Concept
Public Necessity
Necessity: public and private
Public Necessity
A person who enters another's land, or destroys or takes another's goods, to head off a public disaster is privileged to do it. Two Restatement sections state the rule. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196, one is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if the entry is, or the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.1 Under § 262, one is privileged to commit an act that would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is, or is reasonably believed to be, necessary to avoid a public disaster.2 The two sections have the same three parts: a public disaster as the justification, an owner whose property bears the cost, and protection for an actor whose belief in the necessity is reasonable. Learn them as one rule and apply it to whichever kind of property the facts put at risk.
The standard illustrations of a public danger all threaten a community. One dynamites a house to stop a fire that endangers the entire town, destroys animals carrying an infectious disease to keep it from spreading, or in wartime destroys property to keep it out of enemy hands.3 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. supplies the contrast. A ship unloading at the plaintiff's dock was caught by a storm and stayed moored there through it, with its lines replaced as they parted or chafed. The peril was to the ship and the lives aboard, not to a community, and the court gave the defendant only a conditional privilege: although it had done nothing wrong, it had saved the ship at the dock's expense and owed for the damage.4 A fire in an exam stem therefore does not by itself signal public necessity. Ask whose property or safety is threatened, the community's or one party's, because the answer decides whether the privilege is complete or only conditional.
Surocco v. Geary explains why the law makes the public privilege complete. A house was blown up to check a spreading fire, and its owner sued in trespass. The court's central worry was the holdout. If an owner could resist the demolition or hold the actor liable for it, one stubborn person might involve a whole city in ruin by refusing to allow the destruction of a building that would cut off the flames and check the fire, even when it was perfectly evident that the building must be consumed anyway.5
The privilege is no blank check. The Surocco court said that a building torn down without apparent or actual necessity exposes those responsible to an action in trespass, and that in every case the necessity must be clearly shown.6 The court admitted that the rule can produce hardship, because irresponsible persons may sometimes destroy property without necessity, but it saw no cure in making the parties liable in every case, whether or not the necessity existed.7 The secondary authority states the same limits in modern terms: the emergency must be sufficiently great, and the actor must have acted reasonably under the circumstances.8 Without a genuine emergency, ordinary rules govern and the owner may recover for the loss. Imminence is part of the test in practice. A fire already at the edge of town supports a firebreak, while a fire reported in a distant county supports preparation but does not yet justify entering a neighbor's land.
The privilege does not depend on holding office. Neither Restatement section mentions the actor's status, and the secondary authority treats the rule as fair even where the actor is a private individual, who ought not to have to pay out of his own pocket for acts that benefit the public.9 That fits how emergencies arise, since the person present when a fire jumps a street is often a private citizen and officials may be too far away to act in time. Wartime destruction by private citizens is the setting of Harrison v. Wisdom, where townspeople destroyed property to keep it from an approaching army. The breadth and imminence of the danger, not the identity of the rescuer, carry the privilege.
The reasonable-belief standard completes the picture. Both sections protect an actor who reasonably believes the act necessary, so the actor need not prove afterward that the disaster would certainly have come.10 The secondary authority says so directly: a reasonable mistake about the existence of the privilege does not negate it.11 The Surocco court added a practical reason. The owner, whose judgment is clouded by interest and the hope of saving the property, may not see the necessity as clearly as others do, so the person on the scene must act on his own judgment of the exigencies of the case.12 An unreasonable belief supplies no privilege, because the necessity must be apparent or actual.
When all the elements are met, the privilege is complete. The actor who dynamites the house, destroys the diseased animals, or denies the enemy the property is not liable to the owner.13 That result stands in sharp contrast to private necessity, where, as Vincent shows, the actor is privileged but pays.14 Why the law lets the loss lie where it falls when the danger is public is the subject of the next section.