Concept
Elements Plaintiff Must Prove
Plaintiff's burden of proving negligence
Elements Plaintiff Must Prove
In an action for negligence the plaintiff has the burden of proving four things, and a failure on any one of them defeats the claim.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328A lists them. The plaintiff must prove the facts that give rise to a legal duty on the defendant’s part to conform to the standard of conduct the law establishes for the plaintiff’s protection;2 the defendant’s failure to conform to that standard;3 the causal connection between that failure and the harm;4 and that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally compensable by damages.5
The four elements form two pairs. Duty and breach describe a wrong in the abstract: duty fixes the standard of conduct the law required of this defendant toward this plaintiff, and breach asks whether the defendant fell short of it. Causation and harm tie that wrong to a person. Causation connects the defendant’s departure from the standard to the plaintiff’s loss, and harm establishes that the loss is one the law compensates. A driver who runs a red light and hurts no one has breached a duty without becoming liable to anyone. A person injured by something no breach explains has a loss with no defendant to charge it to.
Requiring all four keeps negligence a claim by one person against another. Without the causal requirement, tort law would stop enforcing individual rights and their correlative duties and would become a system of public law that enlists plaintiffs as private attorneys general to enforce safety rules.6 Causation also divides into two questions: whether the breach in fact brought about the harm, and whether the law holds the defendant answerable for the harm that followed. The sections below take the elements in order, beginning with duty, because the standard of conduct must be fixed before anyone can ask whether the defendant met it.
Proving Duty
Under § 328A(a), the plaintiff must prove “facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff.”7 The wording assigns the plaintiff a specific task. A duty is the law’s demand that one person conform to a standard of conduct for another’s protection, and the plaintiff does not prove that demand directly. The plaintiff proves the circumstances, meaning who the parties were and how they came to stand in relation to each other, that bring the defendant within it. The duty then follows as a legal consequence, so proof of duty runs in two steps: facts first, then the law’s judgment about what those facts require.
The second step belongs to the court. Duty is a legal issue rather than something the plaintiff “proves” in the way a party proves a fact, and a court sometimes has already decided it for a whole category of cases. The issue may still depend on facts that are in dispute, and in that event it cannot be decided until trial.8
Once a duty exists, it carries a standard of conduct, and the standard usually is reasonable care under all the circumstances. A person acts negligently by failing to exercise that care. The factors that decide whether conduct lacked it are the foreseeable likelihood that the conduct will cause harm, the foreseeable severity of that harm, and the burden of the precautions that would eliminate or reduce the risk.9 Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard the law establishes for protecting others against unreasonable risk of harm, so the two elements interlock: duty supplies the yardstick, and breach asks whether the defendant measured up.10
In everyday cases the duty element takes almost no effort. A plaintiff who testifies that she was proceeding through an intersection when a driver facing a stop sign entered it and struck her car has described two people sharing a public road, and the duty of reasonable care raises no difficulty.11
The standard changes when the defendant is a professional. A physician is measured against the skill and care of the average qualified practitioner acting in like circumstances, and the test is objective. It demands competence rather than excellence, and good intentions or a sincere best effort do not satisfy it.12 Jurors cannot work out from everyday experience what a reasonable surgeon would have done, so the plaintiff must put the profession’s standard in evidence, ordinarily through expert testimony.13 A malpractice plaintiff therefore carries a heavier load on this element than an ordinary tort plaintiff, who can simply invite the jury to apply its own sense of what is reasonable.
The court’s gatekeeping role shows most clearly when it declines to recognize a duty at all. In Lucero v. Holbrook, the plaintiffs sought to hold a driver liable for leaving a motor running in a vehicle parked in her driveway. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the driver. It did not accept an argument that rested on how easily the keys could have been removed. The burden that matters, the court said, is the burden of imposing the duty itself: a rule against leaving a motor running temporarily in a driveway would apply across the board and would create potential liability for every person in Wyoming who starts a car on a cold winter day to warm it and defrost the windshield.14 A duty ruling thus sets the law for everyone in the defendant’s position, which is why the court decides it while the plaintiff proves the facts that connect the rule to this dispute.
