Concept
Professional Custom Contrast
Custom as evidence of the standard of care
Professional Custom Contrast
Outside the professions, custom is evidence and nothing more. The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, among the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether conduct is negligent, and it denies them controlling force where a reasonable person would not follow them.1 When no enactment, regulation, or decision fixes the standard of conduct, the trial judge or jury applies the standard to the facts, and custom enters that judgment as one input among several.2 Following custom is therefore not automatically reasonable care, and departing from it is not automatically negligence.3
Professional negligence runs on a different rule. In most jurisdictions, compliance with professional custom insulates the defendant from liability, and failure to comply with it is malpractice. A minority of jurisdictions follow a general reasonableness standard, under which evidence of compliance or noncompliance with professional custom is admissible but not dispositive.4
The two rules give the last word to different decision makers, and exam questions exploit the difference. Against a landlord, a manufacturer, or a shipowner, proof of trade practice goes to the jury, which may weigh it and reject it.5 Against a physician, the same kind of proof ordinarily decides breach, and the dispute moves to what the profession's practice is and whether the defendant met it.6 Applying either rule to the wrong kind of defendant misstates the law. The first subsection below explains why professional custom controls and how a plaintiff proves it. The second shows where courts have stopped deferring to it.
When Professional Custom Controls
For health care providers, and in some jurisdictions for other professionals, the standard of care is not what a reasonably prudent professional ought to have done. It is what the reasonably well-qualified professional ordinarily and customarily does in fact, so the profession sets the standard through its own custom and practice.7 The jury therefore does not ask whether the custom is itself reasonable, as it would in an ordinary negligence case.
The rule cuts both ways, and that symmetry makes it a standard instead of a defense. A physician who followed the custom is not negligent, and a physician who departed from it is.8 The plaintiff's expert must establish the custom itself, such as a custom to locate a certain nerve before cutting nearby or to refer a patient with a given condition to a specialist. Under a reasonable-care standard, by contrast, the expert might testify that the risk of the defendant's procedure was high and its benefits correspondingly low, which could support an inference of negligence without any appeal to medical custom.9 The choice of standard thus changes what the expert may say and what the plaintiff must prove.
Two blood-bank decisions reached opposite results on whether a blood bank should have used surrogate tests to screen for the AIDS virus before an antibody test was available. In Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, the court upheld judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the blood bank, reasoning that "professional prudence is defined by actual or accepted practice within a profession, rather than theories about what 'should' have been done."10 Osborn shows the traditional rule at full strength: once the profession's practice is shown, theory about what should have been done does not matter. The companion decision appears in the next subsection.
A nonprofessional defendant gets no comparable protection. By the 1930s, courts had concluded that a business's conformity with custom no longer necessarily meant that it was not negligent, and the leading case, The T.J. Hooper, marks that shift.11
Necessity is the principal reason for the difference. Professional work is far more complex than the activities in ordinary negligence cases, and jurors know much less about it. Asking a jury whether a course of treatment was reasonable would ask for its medical judgment, and no juror can give that without relying heavily on evidence of the professional standard.12 Compare the familiar end of the spectrum. Modern jurors can readily decide whether the driver in a run-of-the-mill collision drove reasonably, but they know far less about shipping or about the advantages and disadvantages of shatterproof glass, so industry custom helps educate them.13 Medicine lies further along the same line, to the point where custom does the deciding instead of the educating. A secondary reason is that professions tend, at least in theory, to regulate themselves.14
Neither reason is airtight. Nonprofessional industries also make safety choices that require considerable expertise, and some professional errors, such as a lawyer's missing a filing deadline, need no expert to show negligence.15 A jury is as likely to be at sea in other technically complex cases, yet the special rule has not spread to them, largely for reasons of history and continuing solicitude for professionals, among whom are appellate judges who once practiced law.16
Because the standard is a fact about what the profession does, the plaintiff must ordinarily produce expert testimony to prove breach, and usually also to prove factual causation, unless the defendant's negligence is obvious even to a layman or res ipsa loquitur applies.17 Legal malpractice follows the same pattern. The plaintiff generally needs an expert to establish the standard and the lawyer's failure to meet it. The standard is generally determined statewide, so a lawyer in Buffalo could testify that a lawyer in Schenectady was negligent, and a lawyer who holds herself out as a specialist may be held to the heightened standard of other experts in that field. Rules of professional conduct may bear on the standard of care, but courts generally do not give them per se effect, unlike safety statutes in ordinary negligence cases.18
Whose custom counts varies among jurisdictions. Some measure physicians against practitioners in the same or a similar locality, others against a national standard drawn from average, qualified practitioners, and still others judge general practitioners locally and board-certified specialists nationally.19
A profession may also hold more than one view of good practice. In many jurisdictions a "two schools of thought" or "respectable minority" rule applies: a defendant who followed a school of practice that a respectable minority of practitioners follows is not liable for malpractice, even if much of the profession rejects that approach.20 See Jones v. Chidester.
