Concept
Criticism and Judicial Resistance
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
Criticism and Judicial Resistance
Alternative liability has the approval of both Restatements and still divides the courts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3) puts the burden on each actor to prove that he did not cause the harm when the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, harm is proved to have been caused by only one of them, and it is uncertain which one.1 The Third Restatement approves the same rule in § 28(b).2 The shift helps only a plaintiff who has established tortious conduct by every defendant. The Summers trial court found exactly that when it held both hunters negligent for shooting toward a companion whose location they knew, and it held the plaintiff not contributorily negligent.3
The sharpest objection is that the rule makes a defendant pay for a harm he did not cause. Both hunters in Summers were negligent, but only one shot injured the plaintiff. Neither hunter could prove whose shot it was, so both were held liable.4 The court thus held one defendant liable even though he did not in fact cause the harm.5 That is a real departure from traditional doctrine. The other hunter's negligence, admitted as it is, would ordinarily not be enough, because a defendant's negligence must cause the injury before it can support liability.6
Defenders of the rule answer that the alternative is worse. Under ordinary but-for proof, a plaintiff who was shot by one of two negligent hunters loses because the evidence cannot say which one. A number of courts find the departure from the traditional rules more acceptable than sending the plaintiff away empty-handed.7 Summers gave two reasons. The defendants were better placed than the plaintiff to establish whose tortious act caused the harm, and as between two negligent defendants and an innocent victim, the defendants should pay.8 The court also saw that both hunters had committed the same act, that both were negligent, and that one of them had injured the plaintiff. It would be unfair to let both go free simply because the plaintiff could not pinpoint the shot.9 Nor is liability automatic, since each hunter remains free to escape by proving that he did not cause the harm.10
The proposition itself is narrow. Where two (or perhaps more) defendants commit substantially similar negligent acts, one of which injured the plaintiff, the burden shifts to each to show that he did not cause the harm, and if neither can, both are liable.11 A number of courts follow that rule. Others have rejected Summers entirely and left the plaintiff to prove causation under the traditional but-for test.12
Leuer v. Johnson is the leading example of the second camp. On facts similar to Summers, the Minnesota court granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiff could not prove that it was more likely than not that either one's shot had hit him.13 With two possible shooters, neither one's shot is more likely than not to have been the one, so ordinary preponderance proof fails for both. The two lines of cases agree on the facts and on the odds, and they differ on whose risk the evidentiary gap should be. A court like Leuer gives more weight to the principle that liability follows proof of causation. A court following Summers gives more weight to preventing negligent defendants from escaping through the very uncertainty their conduct created.
Legislation can also threaten the doctrine from outside. Joint and several liability is inherent in the application of alternative liability,14 so a statute that restricts joint and several liability puts the doctrine at risk. In Napier v. Osmose, Inc., a federal district court in Michigan found that the legislature's action precluded the use of alternative liability in a case against pesticide manufacturers.15
A fact pattern with two negligent hunters, one pellet, and no evidence about whose gun fired it tests the doctrine directly. Where the stem says the jurisdiction follows the Restatement approach, the answer runs in order. The plaintiff has shown that each hunter was negligent, only one shot struck him, and both hunters are before the court. Neither can prove that his own shot was not the one, so both are liable. Where the stem says the jurisdiction follows Leuer, the same facts end in summary judgment for the defendants, because the plaintiff cannot show that either shot more likely than not hit him.