Compare the intersection plaintiff with the Lucero plaintiffs. The first proves ordinary facts, and the law supplies the duty without difficulty. The second could prove every fact alleged and still lose, because the question was whether the law should impose the duty on anyone in the defendant’s position. No amount of better evidence cures an absent duty, and a court can end the case on that ground at summary judgment before a jury hears anything about breach or causation. When a serious injury follows a careless act, the first question is still whether the law recognizes a duty running from this defendant to this plaintiff.
Proving Breach
The second element asks what the defendant actually did. Under § 328A(b), the plaintiff must prove the “failure of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct” that the duty element established.16 Breach compares two things: the conduct the law required, which duty fixed, and the conduct the defendant engaged in. The plaintiff supplies the evidence of what the defendant did, and the jury decides whether that conduct measured up. A defendant who owed reasonable care and gave it has breached nothing, however badly the plaintiff was hurt.
The comparison uses an objective benchmark. A person acts negligently when the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances,17 and the law asks what a reasonable person would have done in the defendant’s position, not what the defendant intended or hoped. The medical standard states the point outright: the fact that a physician meant well or practiced to the best of his ability is not relevant, because conduct is measured by objective criteria.18 Ordinary defendants are measured the same way. The objective measure also serves proof. If sincerity could excuse carelessness, the plaintiff would have to prove the defendant’s hidden state of mind, and identical conduct would produce different results depending on how conscientious each defendant felt.
To decide whether conduct fell short, courts weigh the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may follow, and the burden of the precautions that would eliminate or reduce the risk.19 The first two factors measure how dangerous the conduct was, since a risk grows with the probability of harm and with its gravity. The third measures what removing the danger would have cost. Conduct lacks reasonable care when a precaution that was cheap relative to the danger went untaken. The balance keeps the standard from becoming either impossible or empty: a rule demanding every conceivable precaution would make ordinary activity too costly to pursue, while a rule demanding none would leave foreseeable and preventable injuries unanswered.
The burden factor reads differently at the duty stage than at the breach stage. In Lucero the court used it to ask what a rule against leaving a motor running would cost across everyone it would reach, not what it cost one driver to remove her keys.20 Breach asks the narrower question whether this defendant’s conduct on this occasion was unreasonable.
Direct evidence usually proves breach, and the intersection plaintiff shows how little that can require. A plaintiff who testifies that she was proceeding through the intersection when a driver facing a stop sign entered it and struck her car has described conduct from which a jury could find a failure to yield and, with it, a failure to use reasonable care. If the jury believes the testimony, it may find breach, though it is not required to.21 Breach goes to the jury in most cases because it applies a general standard to particular facts, and reasonable people can disagree about whether those facts measure up. A judge withholds the issue only when the evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find a departure from the standard, a threshold that the later section on production and persuasion develops.
Direct evidence takes familiar forms: a misassembled tool, a video of the accident, eyewitness testimony, and expert testimony. Sometimes no one can say directly what the defendant did or failed to do, and the plaintiff turns to circumstantial evidence, which is proof of one fact that makes another relevant fact more likely, as dog prints in fresh snow make it more likely that a dog recently passed by.22 The burden on breach is the same either way, and only the route to the jury differs. A defendant who has violated a pertinent statute or ordinance may also be presumed negligent in some circumstances.23
When the defendant is a professional, the benchmark shifts from the reasonable person to the average qualified practitioner acting in like circumstances. The standard asks for competence rather than excellence, so a physician is not liable merely because another physician might have done better. If two procedures were available and the defendant selected one, the question is whether a competent physician could have selected it, even if another physician would not have.24 The same holds for an error of judgment in diagnosis or treatment when expert opinion places the physician’s conduct within a range of acceptable alternatives.25 If one expert’s preference were enough, liability would attach to the exercise of judgment itself rather than to incompetence, and any bad result paired with a single expert who would have done otherwise would produce a verdict.
