Concept
Causation in Negligence
But for and substantial causes
But-For and Substantial Factor Causation
Causation in Negligence
Careless conduct alone does not make a defendant liable in negligence. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430, a negligent actor is liable for another's harm only if two things are true: the conduct was negligent toward that person, and the negligence was a legal cause of the harm.1 The causal requirement rests on fairness. A defendant should be held liable only for the injuries he actually caused.2
The two versions differ in one fact: whether the careless act entered the chain of events that produced the loss. In the toddler version, Jones's lapse is what lawyers call "negligence in the air," carelessness irrelevant to the injury and therefore not actionable.3 Proof of breach settles whether the defendant was careless. It does not settle whether the carelessness mattered to this plaintiff's injury, and that second question is the subject of this chapter.
Causation in negligence has two components, causation in fact and legal or "proximate" causation, and casebooks treat them separately.4 The Second Restatement substituted the bland term "legal cause" for proximate cause, but the substitution never won wide acceptance. The Third Restatement keeps "proximate cause," with evident reluctance, in the title of its chapter on "Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause)."5 The word "proximate" does not mean "nearest." The doctrine asks whether more distant acts or events, in time or space, are causally connected to the particular injury.6 Proximate cause also has closer kinship with the breach question than with cause in fact.7 Because the Second Restatement runs both halves through its single phrase "legal cause," its sections must be read with the split in mind. This chapter develops the factual link through the but-for and substantial-factor tests, and the scope-of-liability half is taught separately.
Three Restatement building blocks come first. The first shows how liability is assembled from negligence and legal cause. The second explains why the negligence must run toward this particular plaintiff. The third fixes the meanings of harm and injury that the later tests assume.
Negligence Plus Legal Cause
Section 281 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the general formula for liability when an actor invades another's interest unintentionally. The actor is liable if the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, if the actor's conduct is negligent with respect to the plaintiff or a class of persons that includes the plaintiff, if that conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and if the plaintiff has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from suing.8 All four conditions must be met, so a plaintiff who clears three of them still loses on the fourth.
The first and fourth conditions work at the edges of most negligence cases, and the second has its own subsection. That leaves the third as the one this chapter develops. Section 430 restates it for the negligent actor: liability for another's harm requires that the conduct be negligent toward the other and also that the negligence be a legal cause of the other's harm.9 Traditional statements of the negligence claim list a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury as an element of its own.10
Breach and causation stay separate because they ask different questions. Breach asks whether the defendant's conduct fell short of reasonable care. Causation asks whether that shortfall took part in producing this plaintiff's harm. A plaintiff can therefore prove breach conclusively and still lose on causation without any inconsistency. The pairing of the two requirements shifts a loss only to an actor who was both careless and responsible, as Jones was in the first version of the wiring story.11
The same causal requirement governs the fourth condition when the carelessness is charged against the injured party. In Martin v. Herzog, the court held that a collision more than an hour after sundown between a car and an unseen buggy proceeding without lights supports an inference of a causal connection between the collision and the lack of signals. If nothing else breaks that connection, the court said, the case is prima facie one of negligence contributing to the result.12 The court also refused to treat a statute designed to protect human life as a mere form of words.13 The contributory negligence defense exists because a negligence rule aims to induce optimal care from both parties, and primary liability alone may dilute the injured party's incentive where that party can avoid the accident.14 The defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's negligence and, except as the apportionment rules provide, of proving that it was a legal cause of the plaintiff's damages.15
Negligent Toward the Plaintiff
Section 430 requires that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other person, which makes negligence relational.17 A defendant is never careless in the abstract. The defendant is careless toward particular people and with respect to particular dangers. The Restatement ties the idea to two features of the conduct: it causes harm to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, and it subjects the plaintiff to the hazard from which the harm results.18 The first feature answers who is endangered, and the second answers what the endangerment consists of. Carelessness becomes carelessness toward this plaintiff for this harm only when the plaintiff belongs to the endangered class and the harm comes from the hazard.
Both features follow from the reason conduct is called negligent at all. An actor's liability is limited to the harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.19 Without that limit, the actor would answer for consequences that gave no reason to take care, and liability would outrun fault. The class feature limits who may recover, and the hazard feature limits which harms count.
Courts usually apply the limit through the foreseeability test or its elaboration, the harm-within-the-risk test. The key to both is that proximate cause is more closely related to breach than to cause in fact.20 The hazard feature does its clearest work when the factual link is present and liability still fails. In Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, a trolley ran above the speed limit and was struck by a falling tree at a spot it would not have reached at lawful speed. Speeding does nothing to make falling trees more likely, so the harm lay outside the risk that made the speed negligent. Gorris v. Scott applies the same limit to a statutory duty. Sheep were washed overboard from a ship whose owner had ignored a rule requiring pens, but the rule aimed at preventing contagious disease, so the loss fell outside the risk behind the rule.
A driver who runs a red light and hits cross traffic shows the opposite picture, because both features line up at once. The person in the intersection belongs to the class that red-light running endangers, and an intersection collision is the very hazard that makes running the light negligent.21 In ordinary cases, a defendant who was negligent, and whose negligence was a cause in fact of the harm, also satisfies the proximate cause requirement.22 The scope inquiry therefore becomes decisive only in the occasional case where the harm is a freak relative to the risk.
The but-for and substantial-factor tests that follow measure the factual link. A plaintiff who establishes that link has not thereby shown that the harm fell within the risk that made the defendant negligent.
Harm and Injury Defined
Section 7 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives three words fixed meanings, and the causation sections that follow use all three. Injury denotes the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.24 Harm denotes the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person, resulting from any cause.25 Physical harm is the narrower term for the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels.26 Injury is therefore a statement about rights: a legal interest was crossed. Harm is a statement about the world: the plaintiff is worse off in fact. Physical harm names one kind of harm, the kind that shows up as a broken arm, a scorched lawn, or a dented truck. Casebooks and opinions, including some sources quoted in this chapter, often use "injury" in the everyday sense of the plaintiff's loss, so check which sense a passage intends.
The phrase "resulting from any cause" in the definition of harm leaves room for the causal inquiry. A loss counts as harm whether a defendant's carelessness, a stranger's act, or the weather produced it, because the definition says nothing about its source. Harm is the thing whose origin the but-for and substantial-factor tests trace, and section 430 is phrased in just those terms, asking whether the actor's negligence was a legal cause of the other's harm.27 The tests therefore run to actual loss, and they ask whether this defendant's negligence is what produced it.
Negligence also requires actual harm in its own right. Nominal damages to vindicate a technical right cannot be recovered in a negligence action if no actual damage has occurred.28 Negligence liability moves a real loss from the person who bears it to the careless actor who caused it, and where no loss exists there is nothing to move.
The two drivers were equally careless, and the one fact that moved the answer is whether the carelessness left the plaintiff with a loss in fact. The first scene shows that proof of breach cannot manufacture a claim when no harm exists. The second shows the vocabulary at work: a broken arm is physical impairment of the human body and a crushed bicycle is physical impairment of a chattel, so both fall within the definition of physical harm.29 Harm need not take physical form at all, because the general definition reaches loss or detriment of any kind.