Concept
The Burden-Shifting Holding
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
The Burden-Shifting Holding
The defendants in Summers raised two defenses. They said they were not joint tortfeasors, because they had not acted in concert, and they said the evidence did not show which of them had committed the negligence that caused the injury.1 The California Supreme Court held both liable anyway. It moved the burden of proof on causation from the plaintiff to the defendants. The plaintiff no longer had to show whose shot struck him. Each defendant had to show, if he could, that he was not the cause, and a defendant who failed answered for the injury.2
The court's reasoning has three strands, and each answers a different objection to leaving the burden with the plaintiff.
The first strand is fairness. Both defendants were wrongdoers, each negligent toward the plaintiff, and together they brought about a situation in which the negligence of one of them injured him.3 The plaintiff was an innocent party, and the uncertainty about whose shot hit him came from the defendants' joint negligence, not from anything he did.4 So the court said it should rest with each defendant to absolve himself if he can. The defendants had placed the injured party in the unfair position of having to point to which of them caused the harm.5
The second strand is the result the opposite rule would produce. If the plaintiff had to pin the injury on one defendant, each defendant could point to the other. The court saw where that led: if one can escape, the other may also, and the plaintiff is remediless.6 Under the but-for rule, the less anyone could learn about which gun fired, the safer each hunter would be. The no-recovery outcome of cases such as Adams v. Hall was the result the court refused to reach for two negligent defendants.
The third strand is the evidence. Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position than the plaintiff to offer proof of which of them caused the injury.7 Each hunter knows where he aimed and when he fired, while the plaintiff knows only that a pellet struck him. A burden placed on the side that holds the proof draws that proof into the open, and a defendant who can produce it goes free. The common law has used the same device outside hunting cases. As Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins later put it, in multiple causation cases where a breach of duty has been established, the common law of torts has long shifted to the defendants the burden of proving that their negligence was not the but-for cause of the injury.8 The qualifier matters. The shift answers only the question of which actor caused the harm, and it comes after a breach of duty is established.
The court also said that this reasoning had recently found favor in its own decisions, and it drew a direct parallel to Ybarra v. Spangard, in which a patient injured while unconscious on an operating table could not say which of the persons connected with the operation had caused his injury.9 The unconscious patient has the injury but not the explanation, and so does the hunter struck by one pellet from one of two guns. In each case the people who can explain what happened are the defendants. The Summers opinion states the parallel plainly: the plaintiff there likewise was not able to establish which of the defendants caused his injury.10
Concert of action was available as an alternative ground, and the court treated it as the weaker one. Earlier hunting cases had imposed liability by describing the defendants as acting in concert, but the court thought those cases were straining that concept. It pointed instead to Oliver v. Miles, where two hunters shot at partridges and, in doing so, shot across a highway and injured a traveler. The Oliver court stated that the hunters were acting in concert and that both were therefore liable.11 The strain is easy to see. Concert ordinarily implies a shared plan, and two hunters who each fire at a flushed bird have not obviously agreed on anything about their aim. Summers did not need to settle the point. The court rested on policy: each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether the two are deemed to act in concert or independently. The plaintiff had not changed his theory, because the joint liability and the lack of knowledge about which defendant was responsible were both pleaded, and the proof developed the case under either view.12 The full contrast between concert of action and alternative liability appears in the related-doctrines section below.
The holding has a trigger and a consequence. The trigger is a situation in which two or more defendants were negligent toward the plaintiff, the plaintiff suffered a harm that only one of them caused, and the plaintiff cannot prove which one.13 The consequence is that each defendant must try to prove that he was not the cause of the harm, and a defendant who succeeds drops out. If none can, all are liable, jointly and severally, so that each answers for the whole damage.14 The cost of the rule should be stated plainly: one defendant is held liable although he did not in fact cause the harm.15 The court accepted that cost because, as between an innocent victim and two negligent defendants, the defendants should pay even without proof of which one caused the accident.16
The rule stops where its premise stops. The defendants invoked authorities holding that a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the negligence and the injury. The court distinguished the Hernandez case on exactly that ground: there was an entire lack of such a connection, and there were not several negligent defendants, one of whom must have caused the injury.17
A later decision asked what made the Summers facts a fair occasion for the shift. In Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the California Supreme Court looked back at Summers and found that a number of important factors combined to make the burden-shifting rule fair and just.18 It listed five.
Taken together, the factors describe a closed field of equally culpable actors, a single sudden injury, and a plaintiff who cannot learn which actor inflicted it. When those conditions are missing, because an actor outside the courtroom might have caused the harm, or the injury built up over time, or the plaintiff has proof of his own, the case for shifting the burden is weaker. The stakes are the ones the court identified in Summers: without the shift, the tortfeasors would have escaped liability, and the injured plaintiff would have had no legal means to seek redress for a negligently inflicted injury.19