The two cases differ in one respect: whether the conduct fell inside the range a competent practitioner could choose. A bad result appears in both and decides neither. The plaintiff’s task is to prove the departure itself, whether the defendant is an ordinary actor measured against the reasonable person or a professional measured against the competent practitioner.
Proving Actual Cause
The third element is the causal connection between the defendant’s failure and the plaintiff’s harm, and the burden of proving it stays with the plaintiff like the others.27 Causation ties the violation of the plaintiff’s right to the defendant’s breach of duty, and a plaintiff who has shown only a careless defendant and an injured person has not yet shown that one has anything to do with the other.28 Courts once folded two questions into the single label of proximate cause and now treat them separately. Actual cause, also called cause in fact, asks whether the breach in fact brought about the injury. Legal cause asks whether policy limits liability for the harm that followed. The jury resolves both.29 This section takes actual cause, and the next takes legal cause.
Courts ordinarily test actual cause with a counterfactual question: without the defendant’s negligence, would the plaintiff have been injured? That is the but-for test. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 26 states it this way: conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct. Cause in fact will almost always be established once that test is met.30 Courts generally require the plaintiff to prove but-for causation by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that the plaintiff’s account is more likely true than not. A few older cases, and a few current ones, demand more and require the plaintiff to eliminate every cause of the accident other than the defendant’s negligence.31 The test exists because liability must follow from harm the defendant’s conduct actually produced. A defendant whose carelessness changed nothing has caused this plaintiff no loss, and charging that defendant would turn tort law from a remedy for one person’s wrong against another into a system for policing safety.32
The but-for test can defeat a plaintiff who proves a plain breach. In Gills v. United States, a federal district court in Virginia found that a physician was negligent in leaving a surgical sponge in the decedent’s body and that removing it required a second operation. The patient, however, died of other causes without ever waking from the first operation, and the court held that the plaintiff had not shown the sponge caused the death. It awarded no damages for the negligence.33 The court called the missing link proximate cause, the older label that covers both questions. The facts show a failure of the factual link: the patient would have died when he did whether or not the sponge had been left behind.
Because the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s act was the cause, the evidence has to put the defendant’s conduct above even odds. The preponderance standard is the lowest one used in civil actions. It means only that the plaintiff should prevail if success is more likely than not, which is why it is sometimes called the 51 percent standard.34 In medical cases courts phrase the same requirement as proof that the negligent conduct most probably caused the harm.35
The 40 percent result does not mean a plaintiff must rule out every other conceivable explanation. In Stubbs v. City of Rochester, the plaintiff contracted typhoid fever and claimed the city’s contaminated water caused it. Other causes were possible, and the court held that a jury could find actual cause if it could be reasonably certain that the contaminated water caused the fever. The plaintiff did not have to actively disprove the other causes.36 Those other causes were disparate and impossible to prove, and requiring the plaintiff to negate them would have prevented her from seeking relief at all.37 Stubbs relieves a plaintiff of eliminating remote alternatives. It does not lower the requirement that the evidence support reasonable certainty about the defendant’s conduct. The worker with a 40 percent showing has nothing to be reasonably certain about, because the plaintiff’s own evidence makes the defendant the less probable explanation.
