Concept
The Section 286 Test
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
The Section 286 Test
A violated safety statute does not by itself settle a negligence suit. The court decides whether the legislature’s standard becomes the civil standard, and the standard governs only because the court accepts it; when none is adopted, the case goes to the jury, which decides whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would have.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 tells the court what to look for. The court may adopt the requirements of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation as the standard of conduct of a reasonable person when its purpose is found, exclusively or in part, to do all four of the following:2
- protect a class of persons that includes the one whose interest is invaded;3
- protect the particular interest invaded;4
- protect that interest against the kind of harm that resulted; and5
- protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.6
Michigan’s opinion in Anderson quotes the section in full and treats the adoption of a statutory standard as an application of the statutory purpose doctrine.7 The test concerns a statute’s purpose and not its remedy. In McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that a nursing home’s violation of several health and safety regulations caused her father’s death, and the court, reversing the lower court, observed that she could assert negligence per se even without a private cause of action under the federal statute.8
Each part of the test keeps the borrowed standard within the limits of what the legislature decided. A safety statute records a judgment that certain people need protection against certain dangers, and a court that adopts it as a measure of care must adopt the limits of its purpose too, because those are presumably the limits of its validity.9 Without those limits, a violation of any statute would count as negligence toward anyone who happened to be hurt afterward, whether or not the statute had anything to do with the injury. Evidence of a violation can establish breach only when the statute sets a standard relevant to the harm that occurred.10
The four parts are joined by and, so the plaintiff must satisfy all of them, and a statute that fails any one cannot supply the standard of care.11 The phrase “exclusively or in part” keeps the test workable, because legislatures seldom act for a single reason: a statute qualifies when protecting this plaintiff against this harm is among its purposes.12 The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14 compresses the four parts into two, asking whether the statute is designed to protect against the type of accident the defendant’s conduct causes and whether the victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.13 Courts likewise speak of a two-pronged test of type of risk prevented and class protected.14 The Second Restatement’s separate parts for interest, harm, and hazard therefore overlap, and the Third Restatement answers them with a single question about the type of accident.
Passing the test is necessary but not sufficient. The plaintiff must still prove that the violation was a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the harm, and a court usually should decline to adopt a statutory standard that is obsolete, arcane, trivial, vague, or little more than a general rule of reasonable care, or one that policy considerations weigh against.15 The subsections that follow take the four parts in turn: the person, the interest, the harm, and the hazard.
Class of Persons Protected
The first part of the test asks whether the legislature had people like the plaintiff in view. The statute must be meant, exclusively or in part, “to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded.”16 A plaintiff outside that class cannot borrow the standard, even when the defendant plainly broke the statute and the plaintiff was plainly hurt. Because the test says “in part,” a plaintiff need fit only one of the groups the statute protects.17 Injury from the violation does not place a plaintiff in the class, for the question looks to the legislature’s purpose and not to causation.
The school bus cases hold the statute constant and vary the plaintiff. A statute requiring drivers to stop for a school bus is obviously aimed at protecting school children from injury, not other drivers, and on that rationale the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Paquin v. Tillinghast, on similar facts, that violation of the statute could not be used to establish negligence.18
The statute and the violation are the same in the child’s claim and the motorist’s. Only the plaintiff differs, and with the plaintiff comes the question whether the legislature was thinking of that person when it wrote the rule.
Falling outside the class costs the plaintiff only the shortcut. A motorist who pulled out of a side street because he expected the other driver to stop for the bus, as the statute required, cannot say that the violation itself equals negligence. He may still prove those facts to show that the driver failed to do what a reasonable person would do, given what drivers normally expect, and the statute then enters as evidence under the usual reasonable person standard.19 The section on when the test is not met returns to what a plaintiff keeps.
