Concept
Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1) answers the question the earlier sections left open: who must prove causation. Except as stated in subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proving that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the plaintiff's harm rests on the plaintiff.1 The but-for test, the multiple-sufficient-cause rule, and the substantial factor filter define what a cause is. Section 433B(1) tells the court which side loses when the evidence on those definitions comes out incomplete.
The allocation follows from what the plaintiff asks for. A plaintiff who sues in negligence wants the court to move a loss onto the defendant, and the defendant may fairly demand evidence that the defendant's own wrong produced it. Reverse the burden, and anyone careless near the scene of an injury would have to disprove a link the plaintiff never tried to establish.
This unit takes the ordinary rule and its standard of proof first. It then turns to the exception in § 433B(3), which relieves a plaintiff who can prove that someone's negligence caused the harm but cannot prove whose.
The Preponderance Standard
A plaintiff carries the burden by showing that causation is more probable than not. Hamil v. Bashline states the standard from both directions. The plaintiff need not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and need not eliminate entirely the possibility that the defendant's conduct was not a cause. It is enough to introduce evidence from which reasonable people may conclude that the defendant more probably than not caused the event.2 Lawyers call this proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Each edge of the standard has its own reason. The upper edge reflects a fact about causation: it cannot be proved mathematically, because no one can say with absolute certainty what would have happened had the defendant acted differently.3 A certainty requirement would defeat nearly every claim built on an omitted precaution, since the plaintiff would have to prove the outcome of an event that never took place. The lower edge protects defendants from speculation. Dean Prosser put the limit this way: the plaintiff must offer evidence that gives a reasonable basis for concluding it is more likely than not that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor. A mere possibility of causation is not enough, and where the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, the court should direct a verdict for the defendant.4
Because certainty is out of reach, the factfinder may draw on ordinary experience. If a particular act or omission might be expected, as a matter of ordinary experience, to produce a particular result, and that result has followed, the conclusion that a causal relation exists may be justified.5 The opinion quotes an earlier federal decision about a seaman who died on a ship where no guard rope had been run. No one could be sure the seaman would have seized the rope, or that it would have stopped his fall, but the court would not insist on certainty where certainty was impossible. Such lines were run for the express purpose of protecting seamen, so whether the rope would have saved him was a question on which reasonable people might at least differ.6
Negligence alone does not satisfy the burden. In Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., the trainmen ran 12 miles per hour over the railroad's own 25-mile-per-hour limit, and the court treated the violation as evidence of negligence. It then identified the prime issue as whether the excessive speed was a cause in fact of the fatal collision.7 Proof that the defendant acted wrongly and proof that the wrong produced the harm are separate showings, and the plaintiff must make both. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories begins from the same premise: as a general rule, liability depends on the plaintiff's showing that the injuries were caused by the defendant's act or by an instrumentality under the defendant's control.8
The landlord's negligence is identical in both versions, and the evidence alone moves the answer. The burden follows the plaintiff through every showing this chapter has described. A plaintiff relying on the but-for test must show it more probable than not that the harm would not have occurred without the defendant's negligence. A plaintiff relying on the multiple-sufficient-cause rule must show by the same standard that the defendant's force was actively operating and sufficient to bring about the harm alone.11 The opening words of § 433B(1), except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), warn that the allocation can change. The next subsection takes up the situation in which it does.
When the Burden Shifts
Section 433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reverses the plaintiff's burden for one narrow situation: the plaintiff can show that someone's negligence caused the harm but cannot show whose. It provides: "Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm."13 The text builds in three conditions. Every actor must have been tortious toward the plaintiff, the evidence must establish that exactly one of them caused the harm, and the uncertainty must lie in which one. When all three are present, each defendant must prove his own innocence.
Summers v. Tice shows the rule at work. Two defendants each negligently fired toward the plaintiff, and a single shot struck his eye. It came from one gun or the other, and nothing established which.14 The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against both. The defendants had put the plaintiff in the unfair position of pointing to the one who injured him, and if one could escape by pointing at the other, the other could escape the same way and the plaintiff would be left without a remedy. The burden therefore fell on each defendant to absolve himself if he can.15
Two features of the situation carry the rule. The first is that every defendant is a proved wrongdoer. The Restatement's comment names the alternative as the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury on an entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability because their conduct has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them caused the harm.16 The Summers opinion also quotes an earlier decision's observation that holding otherwise would exonerate both defendants although each was negligent and the injury resulted from that negligence.17 The second feature is evidence. Ordinarily the defendants are in a far better position than the plaintiff to offer proof about which of them caused the injury.18 Where the defendants are independent tortfeasors and apportionment cannot be proved, the innocent plaintiff should not lose redress, and the wrongdoers can work out any apportionment among themselves.19
This exception differs from the multiple-sufficient-cause rule of § 432(2), and an exam stem with two negligent actors and one injury can invite either. Under § 432(2), both forces are actively operating and each alone is enough to bring about the harm, so nothing about causation is unknown, and the actor's negligence may be found a substantial factor.20 Under § 433B(3), only one force injured the plaintiff, because the single shot came from one gun only, and the unknown is which actor sent it.21 A defendant under § 432(2) gains nothing by pointing to the other sufficient force. A defendant under § 433B(3) leaves the case by proving that he did not cause the harm.22
In the second version, a roofer who makes that proof leaves the case, and if neither roofer can, both answer for the loss.
A plaintiff may also reach a second wrongdoer by a route that needs no burden shift. Under concert of action, a party who, under a common plan or scheme, assists, participates with, or actively encourages a wrongdoer who tortiously harms the plaintiff shares liability. In the classic drag-race case, one car hits the plaintiff and the other driver is held liable for helping create the risk.25 Concert turns on participation in group activity the actor knows to be tortious. Alternative liability needs no such connection, because it reaches independent actors when the proof shows that one of them caused the harm and leaves open only which.26
The shift has limits that follow from the text of § 433B(3), which applies when it is proved that the harm was caused by only one of the tortious actors. A plaintiff who sues a few among many possible sources cannot make that showing if the one who caused the harm may not be before the court, and shifting the burden then risks holding liable a defendant who did nothing wrong. Sindell shows the pressure. The plaintiff placed primary reliance on cases holding that, when a party cannot identify which of two or more defendants caused an injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendants, the theory called alternative liability. Yet the court proposed and adopted a fourth basis for permitting the action to be tried, grounded on an extension of the Summers doctrine.27
Courts also differ on whether to apply the rule at all. In Hood v. Hagler, a court relied on Summers to shift the burden to two neighbors whose similar dogs roamed freely between their properties, when the plaintiff could not tell which dog had bitten her.28 In Leuer v. Johnson, a Minnesota court on facts similar to Summers granted summary judgment to the defendants, because the plaintiff could not prove that it was more likely than not that either had fired the shot that hit him.29 The two decisions rest on closely related facts, and what separates them is each court's willingness to relax the plaintiff's burden under § 433B(1). An exam answer should present the burden shift as the Restatement's rule and note that some jurisdictions decline to apply it.