The relief also depends on the plaintiff’s position. Suppose Paula blames a driver’s negligence for a wrist injury, and she has hurt the same wrist five times before. She knows the history of each earlier injury and is uniquely situated to show that none of them caused the present one, so a court has far less reason to excuse her from addressing them than it had to excuse the typhoid plaintiff.38
The kind of risk the negligence created can carry a plaintiff over the line. Judge Cardozo applied this reasoning in Martin v. Herzog, a nighttime collision involving a vehicle without the required lights. Lights are required precisely to reduce the risk of such accidents, he said, and that fact sufficed to show causation unless the negligent party demonstrated, for example, that bright street lights or a full moon made the missing lights an unlikely cause in the particular instance.39 Zuchowicz v. United States draws on that reasoning. When negligence is wrongful because it raises the chance of a particular kind of accident, and an accident of that kind occurs, the fact-finder may find that the negligence caused it, and the negligent party can answer with evidence that its conduct played no part in the actual case.40
The but-for test breaks down in one recurring situation, and courts handle it with an exception rather than a second requirement. When two causes would each have produced the harm alone, each actor can say the other’s act would have sufficed, and a strict but-for test excuses both.41 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. is the standard illustration. Two fires merged and destroyed the plaintiff’s property. One was due to the defendant’s negligence, and the other, which was not, would probably have burned the property anyway. The plaintiff could not say the property would still stand but for the defendant’s fire, so the court allowed the plaintiff to show instead that the defendant’s fire was a substantial factor in producing the damage. That substantial-factor test appears in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431(a) and, under the label multiple sufficient causes, in Restatement (Third) of Torts § 27.42
The exception has limits that matter as much as its content. The substantial-factor test is an alternative route for the unusual situations in which but-for analysis yields an unsatisfactory result. It is not a second hurdle after but-for is met, although students often run both tests on every set of facts as though the plaintiff had to pass both. In an ordinary case the but-for test controls, and the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s act was a but-for cause of the harm.43 The sponge in Gills was not one of two sufficient causes of the death, because it contributed nothing to the death, so no substantial-factor argument was available. Had the defendant’s fire in Anderson burned itself out in a field before the other fire arrived, it would have failed under either test, since it would have been neither necessary to the loss nor a contributor to it.
Actual cause often turns on scientific or medical facts that jurors cannot work out from everyday experience. A malpractice jury must often grapple with unfamiliar processes that carry inherent uncertainty, and it normally cannot find causation from speculation and conjecture, so expert testimony is generally essential.44 The requirement yields in a few situations: when the occurrence and its causative effects are within the general knowledge of lay jurors, and when the defendant’s own testimony or admissions supply the necessary analysis.45 Jurors need no expert to know that a collision crushed a fender, but they do need one to know whether a drug dose produced a disease.
A few courts have also relaxed the but-for demand for one class of medical cases. Oregon, for example, recognizes a limited loss-of-chance theory of recovery in common-law malpractice cases in which the plaintiff alleges the loss of a chance at a recovery or better medical outcome. Because the case came up at the pleading stage, the court left the details of such a claim for later.46
Proving Legal Cause
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 states the test for the second part of the causal element: negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm if the conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and no rule of law relieves the actor from liability because of the manner in which the negligence resulted in the harm.48 Legal cause, also called proximate cause, asks whether the law will hold the defendant answerable for the harm that actually followed. The plaintiff must prove it along with actual cause, since the two issues together make up the causal element.49 Section 431’s first clause echoes the substantial-factor test from the last section, but the clause that matters here is the second: a rule of law that can relieve a defendant even though the breach was a but-for cause.
Actual cause cannot mark the end of liability. The events without which a harm would not have occurred are beyond counting, yet no ordinary mind would call most of them causes. The Restatement uses the word substantial to separate the two. It denotes that the defendant’s conduct had such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable people to regard it as a cause in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called philosophic sense, which includes every event without which the happening would not have occurred.50 Legal cause thus asks the question of responsibility that but-for analysis leaves open.
Courts that limit liability by what could be foreseen reached their result in Wagon Mound (No. 1). A ship negligently discharged oil into a harbor, the oil later caught fire, and the fire damaged the plaintiff’s wharf. The court held the defendant not liable for the fire damage because a fire was not a foreseeable consequence of the spill.
