Concept
Emergencies
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
Emergencies
A person who must decide in seconds cannot weigh the options as a jury later can. The Restatement (Second) of Torts accounts for that gap: in determining whether conduct is negligent, the fact that the actor "is confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid decision" is a factor in judging the reasonable character of his choice of action.1 The provision does not relax the test. It adds a fact to the situation in which the reasonable person is placed, because the time that person had to think is part of that situation. A jury reviewing the choice months afterward, with every fact laid out and the outcome known, would otherwise measure the actor against a calm reflection he never had. Three questions follow: how the emergency enters the standard, why it shelters no one who created it, and where it stops applying.
Emergency as Circumstance
The Restatement fits the emergency inside the objective test instead of carving an exception out of it. A defendant may make a decision in the second before an impending accident that he would not have made with time to weigh the choices. The jury asks whether that decision was reasonable in light of the circumstance that he had to act in a split second, and the so-called emergency doctrine "means no more than this."2 Time pressure belongs among the circumstances for a practical reason. A decision is only as good as the information and reflection behind it, so a prudent person with a minute to think will do what a prudent person with a second cannot. The jury must therefore know how long the actor had, and it then asks whether he chose reasonably under that pressure. A choice that hindsight shows to be "unwise or ill-considered" may still have been "not unreasonable or imprudent under the stress of surrounding circumstances."3
Because the emergency changes the facts and leaves the measure alone, the standard stays the one the law has always used. The courts refused to make liability "co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual," and required instead "a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe."4 An emergency does not trade that measure for the actor's own best judgment under pressure. It "does not excuse the actor from complying with the standard of the reasonable person," and his conduct may still be found unreasonable in light of the emergency.5
The chauffeur in Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co., whose ordeal the discussion of reasonable belief recounted, shows the factor at work. Justice Carlin framed the case as one that "presents the ordinary man--that problem child of the law--in a most bizarre setting": a lonely chauffeur who "became in a trice the protagonist in a breath-baiting drama," set in motion by armed highwaymen who had just relieved a man of his belongings at pistol point.6 The yardstick remained the ordinary man. The new fact was the setting in which the ordinary man had to choose in a moment.
The Third Restatement carries the same position to both sides of the lawsuit, noting, "for plaintiffs and defendants alike," that the law of negligence takes into account "an unexpected emergency requiring rapid response."7 Raimondo v. Harding applies the point to a plaintiff. The plaintiff, fleeing a gang attack, ran into the path of a speeding car on a public highway, and the defendant argued that he was contributorily negligent, meaning that he failed to use the care a reasonable person would use for his own safety. Under the emergency principle, the question is whether the plaintiff, acting without time to deliberate, did what a reasonably prudent person would do in the same emergency. It is not whether another route would have been safer. The factfinder therefore asks the same thing whichever party acted in haste: whether a reasonably prudent person under that pressure could have chosen as the actor did.
The short time counted for the driver, but it did not make her choice reasonable, because a safer response was obvious and available. The jury puts the lack of time on the actor's side of the scale, and the response can still fall below what a prudent person would have done. Where every available response is dangerous, the same pressure may make a hasty and imperfect choice a reasonable one.
Jurisdictions differ on whether the jury hears about the emergency in a separate instruction. Pennsylvania's Lockhart v. List keeps a separate sudden emergency instruction to explain the context for judging the actor's behavior. Colorado's Bedor v. Johnson abolished the instruction after finding that it puts undue emphasis on one aspect of the circumstances and confuses juries.8 The argument for abolition rests on redundancy, since jurors are already told to judge the actor by what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances, and a special instruction singles out one circumstance for emphasis. The disagreement concerns only how the jury is told. The test it applies is the same.
Self-Created Emergencies
The credit for an emergency stops at the edge of the emergency. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 296(2), the fact that the actor is not negligent after the emergency has arisen does not preclude his liability for the tortious conduct that produced the emergency.10 Subsection (1) speaks only to the response, because it counts the emergency in judging the choice the actor made once the danger was upon him.11 Subsection (2) adds that the conduct leading up to the danger is judged separately. A flawless response to a peril does nothing for the earlier act that created the peril, which stands or falls under the ordinary standard of care.
Courts reach the same result: an actor whose own negligence created the peril cannot rely on the emergency. In Lunzer v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co. a driver put himself in a position of peril by driving onto railroad tracks although he saw a train approaching, and in Frisby v. Agerton Logging, Inc. a driver put himself in peril by driving down the middle of the road.12 The Third Restatement states the caveat for plaintiffs and defendants alike: no party can rely on an emergency created by his own prior negligence.13 A plaintiff whose own carelessness produced the peril cannot use the emergency to answer a contributory negligence defense, just as a defendant cannot use it to answer a negligence claim.
The reason follows from why the law counts emergencies at all. An emergency earns allowance because the actor did not choose the situation and had almost no time to think, so a jury must not judge his hasty choice by what calm reflection would have produced. A driver who steers onto the tracks with a train in view had the opposite opportunity at the earlier moment. He could have stopped, waited, or stayed in his lane, and no shortage of time forced his choice. If the later rush could excuse the earlier carelessness, the fault would supply its own defense, and the more reckless the first act, the more desperate and forgivable the second moment would look.
The cases are sometimes summarized by saying that the emergency doctrine is unavailable, as though everything the actor did during the emergency became negligent. Windsor v. McKee states the point more exactly: it is not the conduct after the emergency has arisen that the law does not excuse, but the negligent conduct that brought it about.14 The actor may be held liable for the negligence that created the emergency even though his conduct within it was acceptable.15 The line matters for how liability is described. The breach is the earlier act, and an essay that labels a sensible swerve or braking negligent has located the fault in the wrong place. The line also shows the defendant where to argue. To say that his response was reasonable may be true and still answers only the second moment. His real defense is that his earlier conduct was itself reasonable, so that he did not create the emergency by negligence.
