Concept
Undertakings Benefiting Third Persons
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Undertakings Benefiting Third Persons
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts carries the volunteer's duty past the person who receives the help. One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another that he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or that person's things is liable to the third person for physical harm resulting from a failure to use reasonable care in the undertaking, if one of three conditions is met.1 Under §§ 323 and 324, the person helped and the person hurt were the same individual. Under § 324A they come apart: the defendant deals with one person, and the person injured is someone else whose safety the dealing was meant to serve. The Third Restatement says the same in § 43, which applies when the actor knows or should know that the services will reduce a risk of physical harm to which a third person is exposed.2
The three conditions are alternatives, so proof of any one completes the duty and the plaintiff need not establish the other two:
- The defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm.3
- The defendant has undertaken to perform a duty the other owes the third person.4
- The harm is suffered because the other or the third person relied on the undertaking.5
Courts once resisted this extension, and their resistance shows the problem the rule solves. Suppose a defendant promises to keep another person's brakes in good condition, never lifts a finger to do it, and the brakes fail, injuring people who never dealt with him.6 Courts once denied liability on two grounds: the injured persons were not in privity with the defendant, meaning they had no contract or direct dealing with him, and the defendant was chargeable only with nonfeasance, a failure to act, rather than with any affirmative act of negligence.7 The nonfeasance objection loses its force once the defendant begins to perform and does so carelessly, because liability then rests on negligent conduct and the promise drops out. The hard case is the promise that was never performed. Modern law reaches it through a series of rules, and the duty arises whether the undertaking is an enforceable promise or a merely gratuitous one.8 The people the services were meant to protect are the ones most exposed when the defendant fails.
Two further controls keep the rule from reaching too far. The first is the kind of harm: the Restatement speaks of physical harm to the third person or the third person's things.9 The second is the scope of the undertaking itself. When the defendant's duty arises solely from the undertaking, its scope can narrow the duty, particularly if the way the undertaking was limited makes the risk or the reliance unforeseeable.10 Undertakings shown by conduct rather than words are often ambiguous, so an insurance adjuster who inspects a building to decide whether damage is covered has not necessarily undertaken to warn the neighbors that the building may collapse on them.11 The subsections below take the three conditions in the order the Restatement lists them, beginning with increased risk.
Increased Risk to Third Persons
The first condition makes the defendant liable to the third person if his failure to exercise reasonable care “increases the risk of such harm.”12 The rule reaches a defendant who undertakes services for one person that he should recognize as necessary to protect someone else, and this condition asks what the defendant's carelessness did to that someone else's exposure.13 Everything turns on what that exposure is compared with. As under § 323(a), the comparison is with a world in which the defendant never undertook anything; it is not with a world in which the defendant performed carefully.14
The baseline does real work. Any defendant who fails to perform leaves the people the services were meant to protect more exposed than a careful performer would have left them. If careful performance were the comparison, every broken promise would count as increased risk, and the condition would screen out nothing. Measured against silence, the condition separates the defendant who behaved like a risk creator, leaving the third person worse off than if he had said and done nothing, from the defendant who merely failed to make things better. The separation matters more for third persons than for the promisee, because they never dealt with the defendant and may not know of the promise. Only the effect of the defendant's own conduct on their safety ties them to him, and increased risk is the condition built on that tie alone. That is why it can be satisfied when the injured person relied on nothing at all.
An undertaking can itself create the danger. One of two workers at a day-care center assures the other that he will take a comatose child to the emergency room, and then does not.15 The assurance goes to a coworker and aims at the child's protection, which is the shape § 324A describes. It creates the risk that the other worker will not act, because someone has said the matter is handled. The child, being comatose, cannot rely on anything, and she needs no reliance: the undertaking and its non-performance increased the risk to her, and that is enough.16 The worker who gave the assurance left her worse placed than silence would have, since silence would have given the other worker no reason to stand down. The same facts may also be argued as reliance by the other worker under § 324A(c), taken up below, but the increased-risk route requires no proof that anyone relied.
The traffic-signal cases show the same condition failing. A contractor promises a city to repair a malfunctioning signal and then does nothing, and drivers later collide at the intersection. The drivers are third persons whose safety the promise was meant to serve, and non-performance creates a readily foreseeable risk of collisions, so some courts impose a duty to use care in carrying out the undertaking.17 Courts that follow the Restatement's baseline reach the opposite result. The promise to repair did not by itself make the signal more dangerous than it would have been had the contractor promised nothing, so there is no increased risk unless the contractor committed some negligent affirmative act or another condition is met.18 The courts genuinely differ, and an answer should say which view it applies. Under the restrictive view, the drivers' claim moves to the reliance condition, which would ask, for example, whether the city held off arranging another repair because it counted on the promise. That condition is § 324A(c), developed below.
