Concept
Negligence Within the Defendant's Duty
Res ipsa loquitur
Negligence Within the Defendant's Duty
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adds a third condition to the inference: the negligence the accident indicates must fall within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.1 The first two conditions point to a careless act and trace it to the defendant rather than to the plaintiff or a stranger. This one asks whether that act would have breached something the defendant owed this plaintiff. It is the ordinary duty element of negligence, carried into the inference. An inference that the defendant slipped somewhere accomplishes nothing if the slip would have breached no obligation to the plaintiff.
The relationship between the parties usually settles the question, which is why courts dispose of it quickly. When a child was injured while in a defendant's care, one court held the third element established because the defendant had assumed responsibility for caring for the child and owed a duty of reasonable care while dealing with children on its premises.2 Custody does the work. Whatever carelessness explains the injury is carelessness in the very task the defendant undertook.
A defendant does not escape the condition by acting through someone else. In an escalator-injury case against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, the stipulated facts showed that Westinghouse maintained the escalator. That left open whether anyone besides the authority controlled it. The court nonetheless held that the authority effectively had exclusive control, because an authority in control of a public area has a nondelegable duty to maintain its facilities in a safe condition.3 The court used that duty to resolve the control condition, but the same idea answers the duty question. A duty that cannot be delegated means the contractor's careless maintenance is carelessness in performing the authority's own duty to riders. The contract moved the physical work to another company without moving the negligence outside the duty the authority owed.
Medical cases follow the same pattern. Assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital or engaged by the patient, but they normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress. The surgeon can be liable for their negligence under respondeat superior. A surgeon has therefore been held liable when an assisting nurse left a sponge inside a patient, and delegating the task of preventing such mistakes to others does not absolve the surgeon.4 Ybarra rested its departure from the traditional res ipsa limitations on the special relationship between physician and patient, which requires those to whom the patient entrusted his care to assume responsibility for the mishap.5 A lapse by an assistant working under the surgeon is thus a lapse within the surgeon's own duty. Ybarra has drawn criticism in recent years, as advances in science challenge the soundness of its medical conclusions.6
Because custody, the operation of a public facility, and medical treatment each carry a duty on their face, this condition is usually satisfied by the stated facts and is easy to skip on an exam. It deserves real analysis only when the facts place the likely lapse before the defendant assumed responsibility, or in a matter the defendant never owed the plaintiff, or in the hands of someone for whose conduct the defendant does not answer. In those settings the inference has no duty to attach to.