The same logic works for the plaintiff when the harm is the very danger that made the conduct negligent, and the acts of third parties show this most clearly. The Restatement states the principle this way: if the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard, or one of the hazards, that makes the actor negligent, the third person’s act does not prevent liability, whether it is innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal.51 One of its illustrations has a railway conductor put a passenger off a train late at night at a closed station in a lonely district. The only way to the neighboring town passes a construction camp that, to the conductor’s knowledge, includes many persons of vicious character, and the passenger is attacked there. The railway is liable.52 Another has a railroad negligently run down a truck carrying barrels of cider at night, at a place where thefts from freight cars have been frequent. The collision scatters the barrels and stuns the driver, unknown thieves take the cider, and the railroad’s negligence is a legal cause of the loss.53 In each illustration the possibility of the third party’s crime was part of what made the defendant’s conduct negligent, so the crime does not interrupt the chain.
The jury resolves legal cause, as it resolves actual cause.54 Applying a standard like foreseeability to particular facts calls for a judgment on which reasonable people can differ, much like the judgment about breach. The judge keeps a screening role: the issue reaches the jury only if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff, and the judge takes it away only when no reasonable jury could. That threshold is the burden of production, which a later section develops. In the landlord example, evidence of repeated prowler reports would leave the jury to decide whether intruders were a hazard that made leaving the lock broken negligent. With no such evidence, a judge could rule that no reasonable jury could find for the tenant. The screen is narrow by design, so ordinary disputes over foreseeability stay with the jury.
Proving Actual Harm
The fourth element is harm. Under § 328A, the plaintiff must prove “that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally compensable by damages.”56 Two requirements sit in that phrase. “In fact suffered” asks about the world: something must have happened to the plaintiff’s body or property, and evidence must show it. “Of a kind legally compensable” asks about the law: the loss must be one the law treats as a basis for damages. Injury to property qualifies, generally measured by the loss in value or the cost to repair or replace, whichever is less, together with consequential losses such as diminished profits. Bodily injury qualifies as well, and it yields out-of-pocket losses such as health-care expenses and lost earnings or earning capacity, along with intangible losses such as physical and emotional suffering, disfigurement, and loss of life’s enjoyments.57
Harm is usually the easiest element to prove. A plaintiff who testifies that a driver required to stop at a stop sign struck her car and broke her arm supplies the facts for this element along with the earlier ones, because a damaged vehicle and a broken arm are losses of recognized kinds.58 The injury is what brought her to court, and medical records, bills, and repair estimates document it. The element decides a case only when the loss is missing altogether.
The harm element also marks the line between negligence and the intentional torts. In assault, battery, and false imprisonment the tort itself is regarded as harmful, so the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages, which are a token sum recognizing that a wrong occurred, without proving any specific loss. In negligence, damage is an essential element of the claim, and a plaintiff who has suffered no legally recognized harm has no claim at all. A plaintiff who proves duty, breach, and causation but no harm therefore cannot fall back on a nominal award.
The two categories differ because the wrongs differ. An intentional tort consists of deliberately invading a protected interest, such as a person’s body or freedom of movement, so the wrong and the injury to the interest occur together, and the law treats the plaintiff as wronged even when no dollar loss follows. Negligence consists of creating an unreasonable risk, and a risk that never turns into a loss has invaded no one’s interest. If carelessness alone supported a claim, anyone who witnessed or narrowly escaped a careless act could sue over it, and negligence law would become a general regulator of risky conduct. Requiring harm keeps the claim tied to a loss that one person actually suffered at another’s hands.
Proving that a recognized harm occurred is a different task from proving how much it is worth. A plaintiff who shows a real injury of a compensable kind clears this element, while the size of the loss and the precision with which it must be shown belong to the later section on certainty in proving damages. A defendant who argues that the plaintiff could have reduced the loss, or that some other condition of the plaintiff caused the damages, cannot simply assert it. Courts have faulted a defendant who offered no adequate evidence that the plaintiff’s smoking and obesity caused healing difficulties, and one court treated a jury instruction approving a mitigation defense without proof that mitigation would have reduced the damages as error, though a later, more accurate instruction probably cured it.59