Concept
Applying the Framework
Duty and negligent conduct framework
Applying the Framework
A negligence claim has four parts, and each earlier section of this chapter taught one of them. Section 281 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists all four: the interest invaded must be one the law protects against unintentional invasion; the actor's conduct must be negligent with respect to the plaintiff; that conduct must be a legal cause of the invasion; and the plaintiff must not have so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing the action.1 Section 282 defines the second part. Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm, and it does not include conduct that recklessly disregards another's interest.2 Section 284 says what counts as conduct: an act that a reasonable person should recognize as creating an unreasonable risk, or a failure to act that the actor was under a duty to perform.3
The parts also divide the work between judge and jury. Whether a duty is owed is a question of law for the court. Whether the duty was breached is usually a question for the jury, but the judge can always determine that no reasonable jury could find breach on the evidence.4 A plaintiff with no duty therefore loses before anyone asks how carefully the defendant behaved, and a plaintiff whose proof of breach could not persuade a reasonable jury loses without a verdict. The cases that follow show the judge using the second power.
In H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Resendez, the customer's claim rested on the grocer's grape display. The Texas Supreme Court granted the grocer's petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that the customer take nothing.5 The court found a gap in the proof: Resendez presented no evidence that the display created an unreasonable risk of customers falling on grapes.6
Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. shows what the missing proof looks like. There the evidence went beyond the mere existence of a display. Safeway showed its grapes in a slanted bin over a linoleum tile floor with no protective floor mat, and that manner of display created an unreasonable risk that customers would fall on grapes landing on the floor.7 The two cases reconcile on that difference. Both stores displayed grapes, so the activity was the same, and what separated the outcomes was the evidence of how each display was arranged. A display is an ordinary way to sell produce, and some chance that a grape reaches the floor comes with it, so the display cannot itself be the unreasonable risk. An arrangement can be. Slope, floor surface, and the absence of a mat give a jury something concrete to weigh against the small cost of correcting them, and the jury is never asked to condemn displays as such.
Taylor v. Olsen shows the same discipline when the setting is dangerous. A tree standing beside a heavily traveled highway fell on a car. The setting put the probability and gravity of harm on the plaintiff's side of the scale, but the decay was inside the trunk and gave no outward sign, and nothing showed that careful owners bore into healthy-looking trees to inspect them. The judge took the case from the jury by directed verdict, a ruling that the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion.8 A dangerous setting raises the care a reasonable owner must take, but the plaintiff must still point to a precaution within the owner's reach that would have revealed the hazard. The one method that might have found the rot, boring into the trunk, was intrusive, and nothing showed that careful owners use it, so the jury had no unreasonable conduct to find. Had the rot been visible from outside the trunk, or had boring been what careful owners do, breach would have gone to the jury.
A claim built on a failure to act adds a layer before the standard of care applies, because an omission is negligent conduct only when the act was necessary to protect or assist another and the actor was under a duty to do it.9 A stranger who owes no duty to act never reaches the question whether doing nothing was reasonable, and the claim ends at duty. Where the law does impose the duty, inaction can be negligent, and the plaintiff must still prove breach, legal cause, and damage like any other plaintiff. The next hypothetical puts both layers to work.
The aid claim clears the duty step, because Jackson's driving caused the injury and she therefore had a duty to go to Polk's assistance, whether she caused the explosion negligently or innocently. It may fail at breach. Her duty was to exercise reasonable care to aid him, not an absolute duty to help regardless of her own injury, and a reasonable person in her condition probably could not have rushed over. She owed the duty and may not have breached it.10 The driving claim is a separate question, and her reasonable conduct after the explosion does not answer it: the fact that an actor is not negligent after an emergency has arisen does not preclude liability for tortious conduct that produced the emergency.11
Step three is where the grape cases and the tree case were decided, and it demands facts about how the defendant acted. A plaintiff who points to an ordinary activity, whether a grape display or a tree beside a road, has described the setting of an accident without describing an unreasonable risk. Other steps can end a case as completely: a stranger's omission claim dies on duty, and Jackson's aid claim could die on breach even though she owed a duty. An answer that runs the steps in order will find the element on which the claim turns.