Concept
Applying Necessity
Necessity: public and private
Applying Necessity
Solve every necessity problem in the same order: find the tort, sort the emergency, test the privilege, and only then ask who pays. The order follows the way the rules are written. Each privilege excuses an act that “would otherwise be” a trespass to land, a trespass to a chattel, or a conversion, so a privilege has nothing to excuse until a tort is on the table.1 The rules on liability for harm are separate provisions that apply only after the privilege is established.2 The Butler v. O’Hara flood problem runs the whole sequence on one set of facts. Dire flood warnings have issued, the water is rising, and Butler has left New Orleans. O’Hara removes his canoe from his property, fills it with her possessions, climbs in, and paddles away. The canoe receives a gash in its side.3
Start by naming the torts. O’Hara entered Butler’s land to take his canoe, which is a trespass to land unless a privilege excuses it. The canoe invites two labels. Taking it, loading her possessions, and paddling off treats it as her own, and a gash in the hull may show the substantial dominion that makes an interference serious. An interference is serious when the actor might justly be required to pay the owner the full value of the chattel, and whether this one qualifies is a question of fact.4 But O’Hara used the canoe for a relatively short time while Butler, who had left New Orleans, did not need it, so trespass to chattels is the likelier label.5 The gash then does double duty, because trespass to chattels, unlike traditional trespass, requires substantial damage to the property.6 The chattel privilege names both torts, so an exam answer can flag the uncertainty and move on without settling the label.7
Next, ask where the danger comes from. A flood is an outside force: Butler did not create it, and neither did his canoe. The defense privileges are different tools. One reaches an act done to defend oneself or a third person “against the other,” on the same conditions that would justify inflicting a harmful or offensive contact on the other.8 The other protects the actor’s land or chattels, but only where the harm inflicted is not unreasonable compared with the harm threatened.9 Neither is aimed at a flood, which threatens O’Hara through no one’s act, so her claim rests on necessity.
Then decide whether the necessity is public or private. A flood that threatens a city is a large event, but the public privilege turns on the purpose of the act, which must be avoiding a public disaster.10 A volunteer who levels a building to stop a fire from spreading through a district acts for that purpose. O’Hara’s paddling avoids the flood for no one but herself. She protects her own person and property, which makes this private necessity, the privilege that arises in an emergency to enter another’s land to prevent serious harm to self or property.11 The label matters at the end of the analysis, because the rules on paying for harm are written for acts that benefit the actor or a third person.12
The privilege test then follows the text of the rules. The land privilege asks whether the entry “is or reasonably appears to be necessary” to prevent serious harm to the actor or her goods. The chattel privilege asks whether the act “is or is reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary” to protect a person or property from serious harm.13 Both turn on what the situation reasonably appeared to be, so O’Hara is protected even if the water would not in fact have reached her. Dire warnings and rising water threaten serious harm to her and her possessions, and taking the canoe to get out of the water was reasonable and necessary on these facts. She will likely succeed in asserting private necessity.14 One limit remains: both privileges fail if the actor knows that the person for whose benefit she acts is unwilling.15 O’Hara acts for herself, so any objection from Butler would not trigger the limit, because Butler is not the beneficiary. The entry and the taking are privileged, and neither is a trespass or a conversion.
The warnings and the rising water carry the privilege. An exam drafter who wants the privilege to fail simply removes them.
Liability for the entry does not depend on harm, because traditional trespass is actionable at least for nominal damages without proof of any resulting damage.16 A real emergency can also fail the reasonableness check. If a rescue truck were collecting evacuees at the end of Butler’s street and O’Hara knew it, taking the canoe would be neither necessary nor reasonable, because the same protection was available without touching Butler’s goods. The privilege reaches only the interference that the emergency required.17
Two textual points sort the Joyce facts. Farmer’s objection does not defeat the privilege, because the limit looks to the unwillingness of the person for whose benefit the actor acts, and that person is Jimmy.18 The knife raises a different problem. The privilege requires an act that is reasonable and necessary to protect a person from serious harm, and it is written for acts that would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion, so it does not by its terms excuse a threat against the owner’s person.19 Joyce may keep the privilege for the car and still answer for the way she held the owner off, and Farmer can argue that so violent a method made the whole taking unreasonable.
The last step separates two questions that students run together. Finding the taking privileged answers whether O’Hara committed a tort, and the answer is no. It leaves open who bears the harm her use of the privilege left behind. Because she acted for her own benefit, the chattel rule makes her subject to liability for any harm caused by exercising the privilege, and the land rule does the same for harm to Butler’s legally protected interests in the land or connected with it.20 She pays for the gash, and for any damage her entry did to Butler’s land.21 If the entry left no mark, she owes nothing for it. The land rule excepts a threat caused by the possessor’s own tortious conduct or contributory negligence, but a flood is no one’s tort, so the exception gives O’Hara nothing, and the chattel rule as stated here contains no such exception.22
Two errors follow from running these steps together. An answer that stops at the privilege lets O’Hara walk away free of the gash. An answer that bills her for the gash and then calls her a tortfeasor treats the payment as proof of a tort. The privilege defeats the tort, and the duty to pay for actual harm survives it, which is why private necessity is called an incomplete privilege.