Concept
Sellers of Others' Products
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Sellers of Others' Products
A retailer that resells a chattel it neither designed nor built stands in a different position from the maker. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 399 through 402 sort that seller's exposure by two facts: what the seller knew when it sold, and how it presented the product to buyers. A seller who sells another's chattel knowing it is, or is likely to be, dangerous is subject to the supplier liability of §§ 388 to 390.1 A seller who knows or has reason to know of the danger must use reasonable care to inform those at risk or otherwise to protect them.2 A seller who puts out another's chattel as its own is liable as though it were the manufacturer.3 And a seller who neither knows nor has reason to know of the danger owes no negligence duty to discover it by inspecting or testing the chattel before sale.4
These rules follow from what a reseller can do. Negligence asks whether the defendant used reasonable care, and a defendant can use care only on the information and opportunity it has. A manufacturer designs, builds, and tests its product. A seller of someone else's goods usually receives a finished, boxed product and passes it on in the same condition. The rules therefore attach liability to the two facts that change what such a seller can do. A seller that knows of a danger can warn buyers or withhold the goods. A seller that sells under its own name invites buyers to rely on it as they would rely on a maker, and the law accepts the invitation. Where neither fact is present, a careful seller would have acted no differently, and the rules do not create a duty to investigate.
All four sections state negligence rules, so a plaintiff must prove the knowledge, the holding out, or the want of reasonable care that the applicable section requires. Strict liability and warranty are separate theories that these sections do not govern. The subsections below take the knowing seller first, then the seller that holds itself out as the maker, then the seller with nothing to disclose.
Sellers With Knowledge
Section 399 answers the question that the manufacturer rules leave open: what does a party owe who only resells what another built? A seller who sells such a chattel knowing it is, or is likely to be, dangerous is subject to liability as stated in §§ 388 to 390.5 The section works as a cross-reference, much as § 394 does for a manufacturer who knows of a danger,6 and it borrows its consequences from three general supplier rules. Section 388 requires a supplier who knows or has reason to know that a chattel is likely to be dangerous to use reasonable care to inform users when the supplier has no reason to believe they will realize the danger.7 Section 389 keeps a supplier liable even after informing the buyer when the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before use and the injured person is ignorant of the danger or not contributorily negligent in knowing of it.8 Section 390 reaches a supplier who furnishes a chattel to someone the supplier knows or has reason to know is likely, because of youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm.9 A claim routed through § 399 therefore carries the conditions of whichever of those rules fits the facts.
Not having made the chattel is no defense. The supplier rules apply to vendors, lessors, donors, and lenders irrespective of whether the chattel was made by them or by a third person.10 Knowledge explains why. A seller with no information about a danger has nothing to disclose, so a duty aimed at it would really be a duty to go looking, and the rules do not impose that on a reseller. A seller that does know holds the one fact the users lack, and it can pass that fact on at the point of sale. Its liability stays fault-based because it rests on what the seller itself knew.
Section 401 states the duty in full. A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person who knows or has reason to know that the chattel is, or is likely to be, dangerous when used by the person to whom it is delivered or for whose use it is supplied, or by others whom the seller should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is liable for bodily harm if the seller fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of the danger or otherwise to protect them against it.11
The word "or" at the end of that sentence gives the seller two ways to comply. The seller may inform the people at risk,12 or it may otherwise protect them, as by repairing a defect before delivery or withholding the goods. The seller chooses the means but cannot choose to do nothing. Informing works only when the information reaches the people at risk. A seller whose buyer will pass the chattel to someone else, and who has reason to doubt that the buyer will relay a warning, cannot rest on a word to the buyer, because the rules on warning through intermediaries decide whether that notice was reasonable care.
