Concept
The Substantial Factor Test
But for and substantial causes
The Substantial Factor Test
Necessity cannot be the whole definition of legal cause, because every accident has dozens of necessary antecedents: the wet road, the plaintiff's trip onto the highway, the other driver's decision to leave home. An actor whose negligence was one of them has passed the but-for question without showing that the law should call the negligence a cause of the harm. Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the missing standard. Negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if the conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and if no rule of law relieves the actor from liability because of the manner in which the negligence has resulted in the harm.1
Because and joins the two prongs, the plaintiff must satisfy both, and a defendant escapes by defeating either. The first prong asks how much the negligence contributed to the harm. The second asks whether some rule of law cuts off liability despite a real contribution. This unit teaches the first prong; the second has its own section later in the chapter.
The first prong builds on the elimination rule of section 432(1): negligent conduct is not a substantial factor if the harm would have been sustained even without it.2 The first subsection below defines substantial and separates it from the philosophic sense of cause. The second takes up the exception that the opening words of section 432(1) reserve, the case of two forces each enough to produce the harm, where but-for cannot decide. Section 433, the next topic, then lists the considerations a factfinder weighs in deciding whether conduct is a substantial factor.3
Substantial Factor Defined
Section 431(a) makes a substantial factor the first requirement for legal cause: the actor's negligent conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.4 The Restatement's comment adds that necessity does not satisfy the requirement. Except in the overdetermined cases of section 432(2), it is necessary that the harm would not have occurred without the negligence, but necessity is not sufficient; the negligence must also be a substantial factor.5 The elimination rule therefore removes defendants whose negligence made no difference,6 and the substantial-factor requirement then asks how much difference the remaining defendants made.
The comment draws its line between two senses of the word cause. In the so-called philosophic sense, a cause is every one of the great number of events without which the harm would not have occurred, so the manufacture of the car and the negligent act itself both qualify. In the popular sense, which the law adopts, a cause is an event whose effect in producing the harm leads reasonable people to regard it as a cause, and that sense always carries an idea of responsibility.7 The effect of many philosophic causes is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes at all.8 The word substantial keeps those antecedents out of legal cause.
Tying legal cause to the popular sense costs some precision. Necessity is a yes-or-no question, while substantial is a matter of degree. The jury must make an intuitive judgment about what degree of causation is substantial and whether the defendant's negligence reaches it, so the test leaves the jury more leeway than but-for does.9 The gain is that the jury answers the question the law cares about, whether the conduct counts as a cause in the sense that carries responsibility, and not the endless regress of the philosophic sense.
Two fires mark the ends of the range. A person who throws a lighted match into a forest fire that is already consuming the area makes a proved but insignificant contribution, and the substantial-factor requirement exists to eliminate a defendant in that position.10 A railroad whose negligently set fire merges with another and burns a barn stands at the opposite end: its fire was a material element in the loss even though the other fire would probably have done the damage anyway.11 The next subsection develops that case.
Students most often go wrong on how the two tests relate. A plaintiff generally must show that the defendant's negligence was a but-for cause, and only in an unusual situation where the traditional analysis breaks down will a court accept the looser showing that the negligence was a substantial factor.12 Legal malpractice shows the default at work. However serious a lawyer's negligence, causation of damages is not presumed, and the client must prove that the loss would not have occurred, or that a better result would have been achieved, but for the negligence.13 Run but-for first, then. Treat substantial factor as the working test only in the unusual situations where but-for gives no satisfactory answer, such as harm that two sufficient forces overdetermine.14
The phrase itself needs care, because courts use it in several senses. Sometimes it tests cause in fact, sometimes proximate cause, and sometimes it serves as shorthand for both; routine jury instructions often ask only whether the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury, as a proxy for both.15 One court put the additional-hurdle version this way: the but-for test is not the end of the inquiry, and the plaintiff, Virden, also had to tender proof that the defendants' negligent welding of an angle iron was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.16 The Second Restatement's comment would screen out even a necessary but slight contribution. Later treatments narrow the screen: when a defendant makes only a trivial contribution to multiple factual causes of the harm, the harm falls outside the scope of that defendant's liability, but the rule does not reach a trivial cause that is necessary for the outcome, because it applies only when the outcome is overdetermined.17 An exam answer should say which sense of substantial factor it is using.
Multiple Sufficient Causes
Section 432(2) of the Restatement (Second) supplies the exception to the elimination rule. If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence and the other not because of any misconduct on the actor's part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.19 The opening words of section 432(1), Except as stated in Subsection (2), point to this rule, so the two subsections work as a pair.20 Subsection (1) removes a defendant whose negligence made no difference, and subsection (2) keeps in a defendant whose negligence was unnecessary only because a second force was equally enough.
