Concept
Proving Breach With Experts
Professionals, skilled actors, and other special classes
Proving Breach With Experts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts measures a professional by the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of the profession or trade in good standing, unless the professional represents greater or lesser skill.1 A yardstick drawn from a group's practice creates a problem of proof that ordinary negligence cases rarely present. Aviation shows its shape: negligence is the failure to use the care of "an ordinary prudent pilot having the same training and experience" as the pilot whose conduct is questioned.2 Jurors are not pilots, surgeons, or architects, so someone must tell them what a practitioner of the calling does, and the plaintiff's expert witness usually does. The subsections below explain why the law demands that witness, what the testimony must contain, who may give it, and when jurors may decide without it.
Why Experts Are Required
A plaintiff must usually establish a professional's breach through expert testimony, unless the negligence is so obvious that it falls within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors.3 The fact-finder can rarely determine the applicable standard of care without expert help.4
The professional standard explains the rule. The jury's question is what members of the profession ordinarily know and do, which is a fact about a trade the jurors have not practiced. Without a witness from that trade, jurors would measure the defendant against their own notions of good surgery or sound design instead of against the profession's practice. A plaintiff who proves only a bad outcome has therefore proved little about breach, because the outcome does not show whether the profession's practice was followed.
Technical risk judgments depend on specialized inputs in the same way. In one Hand-formula illustration, a railroad's decision not to build an overpass may well have been reasonable: two injuries expected per decade at an average of $500,000 each, over the overpass's 30-year life, add up to $3 million in injury cost, against $12 million to avert the six likely accidents.5 How often injury will occur, what it will cost, and what the precaution will cost are facts that someone must put before the fact-finder.
Once each side presents an expert, the case becomes a contest the fact-finder must referee. The predictable battle of the experts leaves the fact-finder in a curious predicament, because an error of judgment in diagnosis or treatment creates no liability when expert opinion places the physician's conduct within a range of acceptable alternatives. The fact-finder may not speculate, but it is free to find some experts more credible than others.6
What the Expert Must Say
Expert testimony must state what the profession generally does, and what the witness personally would have done does not count. Because the standard of care in a malpractice case is what the profession generally employs, an expert's account of how the expert would have treated the patient is not relevant to whether the defendant committed malpractice.7 The testimony also needs specifics. Calling the care poor, or saying that it fell short of reasonable or good care, states no standard. The expert must say that the particular diagnosis, treatment, or procedure did or did not meet the standards of the medical community, for example that the standard called for a diagnostic test the defendant never gave, or for a smaller dose of an anesthetic.8
Personal preference proves little because custom measures the defendant. A physician who chooses among accepted methods commits no breach, so an expert who would have chosen differently shows only that the profession offers a choice. A witness who says he was trained not to use the defendant's procedure, that in his own judgment the treatment was wrong, that he would have used a better one, or that all the doctors he knows agree has not necessarily established any standard, and a plaintiff who offers nothing more may lose the case.9 The defense can also turn the witness's own practice against the testimony: evidence that the witness follows a different approach from the one declared to be the standard may be admissible on credibility.10
The content of the testimony shifts with the governing standard. Under the traditional medical standard, the expert must establish the profession's custom itself. Where the jurisdiction applies the general reasonable-care standard, the expert may instead be allowed to testify that the procedure carried a high risk and a low benefit, which supports an inference of negligence without any appeal to what other practitioners do.11
The testimony must also reach causation, because the plaintiff must usually prove factual causation through expert testimony as well as breach.12 A witness who shows that the defendant skipped a customary test but cannot say the test would probably have changed the result has shown a lapse without showing that it injured the plaintiff. The second expert in the hypothetical closes that gap.
Who Qualifies as the Expert
A witness must be qualified to give an opinion on the standard at issue, and the plaintiff must establish that qualification unless the defendant testifies to or admits the standard the plaintiff asserts.13 What qualifies a witness depends on the question asked, because the yardstick differs by question. Medical causation is a scientific matter that does not change at a state line, so under a same-locality rule any qualified medical expert could testify to it. Breach was different: only a witness able to state the standard or custom of the defendant's own locality could say the defendant fell short of it.14
The yardstick also shapes who may testify about specialists. A board-certified specialist is judged by the national standard of the specialty, so the witness's own field becomes part of the qualification inquiry, and the question arises whether a physician from one specialty may testify about the standard of care in another.15 In analyzing a problem, identify the governing standard first, then ask whether the plaintiff's witness can state it.
When No Expert Is Needed
No expert is needed when the negligence is so obvious that it lies within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors.16 The exception follows the reason for the rule: an expert translates technical practice for people who have never performed it, and when the departure is visible to anyone, translation adds expense and nothing else. Courts apply the exception narrowly, because many complaints that look like plain mistakes turn on a judgment about what the situation required, and jurors cannot evaluate that judgment without knowing what practitioners do.
