Concept
The Privity Barrier
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Plaintiffs
The Privity Barrier
Cardozo framed the question in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. this way: did the defendant owe a duty of care and vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser?1 Under the rule then prevailing, the answer was no. Cooley's treatise stated the general rule: a contractor, manufacturer, vendor, or furnisher of an article is not liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture, or sale of the article.2 A plaintiff who lacked privity of contract, meaning a direct contractual relationship with the maker, had no negligence claim against it, however plainly its carelessness had caused the injury. This section traces the rule from its English source to the exceptions that came to strain it.
The rule came to America from England. In Winterbottom v. Wright, a contractor had agreed with the postmaster-general to provide a mail coach and keep it in repair. The coach broke down and overturned, and the driver sued the contractor for his injuries. The Court of Exchequer denied recovery because no privity of contract existed between them; the agreement had been made with the postmaster-general alone.3 American courts took over the requirement and enforced it staunchly through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in part to protect a developing industry from widespread liability.4
The English judges feared liability without limit. If the driver could sue, said Lord Abinger, every passenger, and even any passerby, injured when the coach upset might bring a similar action.5 Unless such contracts were confined to the parties who made them, he added, "the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Baron Alderson, concurring, observed that "there is no point at which such actions would stop."6
The rule rested on a second idea: the duty to build carefully arose from the contract alone. Chief Judge Ruggles illustrated the point in Thomas v. Winchester. A builds a wagon and sells it to B, who sells it to C, who hires it to D. A's gross negligence overturns the wagon and injures D. D cannot recover from A, because A's obligation to build the wagon faithfully arises solely out of his contract with B.7 D was a stranger to that contract, and so had no claim.
The same opinion also produced the first exception. A dealer in medicines sold belladonna, a deadly poison, to a druggist, but negligently labeled it extract of dandelion. The druggist, in good faith, used it to fill a prescription calling for the harmless extract, and the patient was poisoned. The court held the original vendor liable.8 Compare the patient with D in the wagon example. Neither had a contract with the defendant, and the defendant's negligence injured both. The court distinguished negligence imminently dangerous to the lives of others from negligence that was not. By 1900, dissatisfaction with the privity bar had produced exceptions of this kind for products "imminently" or "inherently" dangerous to human safety.9 Even after the writ system was abolished, courts continued to require privity in a negligence action unless the case fell within one of these recognized exceptions.10
Two older cases show where the exception stopped. In Loop v. Litchfield, the maker pointed out a defect in a wheel to a buyer who wanted a cheap article and was ready to assume the risk. The wheel lasted five years before it broke, and the buyer meanwhile leased the machinery. The maker was held not answerable to the lessee.11 In Losee v. Clute, a negligently made boiler exploded and injured the neighbor of the buyer, who had no contract with the maker, and the privity rule barred recovery.12 Cardozo would later confine Losee to its special facts: the decision rested on the remoteness of the risk, and the buyer there had not only accepted the boiler but tested it.13 Remoteness belongs to an older vocabulary. Most contemporary courts deciding proximate cause ask instead how foreseeable a result of the defendant's negligence a jury could find the harm to have been, not whether the harm was remote or indirect.14
Other decisions pushed the exception well past poison. In Devlin v. Smith, a contractor built a scaffold knowing that workmen would use it. He was held liable: an improperly built scaffold was a most dangerous trap, and because he built it for their use, he owed the workmen a duty of care irrespective of his contract with their master.15 Torgeson v. Schultz arose when a bottle of aerated water, charged under high pressure, exploded and injured the purchaser's servant; the evidence suggested the bottle had not been properly tested.16
Each new case sharpened a question the exception could not answer. What made a product "imminently or inherently dangerous," and so exempt from the privity requirement, when a defective product like the Winterbottom coach was not?17 Cardozo's own examples show how hard that line was to hold. A scaffold is not inherently a destructive instrument; it becomes destructive only if imperfectly constructed. A large coffee urn may carry the potency of danger if negligently made, yet no one thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is destruction, and the same is true of bottled aerated water.18 A coach fits that description as well, since it endangers its users only when carelessly built. Whether a plaintiff recovered therefore turned on whether a court filed the article under "imminently dangerous" or under merely "defective."