The Restatement's shotgun illustration shows these rules at work. A sold B a shotgun that B said was to be a birthday present for B's son C. A told B that the gun was made by the S Company, whose product was known to be of the highest character, but A knew the gun was made by the Y Company, which notoriously puts out an inferior gun. The gun exploded in C's hands because of defective construction, and A was liable to C.13 A did not make the gun, so the claim runs through the rules for sellers and not the rules for makers. A's knowledge came from the reputation of the gun's actual maker. B, told that the gun came from a reputable maker, had no reason to suspect a problem. C never dealt with A, but A knew the gun was supplied for C's use, which put C among the people A had to inform or protect.
The next pair of retailers holds position in the chain of distribution constant and varies only the information each held.
The appliance dealer did not have to reach the conclusion that the model was dangerous. Reason to know means that the seller holds information from which a person of reasonable intelligence would infer that the chattel is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied,14 and three repaired units plus the maker's bulletin supply that information. The rule asks nothing of the seller that resembles an investigation, so reason to know reaches only what the seller already holds. Used goods follow the same path: sellers of used products are subject to liability in negligence, so a used-goods dealer that knows of a danger in what it resells falls within §§ 399 and 401.15
Knowledge is the element that sorts every reseller into one rule or the other, and the usual error is to excuse a retailer because it did not make the product. Once the seller knew, the identity of the maker stops mattering.
Sellers Holding Out as Makers
Section 400 addresses the seller that does more than resell. One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer.17 The preceding subsection sorted resellers by what they knew. This rule sorts them by how they presented the product, and it applies whether or not the seller knew anything about the chattel.
The rule has a trigger and a consequence. A seller puts out a chattel as its own when it markets the product under its own name, brand, or label, though another company made it, and large retailers that sell house-brand goods are the familiar example. Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability carries the same principle forward for anyone in the business of selling or distributing products who sells or distributes as its own a product made by another.18 The consequence is the manufacturer's liability, which the manufacturer sections define: reasonable care in making the chattel, reasonable care in adopting a safe plan or design, and, for a maker who knows of a danger, the liability of a supplier with that knowledge.19 The seller cannot answer by saying that it did not build the chattel, because the section tells the court to treat it as though it had.
The rule rests on what a name tells buyers. A product carrying a company's name, trademark, or logo represents that the company is responsible in some manner for the product's quality,20 so the rule holds the company whose name appears on the product to the maker's standard.
The consequence matters most where the seller knew nothing. Section 402 shelters an ordinary reseller, who typically has no practical way to find a defect in a finished product and no information about one.21 A holding-out seller does not receive that shelter, because it answers under the manufacturer rules. Section 395, for example, asks whether the maker used reasonable care in making a chattel that, unless carefully made, involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm, and that question does not turn on what the maker knew when it sold the product.22 A holding-out seller can therefore face a claim that a plaintiff could not bring against an ordinary retailer of the same goods. The claim is still one in negligence, so the plaintiff must prove the want of care that the manufacturer sections require.
The usual exam error is to treat every sale of another's product as a holding out, which would leave § 402 with nothing to protect. The rule asks how the seller presented the product to buyers, so a seller that resells a chattel under the maker's own name and label has not put it out as its own.
In both scenes the seller sold a drill it did not make, so the fact that changed the answer is the name the buyer was shown. Where the seller's brand told buyers that the seller stood behind the drill, the law holds the seller to a maker's standard. Where the maker's brand told buyers that the factory stood behind it, the buyer's reliance ran to the factory, and the dealer keeps the shelter of § 402. Knowledge can still change the dealer's position: a dealer that had learned of the switch defect and kept selling would answer under §§ 399 and 401 whatever label the drill carried.23
A holding-out seller is judged as a maker, and the maker's own limits travel with that status. One Kansas-law decision shows the point. The court did not need to decide whether the defendant was the machine's "manufacturer," because to whatever extent it was, it owed no duty to guard or warn a plaintiff with special knowledge, awareness, and experience against the patent, open, and obvious danger of activating the machine with his hands beneath the plunger.24
The principle stops at the company that only lends its name. A trademark licensor is not liable under the holding-out provision, though it can be liable for injuries from defects in products sold under its trademark or logo if it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product.25 The limit follows from the rule's own terms. The modern restatement speaks of sellers and distributors who sell a product as their own, and a pure licensor is neither, while a licensor that takes part in designing, making, or distributing the product has joined the activity that makes makers answerable.
