Concept
But-For Versus Substantial Factor
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
But-For Versus Substantial Factor
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432 states a rule and an exception, and students routinely treat them as two hurdles in sequence. Subsection (1) provides that, except as subsection (2) allows, an actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm if the harm would have been sustained even without the negligence.1 Subsection (2) carves out the case in which two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence and the other not because of any misconduct on the actor's part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about the harm; there the negligence may be found to be a substantial factor.2 The structure has two tiers. But-for is the general test of cause in fact, and the substantial factor test is an alternative approach for the unusual situation in which but-for yields an unsatisfactory result.3
Examinees often run the facts through both tests, as though a plaintiff must satisfy each in turn. That reflects confusion. Generally the plaintiff must show that the defendant's act was a but-for cause, and only in an Anderson-type situation, where the traditional analysis breaks down, does a court accept the more amorphous showing that the negligence was a substantial factor.4
The two tests ask different questions. But-for poses a counterfactual: would the harm have occurred without the negligence? Substantial factor is a matter of degree, and the jury must make an intuitive judgment about what degree of causation is substantial and whether the defendant reaches it.5 That test leaves more leeway to the jury in assigning causal responsibility for the harm.6 Stacking it on a satisfied but-for showing invites the jury to weigh shares of contribution after the counterfactual has already answered the question, and cause in fact will almost always be established once but-for is met.7
The barn in Anderson sits at the other pole. Only one of the two fires was due to the defendant's negligence, and the plaintiff could not say that but for the defendant's fire the barn would still stand, because the other fire would likely have caused the damage anyway. Yet the defendant's culpable act clearly contributed, and holding the defendant liable seemed fair.10 The court therefore applied a less stringent test and held the defendant a cause in fact if the jury found its act “a material or substantial element” in producing the damage.11 The scaffold and the barn differ in the one fact that selects the test: whether a second force was sufficient to cause the entire harm without the defendant's help.
The Third Restatement keeps the exception under a new label. Section 27 recognizes the same concept as “multiple sufficient causes,”12 and that name asks whether each force was sufficient, not how large a share it supplied. The Anderson defendant is a cause on that framing because its fire would have been enough by itself.
Jurisdictions also differ in what the jury hears. California's Mitchell v. Gonzales made substantial factor the general measure of cause in fact in negligence cases, yet Viner v. Sweet later confirmed that the but-for test remains operable in every negligence case except those involving concurrent independent causes, where the substantial factor test applies.13 Virginia took the opposite course. In Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, a mesothelioma case, the court disapproved the phrase “substantial contributing factor” because jurors might hear it as demanding more than a slight contribution or more than the ordinary standard of proof. It required only that the exposure be a sufficient cause, so that each party that caused a sufficient exposure is responsible and other sufficient causes, innocent or negligent, are no defense.14 An answer should therefore say which formulation the forum uses rather than assume one.
Step one disposes of every case in which another cause merely contributed, and the two-force inquiry of steps two and three begins only when the harm would have happened anyway.15 Where a pattern instruction uses the words substantial factor in every case, keep the same order and treat the multiple-sufficient-cause approach as the only route around a failed counterfactual.