Concept
Misfeasance Versus Nonfeasance
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Misfeasance Versus Nonfeasance
The no-duty rule of Restatement § 314 protects a defendant whose only fault is doing nothing, so everything turns on which failures to act really are nothing.1 Fewer qualify than one might expect. A missing precaution is often one feature of conduct that was risky from the start, and the law judges that conduct under ordinary negligence principles, with no special shelter for the omission. In H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., Judge Cardozo conceded that the misfeasance-nonfeasance formula is incomplete and at times misleading, yet he kept it because it points to the question that decides these cases: whether the defendant has gone far enough to have "launched a force or instrument of harm," or has stopped where inaction is at most "a refusal to become an instrument for good."2 Classification therefore comes first in any failure-to-act problem. The exceptions that fill the rest of this chapter matter only after a court has decided that the claim concerns pure inaction.
A defendant who answers a negligence claim by saying "I did nothing" wins only if nothing accurately describes the conduct, and the cases show how seldom it does. A driver who approaches a crosswalk and fails to brake cannot defend a pedestrian's claim by pointing to the omission, because the driver was operating a car and operated it badly. The law charges that as a negligent act.3 A contractor who digs a trench across a public highway and leaves it unlit at night stands in the same position. The missing light is one part of a course of affirmative conduct, digging without lighting or guarding the excavation, and courts accordingly instruct juries that negligence includes the omission to do something a reasonable person would do.4 Cardozo's own examples run the same way. A surgeon who operates without pay is liable although the fault lies in failing to sterilize the instruments, an engineer although the fault lies in failing to shut off steam, and a car maker although the fault lies in inadequate inspection.5
These omissions lose the protection of the no-duty rule because of what justifies the rule. A pure non-actor leaves the plaintiff no worse off than before and merely fails to become "an instrument for good."6 The driver and the contractor differ, since each has put something into the world that can hurt people, a moving vehicle or an open trench. The plaintiff is worse off for what the defendant did, and the skipped precaution is only the way the activity was carried on carelessly.
Moch itself marks the opposite pole. A private water company had contracted with a city to supply water, and its negligent failure to maintain adequate pressure at the hydrants left a fire unchecked. The Court of Appeals refused to treat that failure as a common-law tort and described it as the denial of a benefit rather than the commission of a wrong.7 Unlike the driver and the contractor, the company had launched nothing. The fire arose independently of it, and the shortfall at the hydrant left property owners where the fire had put them. The court also worried about scope. If performing a contract with the city made the company answerable to everyone who might benefit from the water, a coal dealer who failed to supply a shop would answer to the shop's customers, and every promise would carry an open-ended set of new obligations.8 That concern about indefinite liability returns below in the discussion of undertakings that benefit third persons.
No formula tells a court whether a given set of facts shows affirmative action with an embedded omission or simple inaction, and the label can end the case before reasonableness is ever considered.9 In Jackson v. City of Joliet, an officer came upon a burning car that had left the road. He called the fire department and directed traffic but did nothing to rescue the occupants or summon an ambulance, and an occupant died.10 The court treated the officer's conduct, at least in a civil rights claim, as a failure to prevent death rather than an affirmative act causing death. On that classification it never reached the question whether the officer's choices were reasonable in light of the risks.11 A court could as plausibly have likened the officer to the contractor who fails to light an excavation, and that classification would have required it to decide whether the officer was negligent in the circumstances.12 The stakes are concrete. Once the no-duty rule applies, a court does not ask whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonably risky or was justified, while outside the rule those are the central questions.13
The decisions offer no formula, only a tendency to avoid both extremes. Courts keep a specific omission such as failing to brake joined to the driving of which it is a part, and they stop short of describing conduct at its most abstract, so a water company's failure to supply water to a hydrant is treated as mere nonfeasance rather than as negligently running a water company.14 Each extreme would defeat the law. If every omission counted as nonfeasance when described at its narrowest, the no-duty rule would swallow negligence law. If all conduct counted as affirmative activity when described at its broadest, the rule would disappear, since every bystander is engaged in some activity. Between the extremes, a defendant's own earlier step often tips the classification. In Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, a highway patrolman pulled the plaintiffs over into the median, and the court treated his later failure to protect them as affirmative conduct that had created a serious risk of harm, not as nonfeasance.15
Because the label carries so much weight, the real contest in a failure-to-act dispute is over framing. The no-duty rule is consistent with negligence principles, yet it is said to stifle charitable impulses and deter would-be rescuers.16 Almost any inaction can be recast as misfeasance by a court so inclined, so a plaintiff's lawyer searches for the activity inside which the omission sits and describes a defendant who went far enough in what was actually done to affect the plaintiff's interests adversely. The defense lawyer isolates the omission and describes a bystander who merely failed to confer a benefit. An exam stem that says the defendant failed to do something is therefore not yet a no-duty problem. Ask what the defendant was doing when the omission occurred and whether that activity created or enlarged the danger. If it did, argue ordinary negligence. If the defendant was only present and idle, argue § 314 and turn to the exceptions. The same unprevented injury is negligence when the person who failed to prevent it was steering the car, and it creates no duty under § 314 when that person was standing on the corner watching.