Concept
When the Test Is Not Met
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
When the Test Is Not Met
A statute that fails Section 286 costs the plaintiff a shortcut, not a case. The Restatement lets a court adopt a legislative enactment as the reasonable person's standard of conduct only when its purpose, exclusively or in part, is to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff, to protect the particular interest invaded, to protect that interest against the kind of harm that resulted, and to protect it against the particular hazard that produced the harm.1 If any one of those links is missing, the plaintiff cannot use the violation to establish breach, because evidence of a violation serves that purpose only when the statute establishes a relevant standard of care.2 Common sense shows where the edge lies. When Bourjailly turns into the path of Perelman's oncoming car, it does not matter that he also violated a statute requiring him to curb his dog, or one requiring working windshield wipers on a dry day.3
The shortcut matters because of what it removes from the plaintiff's task. Without a formulated standard, the case goes to the jury, which must decide not only what the facts are but also what reasonable conduct required.4 An adopted statute replaces that open question with a narrow one. The jury need only decide whether the defendant violated the statute, and a finding of violation, absent evidence of excuse, requires a finding of negligence. That change substantially eases the plaintiff's burden of proof and brands the defendant a wrongdoer, which may color the way the jury views the rest of the case.5 A statute that fails the test withdraws both advantages.
The claim itself survives because the statute was never its source. An adopted statute does not create a statutory action. It makes an act negligent that might not otherwise be so, or at least evidence of negligence, by fixing a standard against which the fact of negligence can be measured. The gist of the action remains negligence, the nonperformance of a legal duty to the person injured.6 When the statute drops out, the plaintiff still holds that action and must prove it under the usual reasonable person standard.
A school-bus hypothetical shows the exchange. Welty drives past a stopped school bus with its red lights flashing, and Capote, who had pulled out of a side street expecting her to stop, is struck. The statute requiring traffic to stop for the bus was written to protect schoolchildren, and the court may hold that it does not reach Capote's harm. Capote then cannot equate Welty's negligence with her violation of the statute. He can still prove that he pulled out because he expected her to stop, as the statute required, and argue that she failed to do what a reasonable person would do given the normal expectations of drivers. The statute enters the trial as proof of those expectations, and the jury decides negligence under the ordinary standard.7
A statute that misses the plaintiff's interest can likewise survive as evidence, but only when it bears on the care the danger called for. In Hansen v. Kemmish, a statute aimed only at preventing the misbreeding of animals required hogs to be confined by fences of specified strength. A hog broke through a weaker fence, escaped into the highway, and wrecked the plaintiff's car. The statute did not define a standard of conduct to be adopted as a matter of law, but the jury could consider it in deciding what kind of fence would confine hogs effectively.8 Matteo marks the other side of the line. A building code required protective walls or rails, but the consequence it was designed to prevent was that a person would fall accidentally, and it had no object of preventing "bicycle acrobatics." The court upheld the trial judge's refusal to admit the code to establish the store owner's negligence.9 The fence requirement spoke to the very question the jury had to answer, while the rail requirement said nothing about the stunt that caused the injury.
Passing the test leaves the plaintiff with a standard and nothing more. Suppose a statute requires working mufflers, qualifies as the standard, and Welty's muffler was noisy. Her violation establishes liability only if it caused the accident, and a noisy muffler is irrelevant unless her inability to hear contributed to the collision. Evidence that Capote blew his horn and that she could not hear it over the muffler would supply the link, and without that evidence the violation proves nothing about this collision.10 Even the violation can remain a jury question. When a lighting statute establishes negligence only if the light was out, the judge should not direct a verdict, because whether the light was out is a factual issue for the jury.11 The statute fixes what the defendant had to do, and the plaintiff must still show that failing to do it brought about the harm.
The two outcomes mirror each other. When the statute fails the test, the plaintiff falls back on ordinary negligence. When the statute passes but the violation did not cause the harm, the plaintiff still keeps that fallback, and Capote could prove that Welty was negligent in failing to stop for the bus even if her muffler had nothing to do with the collision.12
Two errors recur on exams. One treats a failed Section 286 argument as the end of the case, and the other treats a satisfied Section 286 as proof of liability.