Concept
Reentry on Land
Defense of property: land and chattels
Reentry on Land
The defensive privilege that opens this chapter lets an actor use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to prevent or terminate another's intrusion upon the actor's land or chattels.1 It is built for intrusions on land the actor holds. An owner who has already lost the land stands somewhere else. Title, or a right to immediate possession, can rest with one person while another occupies the land, and the owner then has no possession left to defend. The law answers with a separate privilege, reentry, and it hedges that privilege much more tightly than the defensive one.
The tighter hedging comes from the nature of land. Land is indestructible and buildings cannot be moved, so an owner who waits for a court to decide the dispute loses little.2 The law therefore lets an owner retake land by force only in narrow circumstances, and most of this section marks where those circumstances end.
The privilege takes two forms of very different reach. Peaceable reentry is generally lawful. Forcible reentry is allowed only when the owner satisfies conditions on how possession was lost, how promptly the owner acts, and whether the owner first demands surrender, and statutes often restrict it further. The four subsections below take those topics in that order.
Peaceable Reentry
An owner entitled to immediate possession of land may, if able, enter peaceably and retake possession without liability for trespass.3 Immediate possession means a present right to possess, not one that begins at some later date. Once back on the land, the owner may maintain possession as any possessor may, under the defensive privilege and its conditions: an unprivileged intrusion, force reasonably necessary, and a prior request to desist.4
Everything turns on the word peaceable. Title gives an owner a right to possess but no absolute privilege to enter by any means. The owner may enter property in another's possession peaceably but may not use force to do so, and in most jurisdictions a forcible entry creates civil and criminal liability.5
A landlord shows how the rule works. A tenant fell behind on rent, and his landlord broke open the apartment door while he was away and removed his belongings. She was entitled to have him evicted, but the forcible entry was a trespass for which she answered.6 The tenant's absence did not make the entry peaceable, because the door had to be broken to get in. And her good claim to the apartment settled who should end up in it, not what means she could use to get there.
An entry that needs no force needs no justification beyond the owner's right to possess. A forcible entry is different, because it settles by physical means a question that a court could settle later, and since land cannot be carried off or destroyed, the owner loses little by waiting.7
A statute can narrow the owner's options further. An occupant who qualifies may be entitled, even as against the owner, to the protection of a forcible entry and detainer statute, and these statutes are designed to prevent just such self-help remedies.8 An owner who faces such an occupant must look to the courts.
Exam answers go wrong by treating ownership as the whole question. An owner with a valid claim to possession may retake the land peaceably and may sue for possession, but may not break in or push past an occupant merely because the occupant has no right to be there. Force requires the further conditions that follow.
Wrongful Dispossession
When the owner cannot enter peaceably, force is privileged only if every condition for forcible reentry is met. Two of those conditions look back at how the owner lost the land. The occupant must be the person who tortiously dispossessed the owner, or someone who took custody or possession from a person he knows or should know had done so. And the owner must in fact be entitled to immediate possession.10 Two more conditions, prompt entry and a prior demand, come in the next subsection, so an owner who satisfies these two has not finished the analysis.
The first condition reaches the occupant who started the wrong. The second extends to a taker who knows or should know of that wrong, because such a taker shares in it. It stops short of an innocent taker, who has done nothing the owner may answer with force. The words should know measure notice by what a reasonable person in the taker's position would have realized, so an occupant cannot escape by ignoring plain signs of a break-in.
The third condition asks whether the owner is in fact entitled to immediate possession. A landlord whose tenant's term has not run holds a right to the land only in the future, so a tenant who stays within the term gives the landlord no wrong to answer with force. The words in fact test the owner's actual entitlement, not how the facts looked to the owner, and an honest mistake about the privilege is no defense unless the occupant knowingly induced it, as the next subsection explains.
A student tempted to ask only whether the occupant has any right to be on the land will miss the point of these conditions. An occupant with no right to be there can still stand outside the privilege, as the buyer and the traveler show. The conditions ask how the occupant came to hold the land, whether this occupant shared in the wrong or knew of it, and whether the owner's own right to possession is immediate and actual.