No Duty to Test
Section 402 completes the group by addressing the seller that has nothing to disclose. A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor has reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not liable in negligence for harm caused by the chattel's dangerous character or condition because of a failure to discover the danger by inspection or test before selling it.27 The rule is the counterpart of §§ 399 and 401, which subject a seller who sells another's chattel with knowledge of danger to the supplier duties and require reasonable care to inform or protect those at risk.28 All three sections start from what the seller knew when it parted with the chattel, and § 402 states the result when the answer is nothing. Knowledge therefore divides resellers into those who must warn or protect and those who owe no duty to look.
Three features of the text carry the rule. It covers a seller of a chattel made by someone else, so a maker is judged under the manufacturer rules instead. It requires that the seller lack both actual knowledge and reason to know, and the second phrase means information from which a reasonable person would infer that the chattel is likely to be dangerous.29 And it removes only one theory of fault, the failure to discover the danger by inspection or test. Reason to know cannot mean whatever testing would have revealed, because every latent defect is something a test might have found, and a rule that charged sellers with all of it would leave § 402 protecting no one. The question is what information the seller held when it sold the chattel, and the section does not ask what a search might have turned up.
Two points support the rule. The first is opportunity. A retailer typically buys a product from a wholesaler and resells it, probably without ever taking it out of its box or preparing it for use, and it is hard to identify any act of the retailer that falls below due care.30 The second is fault. Negligence needs conduct to blame, and holding a seller liable when it did nothing wrong and held no warning information would produce liability without fault under a negligence label.
A stem that describes a defective saw sold by a hardware store and asks whether the store is liable in negligence for never testing it requires two answers: what the store held, and what act or omission the plaintiff calls careless.
The first two stores sell the same saw, and what separates them is information. The first falls within § 402 and the second within §§ 399 and 401, which is why a retailer's lack of any role in making the product settles nothing once it holds knowledge of danger. The third store differs in the kind of fault alleged. Section 402 relieves a seller of the duty to look, and it does not touch a claim that the seller's own conduct created the danger. A seller that puts out another's chattel as its own also falls outside the shelter, because it is subject to the same liability as though it were the manufacturer.31 The common errors run in opposite directions: reasoning that a retailer did not make the product and so owes nothing, or that a retailer who never tested a defective product is automatically negligent. Each skips the question of what the seller knew and what the plaintiff says was careless.
The absence of a duty to test belongs to the ordinary seller of another's goods and not to every supplier. A supplier who furnishes a chattel for business purposes, covered earlier in this chapter, is liable if it fails to exercise reasonable care to discover the chattel's dangerous condition or character and to inform those it should expect to use it.32
The rule also bears on a manufacturer that points to a dealer's chance to inspect. Section 396 keeps a manufacturer liable under §§ 394 and 395 even though the danger was discoverable by an inspection that the seller or any other person owed the injured person a duty to make.33 A dealer's opportunity to catch the defect therefore does not relieve the maker, and under § 402 a retailer without knowledge owes no duty to inspect in the first place.
Section 402 closes only the negligence route, so an injured user is not necessarily left without recourse. The same source that describes the retailer's lack of fault observes that a hardware store clearly subject to suit in Indiana would very likely not be liable in a negligence action, so the rule can leave a plaintiff without a negligence remedy against the defendant within reach.34 Express warranty is one alternative, but it is frequently a limited remedy. It applies only when specific representations were made to the buyer about the product feature that caused the injury, and statutory notice provisions that require the buyer to notify the seller of the breach within a short time may bar recovery.35 Those theories belong to other readings. A negligence verdict for the seller does not mean the injured user has no remedy.