The exception answers a dilemma that the but-for test cannot solve. In Corey v. Havener, two cyclists passed a horse and frightened it. The first rider can argue that his act was not necessary, since the noise of the other cycle was enough to scare the horse even if he had not been there. The second rider can make the identical argument about the first. Neither act is a sine qua non of the harm, so a literal but-for test excuses both, and the injured plaintiff recovers from no one.21
The railroad-fire case shows the solution. In Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., two fires merged and burned the plaintiff's barn, and only one was due to the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff could not say that the barn would still stand but for the defendant's fire, because the other fire would probably have done the damage anyway. The court dropped the demand for necessity and held that the defendant was a cause in fact if the jury found that its act was a material or substantial element in producing the loss. The defendant was held liable.22
The exception rests on the symmetry of the dilemma and on fairness. When each of two forces is enough, each defendant can build an excuse from the other's contribution, and the excuses cancel both liabilities, although the defendant's culpable act clearly contributed and it seems fair to hold the defendant liable for it.23 The negligent fire is no bystander to the harm, since it was part of what burned the barn, whether or not another fire stood ready to do the same.
The exception is narrow and leaves the default where it was. The substantial-factor test has gained wide acceptance in the unusual situation that Anderson illustrates, and the Third Restatement recognizes the same concept under the label multiple sufficient causes.24 It remains an alternative approach to cause in fact for situations in which but-for does not yield satisfactory results; it does not displace but-for elsewhere.25 But-for causation stays an essential precondition except where two or more actively operating forces, only one of them the defendant's responsibility, combine to produce a harm that each alone would have produced.26 The Restatement's wording also leaves the matter to the factfinder, since the negligence "may be found" to be a substantial factor.27 A later section returns to the modern formulation.
The text of section 432(2) addresses an innocent second force, but the same logic carries to cases in which both forces are negligent. Suppose two negligently set fires combine to destroy the plaintiff's property, or two tortfeasors separately but simultaneously release contaminated water into the plaintiff's lake, each in an amount enough to cause all the damage. No apportionment is possible, the sine qua non rule is inapplicable, and both defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for the whole loss. This is sometimes called duplicative causation.28 These cases differ from the multiple but-for causes taught earlier. There, removing either negligent act would have ended the accident. Here, removing either act leaves the harm in place, which is why but-for fails and the substantial-factor finding must do the work.
A natural or otherwise innocent second force changes the result less than a student might expect. Suppose two fires are each enough to destroy the plaintiff's property and lightning set one of them. The preferred rule holds the negligent defendant liable, because the fortuitous intervention of a natural event ought not to exonerate a defendant who would have been liable without it, and who would have been jointly and severally liable had the other cause been another person's culpable act.29 The Restatement's text covers this case directly, since it describes the second force as operating "not because of any misconduct on his part."30
A second fire raises a threshold question before the exception can apply: did it actually operate on the plaintiff's property? Suppose Jones's negligent fire burns down the plaintiff's barn, and Smith's negligent fire would have done the same job but didn't, because Jones's fire caused the loss first. Jones will argue that but-for fails because the barn would have burned anyway. Jones's fire nonetheless caused the damage without any help from Smith's, so Jones should be liable even though the but-for test fails.31 Smith caused nothing. Smith's fire was a preempted cause, one that was sufficient but never came into operation, and having the capacity to cause a loss ought not to substitute for actually causing it.32 A would-be poisoner makes the same point. The poison was enough to kill, but if the victim is shot before drinking, the poisoner is not the cause of death, however culpable the attempt.33 Smith falls outside the exception because section 432(2) requires both forces to be actively operating.34
The substantial-factor requirement still screens out contributions that add nothing of consequence. The lighted match from the preceding subsection is not a second sufficient force, because a match could not have destroyed the forest on its own, while each fire in Anderson could have destroyed the barn. Section 432(2) requires both features, a force that is itself sufficient and that is actively operating, before the negligence may be found a substantial factor.35
The same fairness reasoning reaches beyond fires. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the court reasoned that just as it is unfair to let one tortfeasor completely escape liability for his fire merely because another tortfeasor caused another fire, so it is unfair to let Liggett completely escape liability for its pre-1966 behavior merely because its post-1965 behavior (or that of its codefendants), which was immunized from scrutiny at the trial, might also have caused enough damage, by itself, to kill the smoker.36
Courts differ on how far substantial factor reaches. Some, as in California, apply it more broadly to establish factual cause in any context. Most courts use but-for as the exclusive test in ordinary products liability cases involving single, durable products, and the Third Restatement largely follows that approach, defining factual causation in but-for terms and supplying a separate standard for multiple causation.37