Concept
Joint and Several Liability in Practice
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Joint and Several Liability in Practice
Each of two or more tortfeasors whose tortious conduct legally causes an indivisible harm is subject to liability for the entire harm, whether their conduct was concurring or consecutive.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 879 states that rule, and in practice it decides whom the plaintiff may sue, what each judgment says, and who absorbs the loss when a defendant cannot pay. Under pure joint and several liability, as Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 10 describes it, the plaintiff ordinarily may sue any one tortfeasor, some of them, or all of them, jointly or separately, take judgments for the full damages against as many as can be reached, and collect from one defendant or from any combination.2 The name describes both halves of the rule: the tortfeasors may be sued together for the plaintiff's whole loss ("joint"), and each is individually liable for all of it ("several").3 Later sections take up the jurisdictions that have cut the rule back. Legislative limits on damages, some of which have been struck down under state constitutions, are a related development.4
The plaintiff decides whom to sue. The initial pleader has the first say in structuring a lawsuit, and within the law's inner and outer limits on that choice, the pleader decides whom to join.5 Suppose Thatcher is a passenger in Bell's car when Marconi's car strikes it. The jury finds both drivers negligent and fixes Thatcher's damages at $60,000. If Thatcher sues only Marconi, he owes the full $60,000. His negligence was a but-for cause of her entire loss, and the fact that Bell's negligence also contributed does not reduce what he owes.6 Marconi cannot, over Thatcher's objection, compel the joinder of Bell.7 His recourse is to pursue Bell himself, through contribution or indemnity, which later sections develop.
Because the choice of defendants belongs to the plaintiff, the whole judgment can land on whichever defendant the plaintiff selects, and that defendant must then look to the others for relief.8 Contribution is the device that redistributes the burden afterward, so the plaintiff need not sort out the defendants' shares before collecting.
A judgment and a satisfaction are different events. A judgment fixes what a defendant owes, and the plaintiff may hold judgments against several tortfeasors. A satisfaction is what the plaintiff actually collects, and the plaintiff may collect from any one tortfeasor or any group of them up to the full damages the trier of fact found.9 The plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfaction. If three defendants are all found liable and the plaintiff's damages are $100,000, the plaintiff receives a $100,000 judgment against each and may collect from any of them in whatever amounts the plaintiff likes, so long as total collections do not exceed $100,000.10 Once Thatcher has collected $60,000 from Marconi, she cannot collect more from Bell, because no plaintiff may collect more than the assessed damages.11
A judgment against one tortfeasor does not, by itself, end the plaintiff's claim against the others. The earliest cases treated a judgment like a release of all tortfeasors, so that a judgment on the tort claim extinguished the underlying cause of action. The later common law rule is that a judgment against one tortfeasor bars suit against another only if the first judgment has been satisfied. The plaintiff may still sue the second tortfeasor and obtain a second judgment, but may not collect more than the assessed damages.12 A uniform act codifies the later rule in § 3(e), which allows a plaintiff holding a judgment against one tortfeasor to sue the others until the claim is fully satisfied.13
The rule matters most when a defendant cannot pay. If one co-defendant is insolvent, immune, or beyond the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff may still collect the entire judgment from the others. The risk of that co-defendant's inability to pay falls on the remaining defendants, not on the plaintiff.14 Suppose Edison and Joule negligently injure Fermi, and the jury fixes his damages at $27,000. If Edison is insolvent, Joule must still pay the full $27,000. Were each only "severally" liable for half, Fermi would collect $13,500 from Joule and nothing from Edison, and Fermi would bear the shortfall. Joint and several liability instead puts Edison's insolvency on Joule and gives the plaintiff twice the chance of full compensation.15
The rule is harshest when the unreachable defendant is the one the jury blamed most. In Walt Disney World v. Wood, a bumper-car rider was hit by a car driven by her fiancé, Daniel. The jury assigned 85 percent of the fault to Daniel, 14 percent to the plaintiff, and 1 percent to the park. The couple married before trial, and interspousal immunity protected Daniel. The judge reduced the judgment by the plaintiff's 14 percent and held the park liable for the remaining 86 percent, even though the jury had found the plaintiff 14 times more at fault than the park.16 The immune spouse's share of the loss moved to the one defendant left standing. The next section returns to these facts to ask why one tortfeasor's immunity leaves the other's liability intact.
A misunderstanding by the jury can defeat the rule before it operates, so that a plaintiff entitled to full damages from each defendant collects only a fraction. If the court tells the jury to find the defendants collectively liable for the plaintiff's full damages, jurors may read that as one total to be shared. Suppose Fermi's jury finds damages of $100,000, believes it must divide them, and enters $50,000 against each of two defendants. If one defendant cannot pay, Fermi is left with $50,000, which is exactly the shortfall several liability produces.17 The remedy has two parts. Counsel can request an instruction that each defendant is liable for the plaintiff's full damages. A special verdict form can also require separate findings on negligence and on total damages, so that the judge can enter the right judgment against each defendant without depending on the jury's grasp of joint and several liability.18