Concept
Proof Problems and Burden Shifting
Plaintiff's burden of proving negligence
Proof Problems and Burden Shifting
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328A, the plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proving each element of the claim.1 That burden presses hardest on a plaintiff who knows the outcome and little else. A few days after abdominal surgery meant to improve her chances of becoming pregnant, one plaintiff lost function in her left leg (Connors v. University Associates, 4 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1993)); another noticed numbness in her right arm shortly after a bilateral mastectomy, later diagnosed as ulnar neuropathy.2 Each can prove the injury and its timing. Each may have no direct evidence of what the surgical team did.
The law helps a plaintiff in that position in two ways, and neither lowers the burden. The first lets the plaintiff prove negligence circumstantially, and res ipsa loquitur is its best-known form. The second shifts the burden on causation to the defendants, but only in a few narrow settings. Circumstantial proof changes the kind of evidence the plaintiff may use; a shift changes who must carry one element, and courts grant it only when specific conditions are met.
Circumstantial Proof of Negligence
Ordinarily a plaintiff proves negligence with direct evidence of what the defendant did and argues that the defendant failed to take a precaution that reasonable care required. The evidence may be physical (a misassembled tool), demonstrative (a video of the accident), eyewitness testimony, or expert testimony.3 When direct evidence of the defendant's conduct is unavailable, the plaintiff proves negligence by circumstantial evidence, meaning proof of one fact that makes another, relevant fact more likely. Dog prints in fresh snow, for instance, show that a dog has recently passed by.4
Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”) is the best-known doctrine that aids this kind of proof.5 It works in two steps. Given the circumstances of the accident, the jury may reasonably infer that the injury, more likely than not, resulted from negligence. The plaintiff must then connect that negligence to the defendant, and proof that the defendant had exclusive control of the injury-causing instrument when the unreasonable risk arose is one way to do so. With both steps in place, the plaintiff need not identify the specific way the defendant acted unreasonably, because the accident “speaks for itself” on negligence.6
Courts usually apply the doctrine through Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1). Parrillo v. Giroux Co. adopted that formulation in Rhode Island and rejected an older rule that the defendant must have had exclusive control of the instrumentality. The section sets three conditions.
The first condition carries the probability argument: an event of that kind more likely than not reflects negligence. The second connects the negligence to the defendant by closing off other explanations. The third ties the inference to the duty element, because the negligence the event indicates must be a failure the defendant owed the plaintiff care to avoid. Some instructions still speak of the defendant's “exclusive control,” language that has caused problems when read too literally. The better focus is control at the time of the likely negligence, not at the time of the accident.7
Jury instructions track these elements. A typical one tells the jury it may conclude that the defendant was negligent if it finds that the accident is of a kind that does not ordinarily happen without negligence and that the thing that caused it was under the defendant's control at the time of the negligence.8 The inference is permissive. A jury that finds those foundation facts is entitled, but not required, to return a verdict for the plaintiff, so the doctrine carries the plaintiff to the jury and no further.9
When a plaintiff cannot say how or why she was injured, but the injury does not generally occur without negligence, the doctrine can supply a permissible inference of negligence sufficient to reach the jury.10 Morris v. Carlota shows the doctrine at work. The plaintiff sued after discovering that a surgical sponge had been left in her abdomen, and the court held that she did not need expert testimony on the standard of care to bring a malpractice claim.11 The result fits the doctrine's logic. A professional is not liable for a “mere error of judgment,”12 but a sponge left inside a patient is no judgment call at all; it is an injury of the kind that does not generally occur without negligence.
A bad outcome that points to negligence in general is not enough when other causes remain open. In an airbag case, the buyers purchased a car in December 1998, and its airbags deployed spontaneously in December 2001. They argued that the seller, Ricky Smith, had a duty to discover whatever defect made the airbags deploy, and that argument assumed the car was defective when sold. The court found that assumption unsupported on these facts, though it observed that res ipsa loquitur might have permitted the inference had the airbags deployed shortly after the purchase.13
Three years of ownership and use leave room for causes other than the seller's negligence, and the doctrine does not help a plaintiff who ignores them. Courts have refused to apply it to the owner of a used pickup truck that had been driven more than 50,000 miles by two prior owners, one of whom had installed a spotlight on the door frame, and to the owners of a toaster-oven that may well have lived out its useful life. The plaintiff's task is still modest: she must negate only the most likely alternative causes, and only by a preponderance of the evidence, not every conceivable theory of how the malfunction occurred.14
The malfunction theory in products liability shows the same limit. It permits proof of defect by circumstantial evidence, but it does not reduce the plaintiff's burden of proving that the accident was caused by a defect for which the defendant is responsible.15 Courts therefore recite the doctrine's propriety readily and often hold it inapplicable on the facts, because the law will not allow plaintiffs or juries to rely on guess, conjecture, or speculation.16
Circumstantial proof thus gives the plaintiff a way to produce enough evidence of breach to reach the jury. The jury then decides whether the plaintiff has persuaded it by a preponderance. A plaintiff who proves the foundation facts has secured a permissible inference of negligence, and nothing more.17
Narrow Burden-Shifting Exceptions
A plaintiff who cannot prove causation ordinarily loses, and courts shift the burden on that element in only a few settings, each with its own justification.19 Alternative liability applies when two defendants were negligent and only one of them injured the plaintiff. The evidentiary-void rationale applies when the defendants' own negligent omission left no direct evidence of what happened.