In Boyce v. Brown, the plaintiffs' proof of the proper medical standard was weak, so they argued that a physician's failure to X-ray Mrs. Boyce's ankle was so obviously negligent that no expert was needed.17 The court rejected the argument. Laypeople know that an X-ray is often the best way to diagnose the skeleton, but they cannot say that every case of this kind calls for one: X-rays are costly, do not always diagnose as well as other examinations, and in many cases would be of no value, and the record included testimony that arthritis would have been the first thought as the cause of the pain.18 Without expert proof of the standard, the evidence of malpractice was insufficient, and the directed verdict for the defendant was proper.
Dickerson v. Fatehi falls on the other side of the line. After neck surgery the patient suffered severe pain in her right arm and hand, and a hypodermic needle with a plastic attachment was later discovered at the surgical site, a case of the common-knowledge kind.19 Left-behind objects are the standard illustration: a sponge, towel, or clamp inside a patient needs no expert to explain why the surgery fell short.20 The two cases differ in what they attack. The X-ray claim challenged a judgment about cost, diagnostic value, and likely cause, which practitioners make and jurors cannot assess. The needle claim challenged an omission that no accepted practice includes, so nothing was left for an expert to explain.
Res ipsa loquitur gives a plaintiff a second route past the need to identify the specific negligent act. The doctrine is a rule of circumstantial evidence: it does not shift the burden of proof or change the standard of care, but turns an inference of negligence from the circumstances into a formal rule of law.21 Traditionally the inference arises when the injury was caused by an instrumentality or condition within the defendant's management or control and would not, in the ordinary course of events, have occurred without negligence, which makes the defendant's negligence the most probable explanation.22
In professional cases the doctrine takes two forms.23 In the common-knowledge form, an ordinary layperson can see that the conduct fell short, as when a foreign object is left inside a patient. In the expert form, a witness cannot say exactly what the defendant did wrong but can testify that the adverse result would not have occurred had the defendant used ordinary care, and that testimony suffices on both breach and causation.
The expert form works because the inference depends on facts beyond jurors' common knowledge, and testimony can supply them. In a professional case the expert may even testify directly to the inference, for example that the injury would not have occurred if the defendant had not been negligent.24 The control element ties the inference to a particular defendant, so the doctrine ordinarily cannot be used against several defendants unless they share responsibility for the same instrumentality or condition, as in vicarious liability.25
Evidence other than a live expert can also establish the standard of care and its breach in medical negligence cases, including:
- the defendant's own admissions
- authoritative medical literature
- statutes
- standards adopted by government or trade groups, such as hospital or nursing home licensing rules
- inspection reports
- hospital bylaws and rules
- literature accompanying medical products that contains warnings and directions for use.26
Each source records what the profession or the defendant's own institution treats as proper practice, so it can supply information an expert would otherwise supply.
Lawyers and Other Professions
Lawyers face the same rule. Jurors normally have no specialized knowledge of a lawyer's responsibilities, so expert testimony is generally necessary to guide them to the standard of care, and introducing it is normally an essential step in securing damages.27 Ethics expert William Hodes puts the stakes bluntly: without experts, jury verdicts "would often be the result of pure whim and prejudice, or random and arbitrary decision-making."28 As with medical experts, it is not enough for the legal expert to say what the expert would have done; the witness must testify that the lawyer's conduct fell below the standard of care of lawyers in similar circumstances.29
The common-knowledge exception exists in legal malpractice too, and its examples show how narrow it is. A lawyer who takes no action at all to protect a client's interests, or who fails to file what would have been a meritorious suit within the limitations period, breaches a duty any layperson can recognize.30 Courts have found no expert necessary where a client suffered a default judgment because the lawyer did nothing to protect the client, and where a notice of appeal was not timely filed despite the client's instruction to appeal.31 The line falls at a limitations period missed because of a legal judgment, such as a view about when the claim accrued. The lapse looks the same from outside, but the lawyer's choice rested on a legal judgment, and expert testimony is still required to show that the judgment fell below professional standards.32
Courts hesitate to dispense with experts even when a lapse seems clear. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that its own observation, during the appeal in the underlying case, that the client's lawyer had violated basic rules of appellate procedure did not excuse the client from presenting expert evidence on the standard of care and breach in the later malpractice action.33 A number of jurisdictions also require the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to file an expert's affidavit of merit within a specified time after suit begins, or face dismissal, so that frivolous claims are disposed of promptly.34 The expert therefore matters at the start of the case and not only at trial.
Expert proof presupposes a professional standard the expert can describe, and where none can be identified courts may refuse to recognize the claim at all. Courts generally have refused to recognize educational malpractice, partly because it is hard to determine why a student failed to learn, partly because it would be difficult to choose among competing educational theories to set the standard, and partly because of problems in financing an award.35
The expert requirement is the proof-side consequence of the professional standard. Because the standard is defined by what members of the profession ordinarily know and do, the plaintiff must put that practice before the jury, and the people able to describe it are members of the profession.36 The exceptions follow the same logic: when jurors can see the departure without translation, or when an expert can speak directly to the inference of negligence, the missing piece of the standard reaches the jury by another route.