Limits on Professional Custom
The majority rule rests mainly on the jurors' inability to judge technical work, so it loosens where that reason does not reach. Courts have cut it back in four ways, from mild to sweeping. Some treat accepted practice as a rebuttable presumption, a rare decision finds negligence despite compliance, a strong minority of jurisdictions measure a physician's duty to disclose by reasonable conduct, and a minority reject the custom standard altogether.
The mildest limit keeps the profession's practice as the starting point and lets the plaintiff attack it. In United Blood Services v. Quintana, the Colorado court held that the standard of care a profession has adopted, as established by expert testimony, is presumed to constitute due care for those practicing in that profession, but that the presumption may be rebutted. It ordered a new trial so that the plaintiffs could try to prove that the universal practice of blood banks was negligent.22 Quintana faced the same surrogate-testing question as Osborn and came out the other way.
The two courts disagree about what a shared practice proves. Under Osborn, the practice answers the question of what prudence required. Under Quintana, it carries the defendant a long way but leaves the plaintiff free to argue that even a universal practice fell short. The presumption puts the burden of that showing on the plaintiff, and the right to rebut keeps open the possibility that a whole profession lagged behind a precaution that reasonable care required.
A far rarer limit appears in Helling v. Carey. An ophthalmologist had not routinely tested patients under age forty for glaucoma, and experts on both sides testified that the standards of the profession did not require testing at that age. The court held the ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law anyway, basing its decision on its own balance of the seriousness of the potential risk against the cost of the test.23 That balance is the ordinary negligence method of weighing risk against burden, applied where the profession's standard would have answered the question. Reasonable care in that sense is one standard that demands more as the risk grows: dispensing gasoline calls for more care than dispensing ice cream sodas, but the standard is the same one, applied to a larger risk.24 Commentators criticized Helling and the Washington legislature reversed it, and cases that allow recovery against a provider who followed customary practice remain very rare.25
The limit with the widest reach concerns what a physician must tell a patient. In Canterbury v. Spence, the court refused to make the patient's cause of action depend on the existence and nonperformance of a relevant professional tradition.26
The court gave three reasons, each of a different kind. The first is evidentiary. It doubted that a custom of disclosure really exists, and it feared that no custom at all might be taken for a custom of silence, with physician-witnesses merely stating their personal opinions about what they or others would do. The second concerns who decides. Patients vary so much that an omission can be justified only by the circumstances of the individual case, and binding disclosure to medical usage would give the physician alone the decision on revelation, although respect for the patient's right of self-determination demands a standard set by law rather than one that physicians may or may not impose on themselves.27 The third goes to the foundation of professional deference. The special medical standards adapt the general standard to a group who must act as reasonable people with medical talents would, so there is no basis for the special standard where the physician's activity does not bring medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into play. The decision to reveal a patient's condition and the chances of remedy is often a non-medical judgment, and medical custom cannot furnish the test of such a decision, whatever its relevance under the proper test.28 The third reason is the most basic. The case for deferring to professional custom rests on jurors' inability to evaluate technical medical judgment, and what a patient needs to hear in order to choose among treatments is often not a technical medical judgment.
The court therefore held that the standard for the duty to disclose, for physicians as for others, is conduct reasonable under the circumstances.29 A strong minority of jurisdictions likewise reject custom in informed-consent cases and require disclosure of the risks the jury deems material, meaning those a reasonable person would take into account in deciding whether to proceed with the surgery.30
Canterbury keeps the special standard where medical judgment enters. When it does, prevailing medical practice must be given its just due, and in all other instances the general standard of ordinary care applies and the law sets it.31 Professional practice keeps its value as evidence either way, because the practices a profession adopts help show what degree of care and skill is required.32
The broadest limit abandons the custom standard in favor of ordinary reasonable care. A minority of jurisdictions follow a general reasonableness standard, and in them evidence of compliance or noncompliance with professional custom is admissible but not dispositive.33 The shift changes the trial, because the expert is no longer confined to proving custom and may testify, for example, that the procedure's risk was high and its benefits low.34 A few decisions have applied reasonable care only in particular situations, finding the profession's usual practice itself negligent, and those decisions are quite rare.35 The majority of jurisdictions still use the custom standard for physicians.36
Each limit pulls the case back toward the ordinary rule that custom is a factor and not controlling where a reasonable person would not follow it.37 Professional custom keeps control where jurors truly need the profession to supply the measure, and it loses ground where that need fades or where the profession's own practice is in doubt. For a claim about how treatment was performed, a physician who followed accepted practice is protected in a majority jurisdiction. For a claim about what the patient was told, in a jurisdiction that follows Canterbury, the physician meets a reasonable-care standard in which custom is evidence and nothing more.