Concept
Custom and What the Actor Should Know
Custom as evidence of the standard of care
Custom and What the Actor Should Know
Before a jury weighs any precaution, it asks whether the actor should have seen the danger at all. Section 290 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answers by listing what the actor is required to know when the question is whether he should recognize that his conduct involves a risk.1 The question comes first because no one can guard against a danger he cannot recognize, so the law must fix the facts an actor is charged with knowing before it asks whether he responded reasonably to them. Because the Restatement says the actor “is required to know” these matters, a defendant's own ignorance of them does not answer a claim that he should have recognized the risk.
Earlier parts of this chapter used custom to measure precautions: did the defendant take the safeguards that others in the same calling take? Section 295A made the answer a factor for the jury, not a controlling test.2 Section 290 puts custom to a different use. It asks what the actor must understand about the setting in which he acts, so that he can see a risk exists at all, and that question logically precedes any question about precautions. General custom can therefore matter twice in one negligence case: as a measure of the precautions a reasonable actor takes, and as part of the background the actor must have in mind when he decides how to act.
Section 290 has two parts. Clause (a) covers common knowledge about people, animals, things, and forces. Clause (b) covers the legal and customary surroundings of the conduct: the common law, legislative enactments, and general customs, so far as they are likely to affect the conduct of others or of third persons.3 Both parts do one job. They fix the world a reasonable actor is assumed to know before the jury decides whether he handled the risk with care.
Matters of Common Knowledge
Section 290(a) charges the actor with the qualities and habits of human beings and animals, and with the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of things and forces, so far as those are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community.4 Two phrases limit that charge. “Common knowledge” sets the measure at what ordinary members of the community know, so the actor's own education, curiosity, or inexperience neither raises nor lowers it. “At the time and in the community” ties the measure to the place and period of the conduct. The measure lies outside the actor because the objective standard lets people deal with one another without first sizing up each other's intelligence.5
A worn tire shows the rule at work. Everyone who drives knows that a tire worn through to the fabric is dangerous and should come off the car. A driver whose tire blows out in that condition cannot escape by saying he did not know, because the danger is common knowledge among drivers. The same commonness answers a procedural objection: jurors share the knowledge, so the plaintiff need not call an expert to explain it.
Common knowledge reaches only what the community actually shares, and the limit matters as much as the charge.
Common knowledge belongs to the community, not to the individual, so a gap in one person's experience does not lower the bar. A Kentucky court in Tolin v. Terrell described the unpredictability of a mule's kick as a matter of common knowledge and common experience, so that the only safe course is to stay out of range of the animal's heels. A person who has never met a mule is measured against what people who live around mules know, not against his own sheltered history. Weather works the same way. A visitor from a city where it never snows, who fails to recognize snow on a northern road, is held to what an ordinary person in that community knows: the white covering is snow.6 The community in § 290(a) is the one where the actor is acting, so the visitor cannot import the lower standard of the place he left.7
Matters outside common knowledge pose a different question. An actor who lacks such knowledge is not automatically negligent, yet a reasonable person about to do something potentially dangerous may have to learn the facts first. In Gobrecht v. Beckwith, a landlord installed a gas heater in a closed, almost unventilated bathroom without realizing that it would fill the room with carbon monoxide, and a tenant who lit the heater was poisoned. The court held the landlord negligent for failing to inquire into the heater's safety before installing it, and held the tenant not negligent for relying on the landlord instead of inquiring himself. Ignorance did not decide the case; the parties' roles did. The landlord chose to put a gas appliance in a nearly sealed room, so a reasonable landlord would have asked about its safety first, while the tenant, as the user, could assume the appliance had been made safe. Section 290(a) thus tells the court what the actor is presumed to know, and the duty to inquire reaches the further ground that a reasonable person in his position would not leave unexamined.
Customs Affecting Others
Section 290(b) adds the social half of what an actor must know: the common law, legislative enactments, and general customs, so far as they are likely to affect the conduct of the other or third persons.9 Clause (a) covered what the community knows about people, animals, things, and forces. Clause (b) recognizes that the people around the actor live under legal rules and shared habits, and an actor who cannot predict what they will probably do cannot judge how dangerous his own conduct is. The closing phrase keeps the charge tied to that purpose, because a law or custom with no bearing on how others will behave tells him nothing about risk.
