Concept
Risk Created Through Third Parties
Duty to control the conduct of third persons
Risk Created Through Third Parties
Section 315 governs the claim that a defendant should have restrained a dangerous person or protected a victim from one, and it allows that claim only when a special relation links the defendant to the wrongdoer or to the victim.1 A plaintiff hurt by a third person has a second route that never touches § 315: the plaintiff can point to something the defendant did. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 303, an act is negligent if the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.2 The third person’s conduct is then the channel through which the defendant’s act produced the injury, and the court asks whether the act was carelessly done. The plaintiff need not show that the defendant had authority over the wrongdoer or owed the victim protection.
The reason lies in the line between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Comment a to § 302 puts the two baselines side by side: anyone who does an affirmative act must exercise a reasonable person’s care to protect others against unreasonable risk arising out of the act, while the duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted and are in general confined to situations where a special relation between the actor and the other gives rise to the duty.3 Section 315 sits on the second baseline. A defendant who fails to restrain a third person added nothing to the danger, so the law demands a relationship that explains why this defendant, of everyone who might have stepped in, must act. A defendant whose own act exposed the plaintiff is already singled out by that act, and the ordinary duty of care applies with no relationship at all.
The Third Restatement states the affirmative side in terms of risk. As Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC quotes it, an actor’s conduct creates a risk when it results in greater risk to another than the other would have faced absent the conduct, and conduct may create risk by exposing another to the improper conduct of third parties.4
An essay on third-party harm should therefore begin by sorting the claim. Does the plaintiff complain of something the defendant failed to do about someone else, or of something the defendant did? The first complaint starts with § 315. The second starts with § 303 or, if the act held others back from helping, with § 305. Ordinary negligence limits still apply to the second kind, since the act must create an unreasonable risk, and that turns on what the defendant realized or should have realized.
Section 303: Affecting Others’ Conduct
Section 303 holds an actor responsible for what the actor did, so its requirements all concern the act and its foreseeable effect on other people.5 A § 315 plaintiff must find a special relation to explain why the defendant had to do anything at all.6 A § 303 plaintiff needs no such explanation, because the defendant’s own conduct supplies the duty.
The act requirement places the claim on the misfeasance side of the line, and the Third Restatement offers a practical check for it. One court discussing the Restatement observes that the difference between creating a risk and failing to prevent one is clear in theory but hard to discern in practice, and it reports the comments’ suggestion to ask, hypothetically, whether the same risk of harm would have existed had the actor not engaged in the conduct.7 In a typical § 303 case it would not have, because nothing would have drawn the third person toward the dangerous behavior without the defendant’s act.
The foresight requirement limits how far that responsibility runs. Third persons make their own choices, so if every act that happened to precede someone else’s misconduct created liability, actors would answer for reactions they had no way to anticipate. Tying liability to what the actor intended, realized, or should have realized confines it to consequences the actor could have acted on. The unreasonable-risk requirement adds a final filter. Nearly every advertisement, sale, or public announcement affects what other people do, and the rule reaches only the effects that make the act’s risk unreasonable.
The principle is easiest to see in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. A radio station’s on-air contest rewarded listeners who reached an announced location first. Two teenage drivers raced to get there and forced another car off the road. The California Court of Appeal, over a dissent, reversed the plaintiff’s judgment against the station, holding that the station “had no control, or right to control, over the conduct of the drivers of other cars on the highway.” The California Supreme Court unanimously reinstated the judgment, insisting that liability did not open up a Pandora’s box.8 The control argument fails because it belongs to § 315(a), which asks whether the defendant had authority over a dangerous person. The plaintiff attacked something else, the contest the station designed and broadcast. The station acted, a prize for the first to arrive predictably set listeners hurrying toward a point on the road, and hurried driving by young listeners posed an unreasonable risk to everyone else on the highway.
The same logic governs a third person’s deliberate wrongdoing. The drivers in Weirum were reckless, but many § 303 claims pass through a crime, and the defendant then argues that the criminal, and not the defendant’s act, caused the harm. Courts do not treat a crime as an automatic break in the chain. The Kentucky Supreme Court has noted that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link, and it observed that a spark igniting negligently accumulated trash may still have been foreseeable, and so would not cut off liability, whether it was set accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or criminally.9 It is probably impossible to state a comprehensive rule for when a negligent defendant remains liable after a third person’s criminal act. The Restatements point toward foreseeability, treating intervening acts that are unforeseeable, unusual, or highly culpable as possibly outside the scope of the risk.10 When the crime is the very risk that made the defendant’s act unreasonable, the crime cannot excuse the defendant, because excusing it would erase the reason the act was negligent. When the act gave no reason to expect the crime, the crime lies outside the risk and liability ends there.