Courts apply the requirement statute by statute. A sprinkler requirement protects a building’s occupants, so a firefighter hurt in a building that lacks sprinklers may be refused the statute, which was meant to protect occupants and not emergency personnel.20 A driving-permit condition requiring paraplegic drivers to be accompanied by co-drivers protects persons on the highways, not the paraplegic driver himself while he uses a defective wheelchair lift on a vehicle at rest. A statute requiring insurers to return the titles and licenses of total-loss vehicles to the Department of Revenue protects vehicle owners against theft, not pedestrians injured by a defectively rebuilt runaway vehicle.21
The statute’s own language can settle the class. Two elevator-shaft decisions turned on it. In Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co. a firefighter could not use a statute requiring elevator shafts to be guarded, because the title and body of the statute referred to the safety of employees, while in Drake v. Fenton a firefighter could use a similar statute whose title concerned the regulation of building safety and was not limited to employees. The statutes were alike and so were the plaintiffs; the outcomes diverged on how each legislature described the group it meant to protect.
Courts also look at risk. If violating the statute does not at all increase the risk of harm to those in the plaintiff’s situation, courts are very unlikely to treat the plaintiff as an intended beneficiary, because a statute cannot sensibly be said to protect a class when violating it does not increase the risk to that class.22 A borrower who speeds is negligent per se, and had the borrower not been speeding, the borrowed car probably would not have been where lightning struck it. Speeding did not increase the risk of lightning damage, however, so the owner is not among the speed limit’s intended beneficiaries as to that risk. Where a violation does increase the risk to people in the plaintiff’s situation, as in the dram-shop and key-in-the-ignition cases, courts may well place the plaintiff within the class.23
Legislative purpose is whatever the courts say it is, and their views differ. Courts have divided on whether statutes requiring a driver who leaves a car to remove the key and lock it protect people struck by a thief operating the car. In general, though, courts have taken a reasonably broad view of safety statutes.24
Particular Interest Protected
The second part of the test asks whether the statute guards the thing the plaintiff lost. An interest is what the plaintiff lost, whether bodily safety, property, or a financial position, and the statute’s purpose must be, exclusively or in part, “to protect the particular interest which is invaded.”26 The class question asks whom the statute protects; the interest question asks what it protects them from losing. A plaintiff who belongs to the protected group can therefore still fail, because a statute aimed at one interest of that group says nothing about the care owed to another.
A borrowed statute carries only the judgment its legislature made. A legislature that limits speed to conserve gasoline has decided something about fuel; it has not decided that driving faster endangers anyone’s person or property. A court that used the limit to measure care in a collision case would credit the legislature with a judgment about danger that it never made. The same reasoning explains why a statute prohibiting certain activities on Sunday, written to protect the public peace and morals, is irrelevant to whether an activity was conducted negligently, and why a speed limit enacted solely to conserve gasoline is irrelevant in determining whether a driver was negligent.27
The same words can thus carry the standard of care in one state and fail to carry it in another, and the difference lies entirely in the interest the legislature was protecting. An exam answer should therefore identify what the statute guards before asking whether the defendant broke it.
A statute can also protect a public interest and leave a private plaintiff’s economic loss outside it. A law firm sued an accountant and a client under federal and state statutes requiring crimes to be reported, alleging negligence per se. In San Benito Bank & Trust v. Landair Travels the Texas Court of Appeals found that the statutes protect the state’s interest in apprehending felons, and it added that even if they could be construed as protecting the general public, like the law firm, using them to impose liability on those who fail to report criminal behavior would not be an appropriate use.28 The statutes guarded law enforcement, which is a different interest from the firm’s loss.
Deciding what interest a statute guards often points to the kind of harm and hazard it addressed, so the next two parts overlap with this one. The Third Restatement answers all three with a single question about the type of accident the statute was designed to prevent.29 A workable order is to ask first what the statute guards, whether bodily safety, property, public morals, or the government’s enforcement needs, and then to test the harm and the hazard in the two subsections that follow.
