Concept
Standard Versus Duty
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
Standard Versus Duty
A statute can fix the standard of care only for a defendant who already owes care. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285(b) lets a court adopt, as the standard of conduct of a reasonable person, an enactment or regulation that is silent on civil liability.1 The operative word is standard. A standard says how a person who owes care must behave, so it matters only after the duty question is settled. Duty asks whether the defendant owed the plaintiff any care at all, and it is a question of law for the court. Whether the defendant breached that duty is ordinarily a question for the jury.2 Safety statutes describe conduct, so they fit the breach question, and everything earlier in this chapter operates there. The harder case comes when a plaintiff offers a statute to answer the duty question, and courts have been reluctant to accept it.
In most negligence per se cases the defendant already owes the plaintiff a common-law duty to act as a reasonably prudent person, and the statute only sharpens what that duty requires. It does so because the court chooses to accept it. The legislature's formulation becomes the civil standard through judicial adoption, and without adoption the jury asks what a reasonably prudent person would have done.3 The Texas Supreme Court observed that the overwhelming majority of its negligence per se cases involved traffic statutes and drivers or train operators, who already owed care to others on the road or track.4 Per se treatment changes little there, because a violation would usually be negligence under the ordinary reasonableness test anyway.5 The resulting rule is that a statute can supply the standard of care but cannot create a duty that did not previously exist, unless the statute also creates a cause of action.6
The opposite situation arose in Perry v. S.N., a Texas case decided on the pleadings. The plaintiffs alleged that their children were sexually abused at a day care center. Three friends of the operators, they said, saw the operator's husband bring children into the adjoining house and abuse them, yet never reported it to the police or child welfare officials as a Family Code provision required.7 The statute made a knowing failure to report a misdemeanor and said nothing about civil liability. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing on their negligence per se claim.8 It began from the principle that a duty to obey the criminal law, enforced by prosecution, is not equivalent to a duty in tort.9 The common law generally imposes no duty to protect another from a third party's crime or to come to another's aid. A negligence per se claim against these defendants would therefore have drawn the element of duty solely from the statute.10 Recognizing a new, purely statutory duty, the court said, can have an extreme effect on the common law of negligence, because it allows a cause of action where the common law would not.11
Two features of the Texas reasoning show why courts hesitate. First, the statute commanded action, and the court noted that the change in the common law tends to be especially great when a statute criminalizes inaction rather than action.12 Second, the court looked past the facts of these eyewitnesses to the full reach of the statute. The statute required a report from anyone with cause to believe abuse may be occurring, and the court found that trigger too dependent on difficult judgment calls to define the required conduct in many situations.13 The court left open whether the common law should recognize a duty to report in some circumstances, because the plaintiffs had not preserved that claim.14
A statute that creates a duty without a standard can still support a claim, but the route runs through legislative purpose and not through negligence per se. In Scovill v. City of Astoria, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected negligence per se because the intoxicated-persons statute created a duty to act without supplying a standard of care. It upheld the claim as a statutory tort because the statute was meant to protect intoxicated persons who endanger themselves.15 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 38 addresses a statute that states an affirmative duty but neither provides nor bars a private action. It allows a court to consider the legislative purpose and the values the statute reflects in deciding whether to adopt a duty the common law had not recognized.16 Courts have split on the child abuse reporting statutes themselves. Some hold that a reporting requirement is no basis for tort liability, while a few find an implied private right of action or allow a negligence claim.17
The landlord repair decisions are a minority exception that shows the same line from the other side. Housing codes were historically enforced by local government agencies, both proactively through periodic review and reactively in response to tenant complaints, and that remains the normal mode of enforcement. Until relatively recently, tenants had no direct remedy against the landlord when violations occurred.18 A few decisions fill that gap in tort by holding a landlord liable for negligently failing to make repairs that a residential landlord-tenant statute requires, and they treat the violation as negligence per se.19 These courts follow the Restatement (Second) rule on safety statutes, but its qualifications are so numerous that the outcome may differ little from ordinary negligence.20
Students often merge this topic with the statutory-tort discussion at the start of the chapter, and the two answer different questions. A statutory tort exists when the statute itself provides a civil remedy. The plaintiff then sues under the statute, and the only questions are whether the statute is valid and whether the facts fall within its terms.21 Standard versus duty arises when the statute is silent on civil liability and the plaintiff must sue in negligence. The analysis then asks first whether the defendant already owed the plaintiff a common-law duty. Only if so does the court ask whether the statute passes § 286 and sets the standard.