Concept
Effect of the Burden Shift
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
Effect of the Burden Shift
Once the burden shifts, each defendant must prove that he did not cause the harm. The Second Restatement says so directly: where two or more actors are tortious, harm is proved to have been caused by only one of them, and it is uncertain which, the burden is on each actor to prove that he has not caused it.1 The shift is the first step of a process, not its end. Each defendant may try to exculpate himself, a defendant who succeeds leaves the case, and defendants who cannot succeed answer for the plaintiff's loss.
The second step keeps the shift from becoming a presumption of liability against everyone sued. A defendant who proves that his own conduct could not have caused the harm is released, because the rule asks each actor only to prove that he did not cause it.2 The DES litigation shows what such proof looks like. One of the original defendants was dismissed on proof that it had not manufactured DES until after the plaintiff was born, and the court observed that defendants with no better means than the plaintiff of identifying the maker may still be able to prove that they did not make the injury-causing substance.3 The hunters in Summers had no such proof. The trial court could not tell whose gun fired the shot that struck the plaintiff's eye, and that shot came from one hunter's gun or the other's, not from both.4 Neither hunter could show that his gun was not the one, and the court held each of them liable for the whole damage.5
The defendants' burden covers both production and persuasion. The Third Restatement says so expressly: the burden of proof on factual causation, including both production and persuasion, shifts to the defendants.6 A bare denial therefore does not discharge it, and a defendant who offers some evidence of innocence still loses if the record ends in balance. That result is the point of the allocation. In a case like Summers the evidence is evenly divided from the start, and the risk of an evenly balanced record, which ordinarily rests on the plaintiff, rests instead on the defendants.
Defendants who cannot exculpate themselves are each liable for the whole damages. The Summers court rested that result on policy and held each defendant liable for the whole damage whether the two are deemed to act in concert or independently.7 Liability of that kind is joint and several: each defendant answers for the entire judgment, and the plaintiff may collect all of it from any one of them. The reason is the same uncertainty that moved the burden. Because no one can say which defendant caused the harm, any division of the damages would be a guess about a fact no one can prove. The court instead reasoned that when the defendants are independent tortfeasors and apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of redress, and the wrongdoers should be left to work out any apportionment between themselves.8
Full liability also decides who bears the risk that a wrongdoer cannot pay. If each defendant owed only a fractional share, the plaintiff would lose any share owed by an insolvent defendant, and the plaintiff is the one party who did nothing to create the difficulty. Joint and several liability moves that risk to the defendants: the plaintiff collects the full judgment from whichever defendant has assets, and that defendant pursues the other. A later court, discussing joint and several liability generally, called this one of the rule's principal by-products. It noted that the rule frequently lets an injured person recover fully even when one or more responsible parties cannot cover their liability, and it quoted the Summers passage that the wronged party should not be deprived of redress while the wrongdoers work out apportionment between themselves.9
Contribution is the last step in the sequence. A defendant who pays the whole judgment may recover a share from the others, and if both defendants are solvent they end up splitting the loss.10 Contribution only redistributes the loss among defendants. The doctrine does not solve the identification problem; it places the risk of nonidentification on the defendants.11 The strongest objection follows directly: a defendant who in fact did not cause the harm is held liable anyway.12 The rule departs from the traditional rules, and the courts that accept it do so because the alternative is to send the plaintiff away empty-handed. The result may lack intellectual elegance, but it offers a rough and ready justice of the kind courts must often settle for in real disputes.13
Because the theory carries joint and several liability with it, a court or legislature that curtails that liability can undercut the doctrine. One court refused to apply the theory because it found joint and several liability inappropriate on the facts and chose not to modify the theory to fit them.14 In Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., defendants unable to exculpate themselves were held jointly and severally liable, apparently on a per capita rather than a market share basis. Whether that ruling survives the Michigan legislature's restriction on joint and several liability is an open question. One federal court held in Napier v. Osmose, Inc. that the restriction precludes alternative liability in a case against pesticide manufacturers.15 The reasoning is straightforward. Once each defendant answers only for a limited share, the feature that let the plaintiff collect everything from whichever defendant could pay is gone, and a court may conclude that the legislature displaced the doctrine along with it.