Concept
Weighing Section 433 Considerations
But for and substantial causes
Weighing Section 433 Considerations
Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the factfinder three considerations for deciding whether negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm. Each is important in itself or in combination with the others.1 The wording is permissive, so the list works as a set of things to weigh and not as elements to prove. A plaintiff has no tally to complete, and a defendant cannot end the inquiry by winning on a single consideration.
The list exists because substantial factor answers a different question from but-for. The but-for test asks whether the negligence was necessary. The substantial factor test is an alternative route to cause in fact for the unusual situations, such as multiple sufficient causes, in which the but-for test gives unsatisfactory results.2 In those situations necessity no longer separates the defendants who count from those who do not, and the inquiry turns to how much the negligence contributed. The section 433 considerations name facts that make a contribution look larger or smaller.
They are the number of other factors contributing to the harm and the extent of their effect; whether the actor’s conduct created a force or series of forces in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or only a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; and the lapse of time.3 Because the three measure different things, they can point in opposite directions in a single case. A defendant may be one of many contributors, which weakens the claim of substantiality, and yet may have set in motion a force still operating when the harm struck, which strengthens it. The factfinder balances them.
A plaintiff’s case can end before any factfinder does the balancing. In Hill v. Edmonds, the trial court dismissed the complaint against one defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s case, and the plaintiff appealed.4 The later sections on the court’s and the jury’s roles take up who decides what, and on what showing. Here, the three considerations come one at a time.
Number of Other Factors
Section 433(a) asks first how crowded the causal field was: how many other factors helped produce the harm, and how much each contributed.5 The consideration measures headcount and weight together. A defendant can be one of many contributors and still supply the largest share, while another can be one of only two and supply a sliver. Because section 433 lists considerations and not elements, the measure informs a judgment of degree. It sets no number for the plaintiff to beat.
The consideration matters because a contribution is large or small only by comparison with whatever else was at work. Each added contributor takes part of the harm for itself, and a contributor with a large effect takes more. The number shows how crowded the picture is; the extent shows whether the crowd leaves the defendant’s part visible.
The standard transformer illustration marks one end of the range. The Edison Company negligently attaches a transformer to a light pole, and Gaudi negligently backs into the pole, bringing the loose transformer down on a child waiting for the school bus. A secure transformer would have survived the blow, and a loose one would have stayed up without it, so each act was a necessary antecedent and both are causes under the but-for test.6 With only two contributors, each indispensable, Edison’s share is central.
At the other end, a contribution can be so small beside the other forces that it drops out of the case. When a defendant’s negligence makes only a trivial contribution to multiple factual causes of the harm, the harm falls outside the scope of the defendant’s liability. The rule applies only when the outcome is overdetermined, and it does not apply if the trivial cause was necessary for the outcome.7
Section 433(a) hands the factfinder that same fact to weigh. The other forces were so large and the camper’s effect so slight that the camper’s share is unlikely to count as a substantial factor.
Students often read the consideration as a rule that many contributors defeat causation. It is not one. Every occurrence has many causative antecedents, and the defendant’s act need not be the sole, the last, or the nearest cause.8 Edison cannot answer that the accident needed Gaudi too, because that shows only that Gaudi’s act was also a necessary antecedent; remove Edison’s negligence, and the accident still does not happen.9 The trivial-contribution screen likewise does not reach a cause that was necessary.10 On an exam, the number of other factors earns a place in the analysis when the facts show a crowded field and a defendant whose share is arguably slight. Where the defendant’s negligence was necessary and its share large, the consideration adds little.
Active Force or Passive Condition
Section 433(b) asks what kind of contribution the defendant made. Did the conduct create a force or series of forces in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or only a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible?12 The first consideration compares how many contributors there were and how large their shares were. This one sorts the defendant’s own contribution along a line. At one end is conduct that set something in motion that was still operating when the plaintiff was hurt. At the other is conduct that left behind a static situation, one that would have stayed harmless without an independent force.
The line tracks how directly the harm traces to the defendant’s conduct. When the conduct set a force going that was still operating at the injury, the path from act to harm runs through the defendant’s own conduct. When it left only a passive situation, the energy that produced the injury came from a force the defendant did not control, so part of the responsibility belongs to that force and the defendant’s share looks smaller. The consideration carries limited weight, however, because a failure to act when there is a duty to do so may be just as culpable as active wrongful conduct.13 The Restatement lists it as one factor among several, and not as a ground for exempting an actor whose conduct was static.