Kind of Harm Prevented
The third part of the test asks what sort of injury the legislature was trying to prevent. The statute’s purpose must be, exclusively or in part, “to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted.”31 A plaintiff can belong to the protected class, lose the very interest the statute guards, and prove the violation, and still lose here, because a legislature writes a rule against a particular danger and its answer reaches only as far as that danger.
Gorris v. Scott started the line of cases. A carrier shipped sheep without the pens that a statute required for animals on shipboard, a storm washed the sheep overboard, and the sheep’s owner argued that pens would have kept them aboard.32 The statute was meant to prevent the spread of disease, and the court refused to treat its violation as proof of negligence, even though, as chance would have it, the required pens would have prevented the loss.33 The court called the owner’s damage “something totally apart from the object of the Act of Parliament,” and it added that if the sheep had been overcrowded or caused unnecessary suffering and had arrived diseased, the owner might have maintained the action.34 The owner’s property in the sheep was at stake either way. The statute was tied to one way of losing the animals, contagion, and the owner lost them another way.
A pen requirement answers the danger that crowded animals fall ill. Its framers presumably made no judgment that pens were worth their cost as protection against a mass drowning, so the missing pens say nothing, by the legislature’s own measure, about carelessness toward that second danger.35 Whether the violation caused the loss is a separate question from whether the statute was aimed at injuries of that kind, and a yes to the first cannot supply a purpose the statute lacks.
Later decisions apply the same match between the statute’s target and the plaintiff’s injury. In Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Keirsey, a cow entered a railroad right of way and ate itself to death, and the owner claimed negligence per se because the railroad had violated a statute requiring fences to keep animals off the right of way. The court refused to find negligence from the violation, since the statute aimed to protect farm animals from being hit by trains, not from eating too much grass.36 A statute requiring that gasoline be dispensed only into safe containers is intended to prevent leaks, not the risk that gasoline bought in a cup will be thrown on a person to set her on fire, whereas death from an automobile’s deficient steering is a type of risk that certain provisions of the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act seek to prevent.37 And a statute governing the release of dogs aims to protect people from being bitten by diseased dogs, not to keep dogs from running into the street, which could happen no matter when the dog is released. A plaintiff hurt that way cannot prove negligence by the violation, and Capolungo v. Bondi rejected negligence per se on similar facts.38
A mismatch in harm does not always bar every use of the statute. In Hansen v. Kemmish, a statute intended only to prevent the misbreeding of animals required hogs to be confined by fences of specified strength. The defendant’s weaker fence failed, a hog escaped into the highway, and it wrecked the plaintiff’s car. The statute did not define the standard of conduct as a matter of law, but the jury could consider it as bearing on the kind of fence necessary to confine hogs effectively.39
The requirement also marks a real difference between statutory and common-law claims. At common law, so long as the category of plaintiff is foreseeable, the plaintiff need not show that the risk of injury to the plaintiff, or the risk of the harm that occurred, was what made the defendant’s conduct wrongful. In a statutory claim, as Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc. explains, the question is one of statutory intent: whether the plaintiff, though foreseeably injured, was in the category the statute meant to protect, and whether the harm, though foreseeable, was the “mischief” the statute sought to avoid.40 Foreseeability that would suffice at common law therefore does not carry the statutory shortcut.
The rule has critics. Shadday v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. presses the objection that violating a statutory standard of care is negligence, just as violating a common-law duty is, and that the line of cases descending from Gorris lets a negligent defendant escape because the harm that care would have averted was not foreseeable. Given that the shipowner was under a legal duty to pen the sheep, the objection asks, why should he not be liable for a disaster that compliance would have averted?41 The Third Restatement nonetheless keeps the match, framing it as a violation of a statute designed to protect against “the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes.”42
Losing on this part does not necessarily end the plaintiff’s case. The sheep’s owner lost only the statute as a route to proving breach. Whether a common-law claim for negligence in failing to pen the sheep, independent of the statute, could succeed is a separate question for ordinary negligence analysis.43
Particular Hazard Involved
The fourth part of the test asks how the injury came about. The statute’s purpose must be, exclusively or in part, “to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.”45 The kind-of-harm part asks what sort of injury the legislature meant to prevent, and this part asks by what route that injury arrived. A plaintiff can belong to the protected class, can have lost the interest the statute guards, and can even suffer the general type of injury it addresses, and still fail because the harm came by a mechanism the legislature was not guarding against. The Third Restatement merges these parts into one question about the type of accident,46 but the hazard part is worth isolating because it is where the statute’s purpose meets the actual sequence of events.
