Concept
The No-Duty Default
Duty to control the conduct of third persons
Duty to Control Third Persons
The No-Duty Default
A defendant who watches one person about to injure another, and who could step in, usually owes the potential victim nothing. That is the starting point of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315: there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent physical harm to another unless one of two special relations exists.1 The first is a special relation between the defendant and the third person that imposes a duty to control that person’s conduct.2 The second is a special relation between the defendant and the endangered person that gives that person a right to protection.3 Either way, the plaintiff must find a relationship, and knowing about the danger, even being able to act on that knowledge, does not supply one. The sections that follow catalogue the relationships, and they make sense only against the default they depart from.
Maryland shows how courts use § 315 as a working framework rather than a mere summary. Its high court has repeated the observation in Lamb that the earlier decision in Scott v. Watson “suggests that § 315, which reflects the common law of this State, outlines the appropriate analytical framework for determining whether an actor has a duty to control a third person.”4 In that framework the analysis begins with the default and asks whether the facts fit an exception.
Behind the default lies the line between creating a risk of harm and failing to prevent one. In Bell v. Grow With Me Childcare, the court called that line fairly clear in theory but hard to find in practice. It pointed to two tests in the Third Restatement’s comments: whether the same risk of harm would have existed even if the actor had not engaged in the conduct, and whether the harm would not have occurred had the actor never existed.5 A bystander who merely fails to stop someone else’s wrongdoing did not create the risk by either test, because the third person could have caused the same harm with or without the bystander.
Courts have rarely rejected the default outright. Facing practical difficulties with the common law rule, they have increased the number of instances in which affirmative duties are imposed “not by direct rejection of the common law rule, but by expanding the list of special relationships which will justify departure from that rule.”6 The relationships the Bell court adopted from the Third Restatement include school and student, employer and employee, landlord and tenant, and custodian and those in custody. They share one characteristic: the actor is in a position to exercise some degree of control over the other person.7 That shared feature suggests why the law asks about relationships rather than knowledge.
Consider a passenger who realizes that the driver is dangerously drunk. The passenger did not create the danger, has no authority over the driver or the car, and stands in no relationship to the pedestrian the driver later strikes. The default therefore controls, and the passenger owes the pedestrian no duty to talk the driver out of driving.8
Dana and Eli know the same thing, and the relationship is the only difference between them. Eli stands where the examples above stand: an actor in a position to exercise some degree of control over another person.9 On an exam, ask first whether the defendant stands in a recognized relationship, because the defendant’s knowledge will not answer that question.
Because each special relation is an exception to a no-duty rule, the plaintiff must prove that it exists, and courts read the exceptions narrowly. One opinion in Doe v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center put the point this way: in both instances the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the special relationship, and each relationship is an exception to the general rule that there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct or to protect others from it, so the exception “must be construed narrowly.”10 The structure of the rule points the same way. A rule that denies a duty and lists two exceptions leaves the exceptions to mark the edge of liability. Proving the relationship opens the door to a duty without settling its reach, and later sections take up foreseeability as a limit and reasonable care as the measure of the duty.
The Third Restatement reaches the same structure in different vocabulary. Section 37 governs an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm, and it allows an affirmative duty of care where the actor has a special relationship with the plaintiff or with a person who poses a risk to the plaintiff.11 Those two relationships mirror the two exceptions in § 315. The phrase “special relationship” has “no independent significance”; it “merely signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship where otherwise no duty would exist pursuant to § 37.”12 The recognized list is not exclusive. Courts may recognize other areas for affirmative duties under § 37, just as they may adopt additional no-duty rules under § 7 for reasons of policy or principle.13