The active end appears in a traffic case brought by Marshall, who was injured when a car driven by Nugent struck him. The negligence at issue was that of Prince, a servant of the defendant Socony, in cutting a corner. Marshall’s injury came while the traffic mix-up occasioned by that negligence was still persisting, not after the traffic flow had become normal again. Chief Judge Magruder held that the district court committed no error in leaving proximate cause to the jury. The opinion speaks of proximate cause, but its reasoning maps onto section 433(b): the danger the negligence created was still in operation when the harm arrived.14
The court itself drew this contrast. Where the situation had stabilized and the Chevrolet was back on its journey, courts would no doubt hold as a matter of law that the earlier negligence was not a proximate cause, because the extra risks it created were over and the later risks were only those inseparable from being on the highway at all.15 The negligent act and the but-for link are the same in both scenes. What moves the answer is whether the force the negligence created was still operating when the harm occurred.
The distinction hardens easily into a shortcut: the defendant merely created a condition and so did not cause the harm. Some courts have separated active causes from passive conditions on which they operate, but the characterization is arbitrary in many cases, and it overlooks that a failure to act may be as culpable as wrongful action.16 Chief Judge Magruder called the label mere verbiage. It announces a conclusion that the causal relation is too weak for legal responsibility, a conclusion that has to be reached on other considerations.17 An answer that says only that the defendant created a condition stops before the analysis begins.
The loose transformer shows how far the shortcut misleads. Edison’s negligently attached transformer was harmless unless something struck the pole, which is the kind of situation section 433(b) describes. Yet Edison could not escape by pointing to Gaudi, who negligently backed into the pole, because removing Edison’s negligence prevents the accident even with Gaudi’s negligence assumed.18 Passivity does not touch the but-for finding. It enters afterward, as one consideration bearing on the weight of the contribution, and Edison’s was one of two necessary antecedents.
The phrase “other forces for which the actor is not responsible” does not mean that a later negligent actor frees an earlier one. If A negligently spills gasoline and B negligently ignites it hours later, injuring P, A and B are joint tortfeasors, because their independent negligence concurred to cause P’s single, indivisible harm.19 The spill resembles a situation that stayed inert until a spark arrived, and A remains liable all the same. The consideration can lower the weight of a static contribution, but it does not by itself turn a later negligent force into a defense.
Lapse of Time
Section 433(c) completes the list in two words: lapse of time.21 The Restatement fixes no interval after which negligence stops counting, so the consideration has to be read through the cases. It is something to weigh and never a freestanding bar. The cases suggest that the gap matters less for its length than for what fills it.
Time alone does not free a defendant. If A negligently spills gasoline and hours later B negligently ignites it, injuring P, A and B are joint tortfeasors, because their independent negligence concurred to cause P’s single, indivisible harm. The result is the same even when the negligence is separated in time.22 The spill stayed a live hazard through the hours between, and the later negligence ignited it instead of displacing it.
A short gap helps the plaintiff from the other side. In the traffic case discussed above, Marshall’s injury was not remote, either in time or place, from the negligent conduct of Socony’s servant, and it came while the traffic mix-up was still persisting, not after the traffic flow had become normal again. The court held that leaving proximate cause to the jury was not error.23
A gap hurts when something else fills it. Most courts, perhaps all, deny recovery when the plaintiff’s injury is too unusual and too far removed from the type of harm to be anticipated from the defendant’s negligence.24 Consider a hypothetical in that vein.
The driver is a but-for cause of the burns, since without the collision the plaintiff would not have been in that bed. Recovery would likely be denied all the same, because a hospital fire is too unusual and too far from the harm to be anticipated from careless driving. The usual label for that result is proximate cause, which is taken up separately. Here it shows how an interval filled by an unrelated event cuts the link: the risks of the collision had run their course, as in the court’s reasoning about the stabilized traffic, and the fire came from a source that had nothing to do with the driver.
The gasoline and the hospital fire both involve a gap of hours or days, so length does not separate them. What separates them is what filled the gap. In the first, the original hazard was intact when the harm arrived. In the second, the original risk was spent, and an unrelated event supplied the injury. On an exam, a stem that stresses delay calls for one question: what happened in the interval?