A safety statute is written against the particular ways in which the regulated conduct tends to hurt people. When an injury reaches the plaintiff by another route, the violation did not raise the danger the legislature was addressing, and the legislature’s judgment that the conduct was unreasonably risky says nothing about this injury.
A natural disaster is a different type of harm from the one such a statute addresses.47
Other statutes draw the same line. A statute requiring a tarpaulin over a load was probably enacted to keep debris from blowing out of the truck onto the highway and hitting or obstructing other vehicles; it is farfetched to argue that the legislators had in mind protecting pedestrians from debris thrown out of a truck by an explosion, so the court will not find the driver negligent per se.48 A state statute barring hood ornaments from protruding beyond the front hood protects persons who might be struck by moving cars, not a person who impales himself on the ornament of a car at rest.49 In Matteo v. Livingstone, the court reasoned that building code provisions prescribing protective walls or rails are designed to prevent a person from falling accidentally and “do not have as their object preventing bicycle acrobatics,” and it upheld the trial judge’s refusal to admit the statute to establish the store owner’s negligence.50
Satisfying the hazard part does not relieve the plaintiff of proving causation. A court will not apply a statutory standard if the violation was not a cause in fact or a proximate cause of the harm.51 A violation of a muffler statute, for instance, establishes liability only if it caused the accident, and the noisy muffler is irrelevant unless the driver’s inability to hear contributed to the collision.52
Licensing statutes show why but-for causation is not enough. In Brown v. Shyne, a chiropractor with no license to practice medicine held himself out as licensed and operated on the plaintiff’s spine, and she was paralyzed. She asked for an instruction that he was liable no matter what level of care he gave, because the injury would not have occurred had he not treated her.53 Judge Lehman rejected that position. He conceded that without the unlicensed practice the chiropractor could not have injured her, but he held that the protection the statute was intended to provide “was against risk of injury by the unskilled or careless practitioner,” and that unless carelessness or lack of skill caused the injury, the failure to obtain a license “was not connected with the injury.”54 The license statute targets incompetent treatment, so the plaintiff must show carelessness or lack of skill, and the missing license adds nothing to that proof. A statute addressing unauthorized practice of medicine takes the opposite course: it makes the unauthorized practice prima facie evidence of negligence when the unauthorized act was a competent producing, proximate, or contributing cause of the injury.55 The section on licensing and approval requirements returns to that conflict.
Courts read the hazard generously when the injury is a close variant of the danger the statute targets. In De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., a statute requiring open elevator shafts to be fenced, obviously intended primarily to keep workmen from falling in, was held to cover a radiator placed near the opening that was accidentally knocked into it and killed a workman below.56 The hazard behind a fence requirement is an unguarded opening in the floor, and a radiator tumbling through that opening is a near relative of a worker stepping into it. What separates De Haen from the tarpaulin and hood-ornament cases is how far the injury sits from the danger the rule was written to stop: the radiator traveled through the very opening the statute required to be fenced, while the pedestrian was hurt by an explosion unrelated to debris blowing off a moving truck.
A workable way to apply the part is to describe the hazard at the level of generality the statute itself invites. Stated too narrowly, as the exact object or the exact mishap, the description would have excluded the radiator in De Haen. Stated too broadly, as any injury connected with the regulated activity, it would collapse into the but-for argument that failed in Brown and would make the violation equivalent to liability without fault. A plaintiff who fails this part loses only the statutory shortcut and keeps whatever common-law negligence theory the facts support, a point the section on when the test is not met takes up.