Concept
What the Actor Must Know
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
What the Actor Must Know
Negligence asks whether the actor should have recognized a risk, and no one recognizes a risk in a fact he does not know. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 290 therefore fixes the background knowledge the law treats every actor as having, whatever he in fact learned.1 The section names two parts. The first is the community's common knowledge of the world: the qualities and habits of human beings and animals, and the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of things and forces, so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community.2 The second is the law and custom that bear on what other people will do: the common law, legislative enactments, and general customs, so far as they are likely to affect the conduct of the other or third persons.3
Section 289 supplies the rest of the actor's equipment. It gives him the attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable man.4 The knowledge that § 290 describes is a floor, because an actor who knows more must use what he knows: § 289(b) adds the superior knowledge the actor himself has.5 Authority is divided on how far to press that point. Jackson v. Axelrad, a Texas Supreme Court decision citing § 289(b), took the actor's superior knowledge into account, and the Third Restatement agrees, but Fredericks v. Castora refused to hold a truck driver to a higher standard despite twenty years' experience.6 The next two parts take the kinds of knowledge in turn.
Common Knowledge
Section 290(a) charges the actor with what the community knows in common about the world he acts in. Its subjects are the qualities and habits of human beings and animals and the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of things and forces, limited to matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community.7 The measure is the community's knowledge, so a defendant's own gaps in schooling or experience do not shrink it.
Delair v. McAdoo applies the clause to an ordinary object, a tire. The case involved a driver who kept using a tire worn through to the fabric, and the court held that he could not defend on the ground that he did not know the danger. Any ordinary individual, whether a car owner or not, knows that further use of such a tire is dangerous and that the tire should be removed, and a tire worn through several plies is very dangerous. "An owner or operator cannot escape simply because he says he does not know. He must know."8 The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The question is therefore what the community knows, not what this defendant understood.
The opinion gives two reasons. The danger needs no expert, because it lies within ordinary experience: the court compared the tire to a loaded gun, which no one needs opinion evidence to know is dangerous when pointed at another person, and whose user cannot escape liability by saying he did not know it was dangerous. And the court said the rule must be rigid if millions are to drive vehicles that in a fraction of a second may become instruments of destruction to life and property, observing that no series of accidents is more destructive or more terrifying than those that come from blowouts.9
The holding stops where inspection stops. The law requires drivers and owners to know the condition of the parts likely to become dangerous where a reasonable inspection would disclose the flaws, and it assumes they know the dangers such an examination would ascertain.10 The rule thus has two components: a shared understanding of what a worn tire can do, and a duty to look at the parts whose condition inspection reveals.
Both drivers suffer a blowout, and what separates them is what an ordinary person could see. In Delair the evidence was on the face of the tire, so knowledge was attributed to the driver. Here the surface told her nothing, and a rule charging her with the tire's interior would hold her to facts that ordinary people could not have known.
Delair is one entry in a larger stock. A driver is held to know that a car driven fast through loose sand can go out of control, as in Michigan City v. Rudolph.11 No one can deny personal knowledge of the basic principles of physics, such as which materials are combustible, the danger of electricity, and the principles of leverage. The same goes for the limits of the body's physical capacity, the natural propensities of children and animals, the dangers of common sports, and the effects of intoxicating beverages.12
Animals test how far the charge reaches. A Kentucky court in Tolin v. Terrell called it "a matter of common knowledge and common experience that there is no telling when or under what circumstances a mule will or will not kick," and added that the only way to escape danger from a mule's feet is not to go within the radius of its heels.13
What should he have done instead? A person who finds himself in unfamiliar territory must take notice of what he does not know, as when he walks a strange dark hallway or uses an unfamiliar product or substance, and must exercise caution commensurate with his ignorance.14 Ignorance never lowers the standard. It does call for care, and a person who knows he has never handled a mule gains nothing by walking a child behind one.
The phrase "at the time and in the community" fixes where and when the knowledge is measured.15 In a Minneapolis hypothetical, Mitch is held to what an ordinary person in the community would know: that the glistening white powder was snow, not cocaine.16 A Notre Dame law student from Southern California, driving to the library in a lake-effect snowstorm, who does not know that a driver is supposed to steer into a skid, presents the same question.17 Section 290(a) asks what ordinary drivers there know, not what she learned at home. Time works the same way, because the actor's conduct is judged by the foreseeable risk as it appeared at the time and place of the conduct.18
Undertaking an activity enlarges the stock. One who takes up an activity is ordinarily charged with the knowledge common to those who regularly engage in it. A motorist must know the rules of the road. A product manufacturer must know the characteristics and dangers of its product, at least to the extent they are generally known in the industry or reasonably knowable. And the knowledge must be kept reasonably current.19
Law and Custom
Section 290(b) charges the actor with knowing the common law, legislative enactments, and general customs, so far as they are likely to affect the conduct of the other or of third persons.21 Clause (a) told the actor how people, animals, and things behave. Clause (b) tells him what to expect from the people around him, whether the person who may be hurt or a bystander whose conduct bears on the risk.
Most risks arise where the actor's conduct meets someone else's, and he cannot judge such a risk without forecasting what that person will do. The law says what people must do and custom shows what they ordinarily do, so an actor who knows both can predict their conduct. The reasonable person regulates his conduct in light of his expectations of the conduct of others, and clause (b) supplies the information those expectations rest on.22
What the actor forecasts is not limited to careful, lawful behavior. It is sometimes said that an actor may assume that others will act lawfully and carefully, and in specific situations that is true. Where he has reason to anticipate the contrary, however, he must act accordingly, and the duty includes anticipating the negligence or even the unlawful conduct of others when it is reasonably foreseeable.23 Foreseeability marks the line between two failures. An actor who could assume perfect behavior from everyone would ignore foreseeable carelessness, and one who had to guard against every imaginable lawbreaker could not act at all.
The illustrations come in pairs. A driver who fails to slow down near a schoolyard, where children may negligently dart into the street, may be negligent. An owner who leaves a car unlocked with the keys in the ignition may be negligent because of the foreseeable risk of theft.24 Theft is unlawful conduct, yet an owner who knows that cars with keys in them get taken is expected to count on it. The same anticipation of a child's conduct near a street underlies Lederer v. Connecticut Co., where a trolley operator had to anticipate that a child might cross in front of the trolley.
The same forecasting also permits reliance. Where a danger is quite obvious, a reasonable person may properly expect that others will avoid it on their own. Where a third person can be expected to protect the endangered party, as a parent can be expected to protect her child from a particular hazard, the actor may count on that protection.25 In both situations the foreseeable chance of harm is lower than the bare facts suggest, because someone else is positioned to prevent it.
Neither answer is a fixed rule. Whether reliance on others was reasonable is a question of fact, better left to the arguments of counsel than to specific legal rules.26 A jury that hears a driver say he expected the father to hold on to the child decides whether that expectation was reasonable on those facts. The default that others will act lawfully and carefully is therefore never the end of the analysis, because it gives way as soon as the facts supply reason to expect carelessness or lawbreaking.