Concept
Reading Legislative Purpose
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
Reading Legislative Purpose
Every requirement of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 turns on one question: what was the legislature trying to accomplish? A court may adopt an enactment as the standard of care only when its purpose "is found to be exclusively or in part" to protect the plaintiff's class, interest, kind of harm, and hazard,1 and "is found" gives the finding to the court. The assignment carries weight because adoption is the court's decision alone. A legislature's standard becomes the civil standard only because the court accepts it, and when the court declines, the jury must decide what a reasonably prudent person would have done in similar circumstances.2 When a legislature has generalized a standard from the community's experience and prohibited conduct likely to cause harm, the court accepts and applies it.3 It would also be awkward for a court to call reasonable behavior that the legislature has already condemned, and the legislature's judgment, as the authoritative representative of the community, takes precedence over the views of any one jury.4
Finding that purpose is harder than the word "found" suggests, because legislative history is often thin. The court must infer the purposes mainly from the provisions of the statute itself, and it exercises a good deal of judgment about whom the statute was meant to protect and from what hazards.5 The result is that legislative purpose is whatever the courts say it is, and their predilections vary. Different courts have held that similar statutes requiring a driver who leaves a car to remove the key and lock it were, and were not, intended to protect people struck by a thief driving the car. In general, however, courts have taken a reasonably broad view of safety statutes.6 Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., the barroom-brawl case, shows a court doing the same work for a liquor regulation: the Oregon Supreme Court consulted the section of the Liquor Control Act that states the Act's purposes.
The inquiry is more forgiving than it first appears, because a statute may serve more than one end. Section 286 asks about purpose "exclusively or in part," so the plaintiff needs only one of the purposes the court finds to match the injury.7 Suppose a court concludes that a muffler requirement was adopted chiefly to curb noise but also, in part, so that drivers can hear warnings from other traffic. That finding opens the door, and the plaintiff must still connect the violation to the harm. A defective muffler is irrelevant unless the defendant's inability to hear contributed to the accident, as it would if the plaintiff sounded a horn to warn the defendant and the muffler noise drowned it out.8
Courts also test a candidate purpose against what the violation did to the plaintiff's risk. When a violation leaves the danger to people in the plaintiff's position unchanged, a court has little reason to count the plaintiff among the statute's intended beneficiaries. When a violation increases that danger, as in the dram-shop and key-in-the-ignition cases, a court may well hold that the plaintiff falls within the protected class, and the greater the increase, the greater the probability that the court will so hold.9 Some courts conduct this analysis under the heading of proximate cause rather than negligence per se, but the analysis is essentially the same.10
A statute with one narrow aim cuts the other way, and a truck weight limit shows how the same words can come out either way.
The statutory text is identical on both sides of that line, and only the purpose the court finds differs. A statute intended solely to prevent road wear would not support negligence per se for a traffic accident, but a legislature that limited truck weight probably also had in mind that overweight trucks are harder to control and to stop, and the injured driver has a strong argument on that basis.11 An answer that labels the cap a road-protection measure and stops there overlooks the driver's best argument.
A defendant's common-law duty can also reach further than the statute's purpose, and Harned v. Dura Corp. illustrates the point. A portable tank exploded while the plaintiff was using it in the workplace, and the manufacturer pointed out that the safety standard at issue was directed at places of public assembly. The court looked past that mismatch. The manufacturer's duty to design was not created by the statute; it "arose during the manufacture of the tank in question." The common-law duty to design covers all foreseeable risks of physical harm, a class that includes people in places of public assembly and other foreseeable victims like the plaintiff.12 The case does not displace the § 286 test. When the question is whether a statute may supply the standard of care, the four requirements still come first, and Harned adds that the statute's purpose does not mark the outer limit of the defendant's duty.
A statute that does not apply by its own terms can also help. It may be invoked by analogy, more or less as a statutory custom; a statute setting safety standards for a private power company, for example, was admitted as tending to establish the standard for a municipally owned one.13 Because the statute does not govern the case, it works more like evidence of proper practice than like a rule the court must apply.