Concept
Divisible and Indivisible Harm
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
Divisible and Indivisible Harm
When more than one negligent force is a substantial factor in a plaintiff's harm, the question shifts from who caused it to how much each defendant must pay. The answer depends on whether the harm can be divided. A harm is divisible if it separates into parts that trace to particular causes, and indivisible if it forms a single whole that no principled line can cut. A defendant answers only for the part of a divisible harm that the defendant caused, but for the whole of an indivisible harm to which the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor.
Two motorcyclists roar past a plaintiff's horse and wagon, the horse takes fright, and the plaintiff is injured, as in Corey.1 Nothing in those facts separates the fright one machine produced from the fright the other produced: the horse bolted once, and the plaintiff was hurt once. The traditional common-law response to an injury of that kind is to hold every tortfeasor who contributed to it liable for the plaintiff's damages.2 Courts call such defendants joint tortfeasors, a phrase that means they contributed to a single, indivisible injury and are each fully liable for it.3
The reason is practical. Independent tortfeasors ordinarily answer only for the damage each caused alone, but where apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party should not lose the right to redress, and the wrongdoers should be left to work out any division among themselves.4 The plaintiff cannot reconstruct a division that the facts do not contain. A rule demanding one would defeat recovery precisely because the defendants' combined carelessness made the harm impossible to sort. Putting the whole loss on the wrongdoers makes them bear the cost of that gap in place of the person they injured. The causal premise is that where independent torts could each have produced the result, each is a substantial factor in the damage.5
The result changes when the damage separates.
Neither farmer is a joint tortfeasor here, because the two did not contribute to a single, indivisible injury.7 The same causal logic that makes each force a substantial factor in an indivisible harm also limits liability for a divisible one. No part of the extent of an injury is open to the jury unless the negligence is causally connected to the injury in whole or in part, and the court excludes from the jury any claimed injury that the facts do not reasonably connect to the negligence.8 The plaintiff loses nothing under this rule, because the harm divides along a line that tracks who caused what, and no gap in proof exists for the reasoning above to fill.
The motorcycle case and the stubble fires each involve two negligent actors, so the number of defendants does not decide which rule applies, and neither does the relative size of their fault. What decides is whether the injury itself can be cut along a principled line. The riders produced one fright and one injury, while the farmers' fires burned separate ground and left separate losses. A fire case loses that separation once the damage runs together.
Full liability can also rest on a ground other than indivisible harm. In Bierczynski v. Rogers, the plaintiffs sued two young motorists, aged eighteen and seventeen, whom they accused of racing on a public highway, and alleged that both were concurrently negligent in violating speed statutes and other rules of the road and in failing to keep a proper lookout and control of their vehicles.10 One defendant's car never touched the plaintiffs, yet he was held liable because he acted in concert with the other racer to cause the injury.11 An answer that holds both drivers liable should name concert of action and not rest on indivisibility alone.
Comparative fault puts pressure on the traditional rule, because a jury can assign each actor a percentage, and a defendant can argue that the percentages make the harm divisible. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., a jury found the defendant 30% at fault and an unknown driver 70% at fault, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals entered judgment against the defendant for only 30% of the damages instead of holding it liable for the whole. Courts do not apply comparative fault the same way on this point. An answer should therefore present joint liability for indivisible harm as the traditional rule and note that a comparative-fault jurisdiction may apportion the loss by percentage. The full mechanics of joint tortfeasors belong to a separate treatment.
The labels divisible and indivisible do not apply themselves, and the law assigns the decision between judge and jury. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434, the court decides whether the evidence presents a jury issue on substantial factor and whether the harm is capable of apportionment among two or more causes. It also decides causation and apportionment itself in any case in which the jury may not reasonably differ.12 Where reasonable people may differ, the jury decides whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor and apportions the harm among the causes.13 The next section works through these roles.