Concept
Foreseeability as a Limit
Duty to control the conduct of third persons
Foreseeability as a Limit
Section 315 names two special relations that can displace the no-duty default, one running to the dangerous person and one to the endangered person, and neither clause mentions foreseeability.1 Courts supply that requirement themselves. A relationship tells a court whom the defendant may be asked to restrain or protect; foreseeability tells it what the defendant could fairly be expected to anticipate.
Connecticut states the limit in terms that reach every § 315 relation. Its threshold inquiry “has always been whether the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant,” so that if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could not foresee harm of the type alleged to a particular plaintiff, “the question of the existence of a duty to use due care is foreclosed.”2 From that premise the court holds that the mere existence of a special relationship does not create a duty to control a third person or to protect others from one. The defendant answers for failing to do either only if the third person’s conduct was foreseeable, and the court cites Fraser for the rule.3
The two requirements do different work. The relationship explains why this defendant, out of everyone who might have helped, can be asked to act. Foreseeability measures what the defendant could reasonably have been expected to guard against. If the relationship alone sufficed, a defendant would answer for harm it had no reason to anticipate.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California puts both requirements into one opinion. The court called foreseeability the most important consideration in establishing duty and stated the general principle that a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct.4 It then observed that when avoiding foreseeable harm requires the defendant to control another person’s conduct or to warn of it, the common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim. The therapist-patient relationship met that requirement, so the court did not decide whether foreseeability alone could create a duty.5 Foreseeability reappears inside the duty itself: when a therapist determines, or under the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist must use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.6 A foreseeability finding is thus the trigger. A therapist who concludes that a patient will kill an identified person has foreseen the harm to that person.
O’Brien v. Synnott sits at the opposite pole. A patient sued a hospital and a nurse for failing to protect him from alleged attacks by police officers while he was in the hospital, and the court held that they owed him no such duty because the attacks were not reasonably foreseeable.7 Each case involves a relationship of the kind that can support a protective duty, and foreseeability separates them. The Tarasoff therapist had determined, or should have determined, that violence was coming to an identifiable victim. Nothing made the officers’ alleged attacks foreseeable to the hospital, so the patient relationship produced no duty to guard against them.
How Specific the Harm Must Be
The Connecticut formulation asks about “the specific harm alleged,” but courts disagree on how much detail that phrase demands, and parents and businesses sit at opposite ends of the range. Parents face the strictest demand. Courts are reluctant to hold a parent liable for a child’s torts even when the parent knows the child is dangerous and could take steps to prevent harm. They reject liability when the parent could foresee that the child would cause harm of some kind but could not reasonably foresee the specific harm or the specific occasion for it. Once the parent knows of a specific propensity and of an imminent danger or occasion for it, the parent is liable for negligently failing to control the child or to warn potential victims.8
A restaurant case from Illinois sits at the other end. In Marshall v. Burger King Corp., a customer was killed when a car crashed through the restaurant’s wall, and the Illinois Supreme Court held that the restaurant’s duty extended to protecting customers from the negligent acts of third persons even though it had no notice of prior similar incidents.9 The court overruled earlier precedents that demanded particularized notice of the kind of harm and adopted a broad foreseeability test. It read comment f to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 to require an inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances of the accident, and it noted that Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40(b)(3) likewise supports a general duty of care.10
The two tests part ways when the first incident of its kind injures its first victim. A rule demanding notice of prior incidents denies a duty there; an inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances can find one. Read together, the parental cases and Marshall show that “specific harm” carries no fixed level of detail. A parent is held to a known propensity and an imminent occasion, a restaurant to the circumstances as a whole.
Duty or Jury Question
The Third Restatement places foreseeability outside the duty inquiry. Comment j to § 7 treats it as a jury issue relevant to proximate cause and not as a factor in the legal analysis of duty.11 Many decided cases still treat the foreseeability of harm as a consideration in deciding whether a duty exists, as the Connecticut and Tarasoff opinions above do, and one commentator predicts that judges will keep doing so.12
The disagreement is about who decides, and when. Where foreseeability sits in the duty inquiry, a judge can end a claim of unforeseeable harm before it reaches the jury. Under the Third Restatement approach, the jury decides foreseeability as part of proximate cause. Under either placement, harm the defendant had no reason to anticipate does not support liability. On an essay, apply the jurisdiction’s placement if the facts reveal it; otherwise address foreseeability once and note that some courts treat it as a duty question while the Third Restatement leaves it to the jury.