Suppose a second trucker's brakes had been serviced the week before and then failed from a flaw that no reasonable inspection would reveal. Nothing he did produced the danger, so his choice at the bottom of the hill is judged under § 296(1) as one made in an emergency.16 Both truckers had seconds to decide, and both chose under pressure. Only the first trucker's own earlier negligence put him there, and that single difference decides whether the emergency counts for him or against him.
The disabling conduct must itself be negligent, and a careful actor who meets a sudden danger has created nothing within § 296(2). Kentucky's court in Regenstreif v. Phelps counted black ice on a street, falling boulders, swooping airplanes, and darting children and animals among the events that were sudden emergencies.17 A driver traveling at a reasonable speed with her attention on the road, who meets a child darting from between parked cars, has not produced the emergency by any fault, and the ordinary treatment of an emergency as one circumstance governs her case. Whether an event qualifies as an emergency at all is a separate question, which the next part takes up.
Limits of the Emergency Rule
Each word of the phrase in § 296(1), a "sudden emergency which requires rapid decision," marks an edge of the credit.19 The credit rests on a fact about time. A person with seconds to choose cannot gather information or compare alternatives as a person with leisure can, so a jury should not measure the hurried choice against what calm reflection would have produced. Where the facts did not leave the actor short of time in that way, the reason for the credit is missing, and so is the credit. Three limits follow. The event must have been sudden, unforeseen, and unexpected. An actor whose situation called for anticipating a hazard must have prepared for it. A sudden illness that removes the ability to act at all falls outside the doctrine, because an emergency assumes a choice for the jury to judge.
Does a driver blinded by the low afternoon sun get to claim a sudden emergency? In Lifson v. City of Syracuse New York's Court of Appeals said no, because the blinding effect of the setting sun's rays is common and expected, so the driver was not entitled to an emergency instruction.20 Herr v. Wheeler gave hydroplaning the same treatment. The defendant's car hydroplaned during a heavy rainstorm, crossed the median strip, and struck another car, and the court held the emergency instruction unwarranted because standing water on a roadway in heavy rain is a matter of common experience that a driver must anticipate and exercise reasonable care to avoid.21 Neither driver could present the hazard as having dropped out of nowhere. Each had a chance to deal with it before it struck, by slowing down or leaving more room, and that earlier chance is the time to deliberate that the emergency credit assumes the actor lacked.
The list in Regenstreif, which counted black ice, falling boulders, swooping airplanes, and darting children and animals as sudden emergencies, lies on the other side of the line.22 What separates that list from sun glare and heavy rain is whether a prudent person reckons with the event as part of the ordinary run of the activity. Anyone who drives regularly expects glare at sunset and standing water in a downpour, so those conditions belong among the circumstances that ordinary care must already account for. Events of the Kentucky kind usually arrive without warning and leave no earlier occasion to adapt, so a driver who meets one is making the rapid choice that § 296(1) describes. An Iowa decision, Hagenow v. Schmidt, states the purpose directly: the instruction is meant for a defendant who acted in response to a perceived peril and chose a course that hindsight may call unwise but that was not unreasonable under the stress of the moment.23 Opening the label to expected hazards would swallow the ordinary test, since nearly every mishap feels sudden to the person it strikes.
The second limit reaches hazards that an actor ought to have expected even though a particular occurrence feels sudden. A reasonable person anticipates not only the prudent conduct of others but, where it is reasonably foreseeable, their negligence. If she has reason to anticipate the contrary, she must act accordingly, so it may be negligent "to fail to slow down in the vicinity of a schoolyard where children may negligently dart into the street."24 In that setting the time to deliberate came before the danger arrived, when the actor chose a speed. Failure to anticipate the dash may itself be the negligence, and the later scramble is the product of that omission and earns no credit. This duty sits comfortably beside Kentucky's list of darting children, because the label depends on the setting and not on the event alone.
Whether a particular distraction was truly unforeseen is a question of fact. In one reported dispute, four teenagers were driving home from the beach when a back-seat passenger pulled the strings of the driver's bikini top, causing the top to fall and her breasts to be exposed.25 To qualify as a sudden emergency, the event must be unforeseen, sudden, and unexpected, so the question for the jury is whether the passenger's tug was any of these. A history of similar pranks earlier in the same trip would count against the driver. The work is divided between judge and jury. The judge makes the threshold decision whether the emergency instruction is given, and the jury then decides whether there was a sudden and unforeseen emergency not of the defendant's own making and, if so, whether the response was reasonable under the circumstances.26
The third limit separates an emergency from a sudden illness. The instruction presupposes a defendant who acted in response to a perceived peril and made a choice, and it does not apply when it is physically impossible for the defendant to act volitionally. In Hancock-Underwood v. Knight a driver who suffered an acute medical crisis and lost consciousness was held not entitled to the instruction.27 Liability turns on foreseeability instead: an actor who suddenly becomes incapacitated or loses consciousness from a physical illness is negligent only if the incapacity could reasonably have been foreseen.28 The fault, if there is any, lies in the earlier decision to act. A driver whose doctor has warned her that she is prone to blackouts and who drives anyway could have avoided the risk by staying off the road, whereas a driver whose first blackout arrives without any warning had nothing to avoid.
Steps two and three carry most of the screening, because the same kind of event can be an emergency on one set of facts and an expected hazard on another.