Concept
Paying for Private Necessity
Necessity: public and private
Paying for Private Necessity
A privilege to use another's property in an emergency settles only half the dispute. The other half is who bears the loss. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 197(1), a person may enter or remain on another's land when that is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor, the other, or a third person, or to the land or chattels of any of them, unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the person for whose benefit he enters is unwilling.1 Section 263(1) gives the matching privilege for chattels. An act that would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion is privileged if it is, or is reasonably believed to be, reasonable and necessary to protect the person or property of the actor, the other, or a third person from serious harm, again unless the actor knows the beneficiary is unwilling.2
Subsection (1) of each section decides whether the entry or the use is a tort. Subsection (2) of each decides who pays, and for private necessity it puts the bill on the actor. Traditional law calls the result a conditional, or incomplete, privilege: it keeps the actor from being a trespasser or converter without keeping the actor from paying for the damage.3
The public-disaster privileges rest on a different footing. Sections 196 and 262 privilege an entry onto land, or an act that would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion, when it is or is reasonably believed to be necessary to avert or avoid a public disaster.4 The case for that privilege looks to the community, not to the two parties. Otherwise one stubborn person might involve a whole city in ruin by refusing to allow the destruction of a building that would cut off the flames and check the progress of the fire.5 The court that gave that reason declined to cure the risk of needless destruction by making the actors responsible in every case, whether or not the necessity existed. It insisted that necessity be clearly shown, and it pointed to the legislature for the mode in which compensation should be made.6 In private necessity the benefit goes to the actor or to the person the actor is helping, and the Restatement treats the cost differently.
Two questions follow. The first is what harm the actor must pay for, and why. The second is what happens when the possessor created the danger in the first place.
Compensation for Actual Harm
Section 197(2) provides that when an entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, the actor is subject to liability for any harm done in exercising the privilege to a legally protected interest of the possessor in the land or connected with it, except where the threat the entry was made to avert was caused by the possessor's tortious conduct or contributory negligence.7 Section 263(2) states the chattel version more briefly: when the act is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, the actor is subject to liability for any harm caused by the exercise of the privilege.8 The operative idea in both is harm caused by exercising the privilege. Subsection (1) makes the entry or use lawful; subsection (2) asks what that lawful conduct did to the owner's property and sends the bill to the actor. A privileged act and a compensable loss can therefore coexist.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (Minn. 1910) is the case that teaches the rule. A ship was unloading at the plaintiff's dock when a storm arose. By the time the unloading ended, venturing out would have been dangerous, so the ship stayed moored, and the crew replaced the mooring lines as they parted or chafed. The ship buffeted the dock throughout the storm, and the dock owner sued for the damage.9 The shipowner argued that untying would have been negligent, even foolhardy, given the risk to life and ship, and that it should not pay for staying. The court disagreed. The shipowner held a conditional privilege only; although it had done nothing wrong, it had saved the ship at the expense of the dock and was liable for the damage.10
Traditional law treats Vincent as the standard case of an incomplete privilege. The shipowner could use, and even damage, the dock, which it could not deliberately do without necessity. Unlike a person acting in self-defense, though, it had to pay for the privilege by tendering reasonable rental value or compensation for lost or damaged property, as the case may be.11 One summary of the rule puts it in a line: where a boat is saved by being kept moored to a dock during a storm and the dock is damaged, the actor must compensate the owner for the injury.12 The shipowner's argument confused two questions. Prudence is why the ship was allowed to stay, and it does not answer who bears the cost of staying.
One critique of the decision shows the rule's logic by attacking it. The court's reasoning, the critique observed, admits there would be no liability had the first cables not parted or had the master used stronger cables from the start. Yet if the master could not, with reasonable care, have anticipated the storm's severity and sought safety before it became impossible, why should he have to anticipate that severity in choosing his cables?13 The objection assumes that liability should track fault. The rule does not, since the shipowner was liable though it had done nothing wrong.14
The reason for charging the actor is fairness between innocent parties. As between two innocent parties, the one whom nature put at risk should bear the cost of saving himself or his property, rather than the owner of the property that does the saving. For many people that answer ends the inquiry.15 The storm put the shipowner at risk, and the cost of saving the ship fell on the party saved, not on the owner of the dock that did the saving.
The rule has a second side. While the privilege lasts, the possessor may not resist or expel the entrant, so the possessor gives up the right to exclude and keeps the right to be paid.16
The rule charges the actor for harm, and that wording sets the first limit. The actor is not liable for a mere technical tort, such as a trespass on private land to escape a danger.17 Ordinary trespass law differs, since it treats trespass as actionable at least for nominal damages without proof of any resulting damage.18 The privileged entrant pays only when exercising the privilege causes actual damage.
The second limit concerns who benefits. Both subsections speak of an entry or act for the benefit of the actor or a third person, so an actor who rescues a stranger answers for harm done in the rescue just as an actor who saves his own boat does.19
Chattels follow the same pattern. In the Butler–O'Hara canoe scenario, O'Hara used Butler's canoe for a relatively short time, and Butler, who had left New Orleans, did not need it. That makes the interference more likely a trespass to a chattel than a conversion, and it is subject to the defense of private necessity.20 Because that defense is the incomplete privilege of § 263(1), O'Hara would still answer under § 263(2) for any harm the use caused, such as a gash in the hull.21
Students most often skip the third step. A finding that the entry was privileged ends the question whether a tort occurred and opens the question who bears the loss. A fact pattern that supplies a burned chair, a broken pane, or a gashed hull is asking for the incomplete-privilege answer.
Threats the Possessor Caused
The duty to pay carries one exception, and it appears only in the land rule. Section 197(2) charges the entrant for harm done in exercising the privilege unless the threat the entry was made to avert was caused by the possessor's tortious conduct or contributory negligence.24 Two kinds of possessor fault qualify, wrongful conduct and carelessness that contributed to the danger, and either one lifts the duty to pay. The exception sits in subsection (2) alone, and subsection (1) as quoted has no matching limit, so the exception relieves the actor of paying and does not turn the entry into a trespass.25
The exception follows from the premise of the payment rule. The rule puts the cost on the party nature put at risk because the dispute is between two innocent parties.26 In Vincent the danger came from a storm.27 A possessor who wrongfully or carelessly created the danger is not an innocent party. Charging the entrant would let the person who made the emergency pass the cost to the person who stepped in to meet it, so the loss stays where the fault lies.
An exam fact pattern triggers the exception only by tying the danger to the possessor's own wrong or carelessness. A storm, a fire of unknown origin, or trouble in the entrant's own vehicle ties it to no one on the possessor's side, and the possessor collects for the damage as in Vincent. Owning the land the danger reaches is not fault. The exception turns on who caused the threat. As quoted, § 263(2) contains no parallel exception, so an argument from possessor fault on a chattel problem needs a footing other than that subsection's text.28
Kansas changes how the exception works. The Kansas court that adopted the Restatement privilege provisions acknowledged that certain aspects of Kansas civil procedure and common law require modification. It singled out the second paragraph of § 197, which limits the privilege where the entry benefits the actor or a third person, except when the possessor's tortious conduct or contributory negligence caused the danger, and modified that portion to reflect the comparative-fault principles that govern in Kansas.29 The court's sentence does not spell out the mechanics. Comparative fault ordinarily apportions responsibility by each party's share of the fault, so the portable point is that in Kansas the possessor's fault is weighed and does not operate as the Restatement's categorical exception. The allocation itself comes from Kansas comparative-fault law.