Concept
Applying the Doctrine on Exams
Res ipsa loquitur
Applying the Doctrine on Exams
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1) doubles as the outline of an exam answer, because it names what the plaintiff must show before a factfinder may infer that the defendant's negligence caused the harm. The event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur without negligence, other responsible causes must be sufficiently eliminated by the evidence, and the indicated negligence must fall within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.1 Earlier sections taught each condition and the effect of the inference one at a time. A fact pattern asks you to run them together, in an order where each answer decides whether the next question needs asking, and to tie a reason to a specific fact at every stage. The sequence below does that, and the stadium problem after it shows the sequence working on facts.
The first step screens and the remaining steps build. A plaintiff whose own evidence shows what the defendant did wrong proves negligence in the ordinary way, and an answer that reaches for Latin there has misread the facts. Where the cause really is unexplained, the more common failure is to name the doctrine and stop. An answer that says the plaintiff may invoke res ipsa loquitur if the accident does not ordinarily happen without negligence and the negligence was probably the defendant's has restated the test and answered nothing, so the grader has no analysis to credit. The doctrine is a rule about what counts as legally sufficient circumstantial evidence of negligence, and it does no work apart from the facts that satisfy it.6 Each condition therefore needs a conclusion and a reason drawn from a particular fact in the stem.
Step one favors Jane, because she cannot say what Munoz did. The collapse tells her only that the repaired section failed, so the doctrine has a job to do. On the first condition, properly built and maintained stands do not ordinarily fall, and the inference is stronger for a section recently repaired. The other sections held under comparable crowds, which makes the weight of the spectators a poor explanation for this one failure. The second condition ties the event to Munoz. The section that fell is the section Munoz worked on, so a mistake in the repair is the natural suspect, and Jane need not identify the worker who made it. The third condition is easily met, because a contractor that repairs grandstands undertakes work whose evident purpose is the safety of the people who will sit in them. A lapse in the repair is therefore a lapse within a duty owed to spectators like Jane.
The weak point is the ten weeks. Munoz handed the stands back long before they fell, so it will argue that the stadium's staff and crowds had the section in the interval and that Munoz lacked control. A strong answer meets that argument. Control was only ever shorthand for whether other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated, so the real question is whether the evidence makes the negligence, if any, more probably Munoz's than anyone else's, measured at the time the negligence probably occurred.7 Many states and the Third Restatement have dropped the exclusive-control wording for that reason.8 A jury could reasonably say the evidence points to the repair, though the gap weakens the pointer. A stem that added a rally packing section C to twice its capacity the week before would supply a competing cause the evidence does not eliminate, and that fact could defeat the inference.
The last step finishes the answer. If the court concludes that reasonable jurors could draw the inference, Munoz's motion for a directed verdict fails, and in the usual majority jurisdiction the jury may infer negligence but need not, even if Munoz offers nothing.9 Munoz's strongest reply is proof of what actually caused the collapse, which would remove the unexplained accident the inference depends on. Unless the stem signals a stronger local rule, the answer ends at a permissive inference and a jury question.
The opposite error, applying the doctrine where it does not belong, shows up most often in two-vehicle collisions.
Dalton's argument fails at the first two conditions. Collisions between vehicles commonly arise from the other driver's fault or from no one's, so experience does not say that this kind of event ordinarily reflects the defendant's negligence. Dalton's own driving also remains a live competing cause that the evidence does not eliminate. A plaintiff who can assume that the defendant's car caused the crash and that the plaintiff contributed nothing has already assumed the defendant's fault and has no need for the doctrine. Under the Third Restatement, the defendant driver is likewise not the relevant member of a class of actors whose negligence ordinarily causes such accidents.10 The stadium and the intersection differ in whether the circumstances point anywhere. The collapsed section carries the contractor's repair with it, while the intersection carries only two drivers who are equally suspect. The dispute there is over whose account is true, which is a credibility question for ordinary proof. The sound answer says the doctrine does not apply and turns to the direct evidence of who ran the light.