Both scenes involve a promise made to one party for the protection of others, so the promise cannot be what separates them. What separates them is what the undertaking did to the risk. The assurance in the day-care center gave the one person positioned to act a reason to stand down, and the child was worse off for it. The promise about the signal, standing alone, changed nothing at the intersection, and the drivers were exactly as exposed as if it had never been made. A stem that pairs a promise to one party with an injury to another therefore calls for one question first: compared with a world in which the defendant had said and done nothing, did the promise or its non-performance leave the injured person more exposed?
The condition carries a second limit over from § 323(a): it reaches only harm resulting from the risk the undertaking was intended or reasonably expected to protect against.19 In a New Jersey decision, a band had contracted to play at the defendant's place of business, and the defendant had agreed to provide helpers to unload the band's equipment. The defendant supplied none, and the plaintiff slipped and was hurt while unloading the equipment himself. Non-performance was a cause in fact of the fall, yet the undertaking concerned moving equipment and said nothing about avoiding falls, so liability grounded on it was inappropriate.20 A third person injured by a hazard the undertaking was never meant to address stands in the same position. Without a match between the risk and the undertaking, but-for causation alone would make every promisor answerable for any harm that followed a broken promise.
Assuming Another's Duty
The second condition applies when the defendant “has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person.”22 As with every condition under § 324A, the defendant is liable for physical harm resulting from a failure to use reasonable care in services he should recognize as necessary to protect the third person.23 Subsection (a) looks at what the defendant's carelessness did to the third person's exposure. Subsection (b) looks at whose responsibility the defendant took on, and the answer rests on a relationship that existed before the defendant arrived: the party who hired the defendant, the “other” in the Restatement's wording, already owed the plaintiff a duty of care, and the defendant agreed to carry it out.
The standard illustration is the employer. An employer owes its employees a duty of reasonable care, including a duty to provide a reasonably safe place in which to work. If the employer contracts with a safety firm to supply that workplace safety, the firm has contracted to fulfill the employer's duty and must use reasonable care in doing so.24 The principle reaches any defendant who accepts responsibility for carrying out another's duty to protect the plaintiff's physical safety. A railroad that contractually assumed a city's duty of care was held liable for its failure to act in Phinney v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., and a defendant that contractually took over snow-clearing duties that another party owed was subject to liability in Gazo v. City of Stamford.25 In each case the defendant answers for breach of the assumed duty even if the undertaking did not increase the risk and even if no reliance on it is proven.26
Subsection (b) needs neither increased risk nor reliance because of how the duty arises. The other two conditions supply a reason to hold a volunteer who owed the plaintiff nothing to begin with: the volunteer left the plaintiff worse off, or led someone to lower his guard. Under subsection (b) the duty to the plaintiff predates the defendant, because the hiring party already owes it. That party may ordinarily satisfy the duty by taking reasonable precautions, including a contract with someone else to provide the protection needed, so it can shift all or part of the responsibility and be relieved of liability by contracting with the defendant.27 The defendant must then be held to the duty it assumed. Otherwise a contract between two other people, to which the plaintiff was not a party, would settle the plaintiff's rights. In Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Corp. liability was justified in part because of the “displacement and substitution of a particular safety function designed to protect persons like this plaintiff.”28 Contract law offers a parallel: a plaintiff in this position may resemble a creditor beneficiary entitled to sue for a breach of the contract that led to the injury.29
The duty the defendant takes over reaches only as far as the undertaking. Courts hold that the duty of care imposed on a defendant is limited to the extent of its undertaking, and one court treated an undertaking tied to a service contract as ending when the contract ended.30 A resident hurt in the parking garage, which the maintenance contract left to the association, could not invoke subsection (b) against the firm, because the firm assumed the association's duty only as to the stairwell lighting. The same structure supplies a second check. Subsection (b) has nothing to operate on unless the hiring party actually owed the plaintiff a duty, since a defendant cannot take over an obligation that never existed.
