Concept
Necessity as a Privilege
Necessity: public and private
Public and Private Necessity
Necessity as a Privilege
A trespass to land or to goods is ordinarily a wrong whatever the entrant's motive, but an emergency can make the same act lawful. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person may enter or remain on land in another's possession when doing so is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor, to another person, or to the land or chattels of either.1 The entry loses its privilege if the actor knows or has reason to know that the person he is helping is unwilling to be helped.2 The companion rule for goods permits an act that would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion when the act is, or is reasonably believed to be, reasonable and necessary to protect a person or property from serious harm, again unless the actor knows that the person he is acting for objects.3
In both rules the word privilege has a precise meaning. It names circumstances that justify conduct which would otherwise be tortious, so that even when every fact of the plaintiff's prima facie case is proved, the added facts establishing the privilege mean the defendant has committed no tort.4 That separates a privilege from a defense such as contributory negligence, which reduces or bars the plaintiff's recovery but leaves the defendant's conduct tortious.5
What sets necessity apart from the better-known privileges is the source of the danger. The privilege applies when the defendant, defending himself or his property or others or their property from a threat of imminent harm for which the plaintiff is not responsible, intentionally does something reasonably deemed necessary that would otherwise be a trespass or a conversion.6 It is analogous to self-defense and defense of property, with one important difference: the plaintiff did not put the defendant or his property in jeopardy, so the plaintiff is entitled to greater protection and the privilege is more limited. An innocent owner's property interest is sacrificed for a worthy cause, and while that may excuse the tort, the actor may still have to compensate the owner for the loss.7
Two cases show both halves of that bargain. In Ploof v. Putnam, a boat driven by a storm tied up at another's dock, and the court held that the owner could not lawfully cast it off. An entry that is privileged is not a trespass, so the owner has no right to exclude it. In Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., a ship had finished unloading at the plaintiff's dock when a storm arose, and leaving would have been dangerous, so the ship stayed moored and its mooring lines were replaced as they parted or chafed. The buffeting of the ship damaged the dock.8 The ship's owner argued that untying would have been negligent, even foolhardy, given the risk to life and ship. The court disagreed and held that the owner had a conditional privilege only: it had done nothing wrong, but it had saved the ship at the expense of the dock and was liable for the damage that resulted.9 Ploof is usually cited for whether the entry is lawful and whether the owner may resist it, and Vincent for who pays when the lawful use causes harm.
A fact pattern must supply the outside threat, because a sympathetic motive alone does not create a privilege.
The boat in Ploof faced a storm that could have destroyed it, while the commuter faces a missed train. That difference in the seriousness and source of the threat explains why the owner could not exclude the entrant in one case and can in the other.
The sections that follow split necessity in two. The Restatement frames public necessity separately, as entry on land to avert an imminent public disaster10 and as an act otherwise amounting to trespass to a chattel or conversion that is done to avoid a public disaster.11 That branch is treated differently on the question of payment, as the next sections explain. Private necessity is the branch Vincent illustrates: where the act is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, the actor is subject to liability for any harm caused by exercising the privilege.12
The third check is the one students most often skip. A conclusion that the entry was privileged does not end a private necessity problem, because an actor who acts for his own benefit or a third person's remains liable for the harm the privileged act causes.13
A reasonable mistake about the emergency does not defeat the privilege. That departs from the usual rule for intentional torts, under which a person who intentionally enters another's land without a privilege is a tortfeasor even if he reasonably but erroneously believed he was entitled to enter.14 Necessity is different because the privilege is itself written in terms of reasonable belief: the Restatement protects entry that reasonably appears necessary and acts that are reasonably believed to be necessary.15 A mistake is generally privileged when the actor must act quickly to protect an important interest, and a reasonable mistake about whether the privilege exists does not negate it.16 The belief must still be reasonable, since the rules protect only what reasonably appears necessary.