury, so the plaintiff’s recovery depends on how many actors’ fault can be counted.18 Every multiple-tortfeasor problem therefore begins with one question: can the harm be divided among its causes, or must each cause answer for all of it? Divisible harm is apportioned. Indivisible harm triggers the full-liability rule, subject to whatever reform the jurisdiction has adopted.