The assumed-duty rule can also yield to policy. Even where a defendant has undertaken to act for the plaintiff's safety, a court may conclude on the facts of the particular case that a duty is unwarranted.31 In Anderson v. Fox Hill Village Homeowners Corp. a tenant promised the landlord that it would clear snow and ice from the property, and a person employed on the property by someone else fell on a patch of ice. The court refused to let the promise create a tort duty, because the promise to the landlord was not intended to benefit third persons and Massachusetts has a strong policy against imposing snow-clearance duties.32 Gazo came out the other way in Connecticut, where the defendant contracted to take over all of the snow-clearing duties of the plaintiff's employer and was held subject to liability.33 The two decisions differ in what the defendant took over. The defendant in Gazo assumed a duty someone already owed the plaintiff, while the tenant in Anderson made a promise that ran only to its landlord, in a state that disfavors liability for snow-clearance. The result in Anderson is consistent with accepting the assumed-duty rules in cases that do not involve the same policies.34
An exam stem that pairs a contract between two parties with an injury to a stranger to that contract should therefore prompt two questions. Did the hiring party owe the injured person a duty of care, and did the defendant agree to perform that duty? If both answers are yes, the plaintiff reaches a duty of reasonable care without proving increased risk or reliance, which makes this the route to check when a plaintiff cannot satisfy subsection (a) or (c). The analysis ends there only if no policy against recognizing a duty in that setting intervenes.
Third-Person Reliance
The third condition makes the volunteer liable to the third person if “the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.”36 The wording tracks § 323(b), where the person who received the help and the person who was hurt were the same individual, so the clause needed to ask only whether that one person relied.37 Section 324A separates the two. The other is the person the defendant dealt with and agreed to serve, the third person is the one whose safety the services were meant to protect, and reliance by either completes the duty. The addition matters because an injured third person often has no idea that anyone promised anything for that person's protection. A rule that counted only the injured person's own reliance would leave the plaintiff outside an undertaking that others were quietly counting on.
Reliance does its harm by displacing protection, and the person whose protection is displaced is frequently someone other than the plaintiff. When a defendant undertakes a protective task, the people positioned to arrange other safeguards, such as a landlord, a parent, an employer, or a passerby who would otherwise step in, may reasonably stand down, and the plaintiff is then exposed because those safeguards were never put in place. Counting their reliance lets the rule reach harms the undertaking induced even though the plaintiff personally did nothing. The Third Restatement makes the same point in § 43(c), which is satisfied by reliance by “another.”38 The Coast Guard's undertaking to rescue someone, for instance, may lead other potential rescuers to rest on their oars, and that reliance grounds liability if the Coast Guard then fails to proceed with the rescue it undertook, even though the person in the water relied on nothing.39 In Nelson v. Salt Lake City the city had undertaken to maintain a fence between a playground and a river, and a mother relied on the fence's integrity in allowing her child to play, which is reliance by someone acting for the person who was exposed.40 The mother made the decision the undertaking influenced, and her reliance supplies the link between the city's carelessness and the child's exposure to the river.
Reliance by someone else is still reliance in fact, so the same showing applies to whoever relied. That person must have known of the undertaking, must have had a real choice whether to arrange other protection, and must have given that protection up, or never sought it, because the undertaking seemed to cover the need. A party who never learned of a promise could not have changed anything because of it, and a party who would have acted identically without the promise has not relied. The injured plaintiff's own ignorance of the undertaking therefore costs nothing, while ignorance on the part of the person said to have relied defeats the clause.
The same question resolves the traffic-signal scenario from the preceding subsection. Under the restrictive baseline, drivers hurt at an intersection whose signal a contractor promised to repair and never touched cannot rest on increased risk, so their claim turns on whether the city held off arranging another repair because it counted on the promise. If it did, the city's reliance supplies the condition, and the drivers' own ignorance of the contract is irrelevant. Reliance and increased risk also overlap in practice, because reliance often produces the increase in risk, and the separate clause for reliance lets a court recognize a duty even where neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's agent relied.41
The breadth of this clause raises the question that the traditional cases answered the other way. In Moch, a water company had contracted with a city to supply water at the hydrants, its failure to maintain adequate pressure left a fire unchecked, and the Court of Appeals refused to hold that by beginning performance the company had come into a relation with everyone who might potentially be benefited by the water.42 The court concluded that liability would be “unduly and indeed indefinitely extended” by enlarging the zone of duty in that way.43 Its illustrations show the mechanism: a coal dealer supplying fuel to a shop would answer to the shop's customers, and a manufacturer would answer not only to its buyer but to those who look to the buyer for their own supplies, since “[t]he assumption of one relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked together.”44 Moch predates the modern Restatement provisions and does not apply § 324A(c), but its warning explains why the clause demands reliance in fact.
The Coast Guard example and Moch differ in what connects the defendant to the injured person. In the rescue case, particular people held back because the undertaking had been made, so the undertaking changed what specific persons did and the plaintiff's exposure followed from that change. In Moch, the plaintiff's theory tied the company to an unbounded class defined only by the chance of benefiting from the water. A common mistake is to treat status as an intended or foreseeable beneficiary of the undertaking as if it were reliance. The clause asks whether the other or the third person changed conduct because of the undertaking, and a promise to one party that happens to benefit many others creates liability to them only where that showing is made.