Concept
Scope of the Duty
Duty to control the conduct of third persons
Scope of the Duty
Section 315 sets a default of no duty to control a third person so as to prevent that person from causing physical harm to another, and it lifts the default only where a special relation exists between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the endangered person.1 The earlier sections asked when such a relation exists and whether the harm was foreseeable. This section asks what the duty demands once it exists. Keeping that question apart from breach heads off a common error: treating the victim's injury as proof that the defendant failed the duty.
Three points control the answer. The standard is reasonable care, not prevention. Reasonable care can take several forms, of which a warning is the most basic and confinement the most contested. And the therapist's judgment that a patient is dangerous is measured against professional skill, not hindsight.
Reasonable Care, Not Prevention
When a special relation supplies the duty, the defendant must exercise reasonable care to prevent injury from the dangerous person. The defendant need not guarantee that no injury occurs. A duty to prevent would be a duty of absolute protection no matter what the circumstances, and the law seldom imposes a burden that stringent, though it sometimes imposes greater or lesser duties than due care. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 both describe the duty in reasonable-care terms.2 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California states the therapist's version the same way: a therapist who determines, or under the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against that danger.3
Reasonable care fits the reason the duty exists. A special relation gives the defendant some capacity to control or protect, and rarely a complete one. A therapist cannot read a patient's mind, and one court weighing the issue held that a want of close control does not by itself defeat a duty, though the psychotherapist's ability to control the patient remains a factor to weigh.4 A duty measured by outcome would make the defendant a guarantor, and every attack would decide the case before anyone asked what the defendant could have done. Reasonable care asks what a defendant with that relationship and those means could sensibly do.
Both victims were hurt, so the injury cannot separate the two professionals; their conduct does. For the same reason, an instruction telling jurors that the defendant had a duty to prevent the attack misstates the law, because it turns a duty of care into a duty of absolute protection.5
The Range of Protective Steps
Tarasoff describes the required steps in open terms. Depending on the nature of the case, the duty may call for one or more of these: warning the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, notifying the police, or taking whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.7 The list is illustrative, and the facts choose among its items, as they must under a reasonable-care standard. A fixed protocol would demand pointless steps in some cases and omit the helpful one in others.
A warning asks least of the defendant. It needs only knowledge of the danger and a way to pass it on, and it gives the potential victim what is needed to avoid harm, so a defendant with no power to restrain anyone may still have to use reasonable means such as a warning.8 The duty to protect subsumes a duty to warn, though it may reach further.9 Tarasoff shows that taking one step does not end the inquiry. The therapists had tried without success to have Poddar confined, yet the court held that the plaintiffs could amend their complaints to allege that failing to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her breached the duty. No specific statute shielded that failure, and the immunity for discretionary acts under Government Code section 820.2 did not protect it.10
The step that discharges the duty also changes with who is positioned to act on the information. A physician treating a patient with HIV owes a duty to unidentified third persons but may fulfill it by informing the patient of the risks of transmission, as in Reisner v. Regents of the University of California. A diagnosis of Rocky Mountain spotted fever may require the physician to warn the patient's family that they were exposed to infected ticks, as in Bradshaw v. Daniel.11 In the first setting the partners are unknown to the physician, and the patient is the one who controls the risk to them. In the second the family members are known and cannot protect themselves from an exposure they have never heard of, so a direct warning is the available step. Some decisions suggest that reasonable care can call for more than a warning. In Lundgren v. Fultz, the step discussed was blocking the return of guns to a patient with paranoid schizophrenia who was obsessed with weapons.12 Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws, to varying degrees, that allow police and others to take firearms from a dangerous person with due process protections. Whether the availability of those tools makes using them part of reasonable care is an open question.13
Confinement is the step courts have addressed least. In Tarasoff, to the extent liability rested on the therapists' failure to bring about Poddar's confinement, the therapists as public employees could claim immunity under Government Code section 856.14 That ruling disposed of the confinement theory on statutory grounds and left the common-law question open. Whether a duty to protect includes a duty to commit the patient or retain custody is unsettled.15 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, stated that the fear of undue confinement caused by imposing a duty has no reliable statistical support.16 Another court insisted on balancing four factors: the psychotherapist's ability to control the outpatient; the public's interest in safety from violent assault; the difficulty of forecasting whether a patient presents a substantial risk of physical harm to others; and the goal of the least restrictive environment for the patient, together with the importance of keeping psychotherapeutic communications confidential.17 A warning intrudes on confidentiality. Confinement takes away liberty and runs hardest against the least-restrictive-environment goal. A balancing standard lets a court weigh those costs against the public's interest in safety case by case. On an exam, treat warning as the core step, treat the other steps as available depending on the facts, and describe confinement as unsettled instead of assuming it is required.
The Professional-Skill Standard
The therapist's duty arises when the therapist determines, or under the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another.19 The evaluation behind that determination is therefore measured against the profession. The Tarasoff defendants pressed the obvious objection: a duty to protect is unworkable because therapists cannot accurately predict violence, and amici cited studies indicating that clinicians cannot reliably predict violent acts and tend to overpredict them.20 The difficulty of forecasting is one of the factors courts weigh when they decide whether to recognize a duty at all.21
The court accepted the difficulty and fitted the standard to it. In deciding whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence, the therapist need not render a perfect performance. The therapist must exercise the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the therapist's professional specialty under similar circumstances.22 A standard keyed to what a careful member of the specialty would do absorbs the unreliability the amici described. On that standard, a conclusion later proved wrong is not by itself negligence. A rule that punished every missed forecast would push therapists toward the overprediction the studies criticized.
The standard gives no shelter once the therapist has actually concluded that someone is in danger. The Tarasoff complaints raised no prediction problem at all, because they alleged that the therapists knew Poddar was dangerous and failed to warn.23 A plaintiff can therefore bring two different claims. One asserts that the therapist failed to recognize danger that the profession would have recognized, which asks whether the evaluation met professional standards. The other asserts that the therapist recognized the danger and did nothing, which asks whether the response was reasonable care, as described above. Neither claim asks whether the therapist predicted perfectly or prevented the harm.