Custom plays a different role here than it did under § 295A. There it was a yardstick for the actor's own conduct: the jury asks whether the defendant took the precautions that others in the same calling take, and the answer is a factor in deciding negligence, not a controlling test where a reasonable person would not follow the custom.10 Under § 290(b), custom is a fact about how other people behave and what they expect, and the actor must weigh it in judging how great the risk is. The two roles can appear in one lawsuit, but they answer different questions. Section 295A asks what the defendant should have done about a risk, and § 290(b) asks whether he should have recognized the risk, and its size, in the first place.
Actors decide against a backdrop of what they expect from their surroundings, and that backdrop includes the customary behavior of others.11 If an actor's ignorance of the backdrop excused him, the standard would vary with each actor's diligence in learning it, and the person least attentive to those around him would face the least risk of liability. Charging every actor with general customs removes that advantage and gives all actors the same baseline to reason from.
Trimarco shows the charge at work. A tenant's suit arose from a shower door made of ordinary glass, which would have looked no different from tempered safety glass. The tenant and his wife assumed it was safety glass, and nothing suggested the defendants ever told them otherwise.12 The Appellate Division majority had reasoned that, even assuming a custom of substituting shatterproof glass and a safer method of enclosing showers, no duty to replace the glass arose without prior notice of the danger from the tenant or from a similar accident in the building.13 The record that rule had to answer showed a danger and a safer practice that were both public. Bulletins from nationally recognized safety and consumer organizations and official federal publications had warned of the dangers of plain glass in “hazardous locations,” including bathtub enclosures. The landlord's managing agent, long familiar with multiple dwellings in New York City, agreed that since at least 1965 landlords customarily used plastic or safety glass for shower enclosures.14 Proof of a common practice, the court explained, helps formulate “the general expectation of society as to how individuals will act in the course of their undertakings,” and so guides the jury's judgment of particular conduct.15 On that record, the landlord was poorly placed to claim he could not have known the danger of plain glass or the common practice of avoiding it.
Custom that runs against the law raises a question the glass case did not. An actor may say that he was entitled to assume others would obey the statute, so a practice of breaking it cannot be part of what he must know. Fowler v. Key System Transit Lines is the usual authority for the contrary point: even where the conduct a custom describes is unlawful, the custom may be used to show expectations. Take a town in which pedestrians habitually cross in mid-block despite an ordinance. A driver there is held to expect them. The reason follows from what risk depends on. A statute says what people are supposed to do, custom shows what they do, and the pedestrian is struck by the second. A driver who plans only for lawful crossings stakes safety on a prediction that the town's habits have already shown to be false. Whether the pedestrian was also negligent is a separate question about his own conduct.
The fact that moved the answer is how general the practice is. Section 290(b) speaks of general customs, and the contrast between the corridor and the residential street shows why: a habit confined to one person is not one the actor can fairly be charged with having met.
Custom of this kind also bears on foreseeability, and one body of custom evidence can serve more than one role. In products cases, for example, applicable industry customs may show the foreseeability of a risk as well as the cost, feasibility, utility, and acceptability among consumers of the safety measure the plaintiff says the defendant failed to adopt.16 In Trimarco, the circulating warnings showed that the danger of plain glass was recognized, and the common use of safer glazing showed that the precaution was practicable.17 The first point is a foreseeability point of the § 290(b) kind, and the second is a feasibility point of the § 295A kind. For exam purposes, the first step is to ask which question the custom answers. If the facts describe how others behave and what they expect, the issue is what the actor should have recognized, and if they describe what actors in the defendant's calling do to guard against the risk, the issue is the precaution he owed.
Section 290 charges the ordinary actor with what the community knows. The professional standard, taken up next, looks beyond knowledge and skill to two further elements, the first of which is the exercise of a discerning judgment, so that a professional is not liable for a “mere error of judgment.”18