The first exception comes from Summers v. Tice. A single shot hit the plaintiff in the eye, and it came from the gun of one of two negligent defendants, but the plaintiff could not prove which.20 One defendant had caused no harm at all; the other had caused the entire injury.21 Under the ordinary allocation the plaintiff would have lost against both, since he could not say whose shot it was. The California Supreme Court instead held both defendants jointly and severally liable unless one of them proved that the shot came from the other's gun.22
The court gave two reasons. The defendants were in a better position than the plaintiff to establish whose tortious act caused the harm, and as between two negligent defendants and an innocent victim, the defendants should pay even without proof of which one caused the accident.23 Both reasons presuppose proved negligence by each defendant and a single injury that only one of them caused, so the plaintiff's inability to say which was the only missing piece of his case.24
The doctrine has a cost. The defendant whose shot missed is held liable even though he did not in fact cause the harm.25 Ordinary multiple-cause analysis shows how far this departs from the usual rule. Suppose a driver's negligent maintenance and a puddle in the road together cause a crash. His negligence is still a but-for cause, because the accident would not have happened without it, and the puddle does not exonerate him.26 In Summers, by contrast, one defendant's negligence caused no harm at all.27
A related setting involves two negligent defendants who probably each contributed to an injury that is hard to apportion. If the plaintiff proves that both were negligent, most courts shift to the defendants the burden of showing what part of the injury each caused. Defendants who cannot separate the damages are held jointly liable for all of them or severally liable in proportion to their fault.28
The exception stops well short of every case with more than one defendant.
The hunters had each been proved negligent, and the shift relieved the plaintiff of one remaining question: which negligent defendant caused the injury. The passerby has not reached that step. Nothing justifies shifting the burden to the defendants every time a plaintiff sues more than one, a change that would transform American tort law and one the California court did not make even in Summers. The burden stays with the plaintiff, as Restatement (Third) of Torts § 28, comment i, confirms.29
A second exception does not depend on the number of defendants. It applies when the defendants' own negligence has left the plaintiff without a way to learn what happened. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, drownings left no direct evidence of how they occurred, and the court traced that gap to the defendants' failure to provide a lifeguard. A lifeguard's main purpose is to help people in danger, but an attentive one also witnesses the accidents that happen. Without one, the decedents lost protection and the plaintiffs lost the means of establishing the facts. The plaintiffs had proved the defendants negligent in that respect, and the available facts at the very least strongly suggested that a competent lifeguard exercising reasonable care would have prevented the deaths.30
The court held that demanding greater certainty on causation would let the defendants profit from the lack of proof inherent in the situation they had created. The burden on causation therefore shifted to them to absolve themselves if they could.31 The reasoning has precedent. In Martin v. Herzog, Judge Cardozo treated a nighttime collision with a vehicle that lacked required lights as sufficient to show causation, because lights are mandated precisely to reduce the risk of such accidents, unless the negligent party showed, for example, that very bright street lights or a full moon made the missing lights an unlikely cause.32
Products liability voices a related worry. When plaintiffs in a predictable class of cases cannot prove causation, the seller of a defective product knows that it is effectively immunized from liability for that class, and the causation requirement can erode incentives.33 A shift on causation answers that worry where the defendant's own conduct made proof impossible.
Courts have confined Haft to the setting that produced it, an evidentiary void in the direct evidence. In Lopez v. Alroudhan, a pedestrian badly injured when the defendant's car struck her could not remember the accident and invoked Haft. The California appellate court refused to shift the burden, because testimony about the accident and her injuries was available from her, from a police officer at the scene, and from several doctors, and the jury's finding that she had not carried her burden stood. A plaintiff's difficulty in proving causation is therefore not the trigger. The trigger is difficulty that the defendants' own breach created, in a record with no direct evidence to fill it.
Because a plaintiff must prove something before any exception applies, a problem is best worked in order.
Suing several defendants does not move the burden. A plaintiff who names three defendants without proving that any of them was careless stands where a plaintiff who named one would stand. The exceptions exist for plaintiffs who have supplied everything except the one fact that the defendants' conduct or position put out of reach.