Two cases show the first situation at work. In Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, the security agency for an apartment building hired a guard with a violent record, and the guard used his passkey to enter a tenant’s apartment and assault her.11 Garceau v. Engel belongs to the same line of cases in which liability has been found.12 In Easley the defendant’s own act placed a person likely to commit a crime in contact with the plaintiff, and the assault that followed was the danger that made the hiring careless.
Failure on foreseeability marks the opposite pole. The notes cite Williams v. State for the result that there was no liability because the defendant had no reason to anticipate violence, and they ask what follows if a convict who was only a forger, with no record of violence, held up the plaintiff with a gun during his escape.13 The answer depends on whether the defendant had any reason to expect violence from that person. A defendant’s argument that a third person’s crime was the real cause therefore gets a foreseeability answer, not an automatic answer in either direction.
Section 305: Preventing Aid by Others
Section 305 applies the act-based reasoning of § 303 to one particular effect on other people. Under § 305, an act may be negligent if the actor intends to prevent, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to prevent, another or a third person from taking action that the actor realizes or should realize is necessary for the aid or protection of the other.15 Section 303 reaches acts that push other people toward dangerous conduct, and § 305 reaches acts that hold them back from protective conduct. The rule has three working parts: an act by the defendant, an effect on someone who would otherwise have helped, and aid that the defendant realizes or should realize the victim needs. Together they describe a defendant who, by acting, removes a source of help the victim would otherwise have had.
Because the removal is the defendant’s own act, the rule sits comfortably beside the no-duty default. A bystander who walks past an injured stranger adds nothing to the danger, and the chance that someone else will stop is exactly what it was before. A defendant who steps in and discourages others from helping has changed that chance, so the victim ends up worse off than if the defendant had never acted. Liability turns on the interference, and the rule imposes no general duty to rescue.
The fact carrying the claim is the effect on the motorists, who stood aside because of what the driver did. The departure completes the harm, but without the earlier effect on the motorists, the driver’s leaving would be an ordinary failure to help. A second driver shows the contrast.
The two scenes differ in one fact. In the first, the defendant’s act changed what other people did, and in the second it changed nothing about the victim’s position. The inquiry can be run as a short sequence that keeps the interference question apart from the question whether the defendant should have done more.
The boundary of the rule is contested, and Soldano v. O’Daniels is where the contest shows. A shooting was underway at a bar across the street. A patron from the bar asked the defendant’s bartender either to let him use the telephone to call the police or to make the call himself, and the bartender refused. The California court agreed with Prosser that the common law rule denying a duty to rescue violates “common decency” and is “revolting to any moral sense.” It held that the defendant, while not required to rescue, was required “to permit the patron from Happy Jack’s to place a call to the police or to place the call himself.”16 The Restatement principle closest to that result is § 327, which makes a person liable who knows or has reason to know that a third person is giving or is ready to give another aid necessary to prevent physical harm and who negligently prevents or disables that third person from giving it.17 The patron who ran across the street was a third person ready to give aid, so the argument for liability is that the bartender’s refusal disabled him.
The weakness in that argument is what the bartender actually did. The bartender kept the patron from using the bartender’s own telephone and blocked nothing else the patron might have tried. A later California decision, Eric J. v. Betty M., criticized Soldano for not distinguishing between “[i]nterference and refusal to allow one’s property to be commandeered, even for a good purpose,” and the notes ask whether the refusal should instead be governed by the doctrine of private necessity.18 The criticism draws the line this section has been drawing. Interference acts on the aid itself by stopping, deterring, or disabling a helper who was available. A refusal to lend one’s property declines to add to the victim’s options and leaves the helper as free as before to look elsewhere. Where the refused property was the only practical way to summon help, the refusal begins to look like an obstacle, which is the argument for Soldano. Where other means remained, the refusal looks like an ordinary failure to help. An essay should therefore report the result in Soldano, identify the premise that makes it a § 327 case, and note the objection from Eric J. without presenting the decision as settled.
The Third Restatement supplies a parallel from the other direction. An actor who, with no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably appears imperiled and helpless must use reasonable care while the other is within the actor’s charge. An actor who discontinues aid must refrain from putting the other in a worse position than existed before the actor took charge and, if the other reasonably appears to be in imminent peril of serious physical harm, must use reasonable care regarding the peril before ending the rescue.19 Both rules compare the victim’s position with the position the victim would have occupied had the actor never intervened, and § 305 asks the same comparison about help from others. Intentional interference with another person’s assistance is the clearest case, and Restatement (Second) § 326 addresses it.20 A § 305 claim therefore asks the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s act took away help the victim would otherwise have had, and proof that the defendant could have done more does not carry it.