Prompt Entry and Demand
The remaining conditions look forward, at what the owner does next. The owner must enter promptly after the dispossession, or after learning or having reason to learn of it. Unless a demand would be useless, dangerous, or counterproductive, the owner must first demand that the occupant surrender possession. If the occupant refuses, the owner may use such reasonable force, short of force likely to cause serious bodily harm, as the owner reasonably believes necessary to effect the entry.12 These conditions join the ones already taught, so a wrongfully dispossessed owner entitled to immediate possession can still lose the privilege by waiting, by skipping the demand, or by using too much force. The structure matches the rules for recapturing chattels: pursuit without delay, a demand where one is feasible, and reasonable force short of the serious.
Promptness does the most to confine forcible reentry, and the reason lies in the thing being recovered. Land cannot be destroyed or carried off, so an owner who waits for a court gives up little.13 Once the moment of the taking has passed, force accomplishes nothing a court could not, and it adds the danger of a physical contest between two people who each claim the same house.
The clock starts at the dispossession or, if the owner did not know of it, when the owner learns or should know of it. The second starting point protects an owner who was away when the taking occurred. The words should know keep it from becoming a loophole, since an owner cannot postpone the start by ignoring plain warnings.
Both owners demanded and were refused, and both used modest force, so only the interval between knowledge and entry separates the results. The first owner sat on what he knew, and the second acted at the first opportunity. Criminal statutes in nearly every state press harder still, as the last subsection explains.
The demand does the work that the request to desist does in the defensive privilege: it puts words before force wherever words might serve.14 Some occupants will leave when asked, and one who has misunderstood the situation can correct the mistake before anyone is hurt. The three excuses describe situations in which a demand could not do that work. A demand is useless when the occupant has already refused or plainly will, dangerous when asking would invite violence, and counterproductive when the warning would defeat the entry, as when it gives the occupant time to barricade the doors. An excused demand removes only the demand, and the limits on force stay in place.
Two limits govern the force itself. It must be what the owner reasonably believes necessary to effect the entry, so an honest misjudgment about whether a lighter push would have worked does not cost the owner the privilege, but force beyond what entry requires is unprivileged. And the ceiling is force short of that likely to cause serious bodily harm. Deadly means are a different matter. In defending land they are privileged only when the actor reasonably believes the intruder, unless expelled or excluded, is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the actor or to a third person the actor may protect.15 Modern statutes on protecting dwellings and premises generally allow necessary deadly force to stop specified felonies such as arson, burglary, or robbery, while the Model Penal Code approach, adopted in a few states, confines deadly force to cases involving a substantial risk to the person.16
An owner's mistake about whether the privilege exists is no defense unless the occupant knowingly induced it, the same rule that governs chattels.17 The owner chose self-help when a court was available, and the person on the receiving end may have done nothing wrong. An owner who forces entry against the innocent traveler in the preceding subsection, on a reasonable but mistaken belief that the traveler knew of the break-in, answers for the force unless the traveler knowingly created that belief, as by posing as the squatter's partner.
Statutes and the MPC
The tort conditions describe when force to retake land is privileged against a claim for battery or trespass, and criminal legislation makes the practical test stricter. Almost all states make it a crime for a person entitled to possession of land to recover it by force, and courts applying those statutes hold forcible reentry unjustified unless it is made immediately upon the wrongful dispossession.19 That standard is tighter than the tort conditions, which allow entry promptly after the owner learns or should know of the dispossession.20 Forcible entry and detainer statutes push the same way from the occupant's side, protecting a qualifying occupant even against the true owner.21
The immediacy rule rests on the same fact as the rest of this section: land is indestructible and buildings are immovable, so little harm is likely to occur while a court decides who is entitled to possession.22 The same source states the general rule for property. A person who reasonably believes he has been illegally dispossessed may use reasonable nondeadly force to repossess it, but only if he acts immediately after the dispossession or on hot pursuit. An owner who misses that moment is sent to the courts, where title will decide the lawsuit but gives no privilege to use force in the meantime.
Title and the squatter's wrong were both present in that scene, so neither explains the result. The week between the dispossession and the entry does.
The Model Penal Code takes a broader view, consistent with what the 'well-conducted person' would expect to be allowed.23 Even when the actor does not enter immediately after the dispossession, the Code justifies force to reenter land if the actor believes two things. The first is that the person against whom the force is used has no claim of right to possession. The second is that the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be, are so urgent that postponing the entry until a court order is obtained would be an exceptional hardship.24 The test turns on what the actor believes, whereas the tort conditions ask whether the owner was in fact entitled to possession.
Two features keep the Code's alternative narrow. The actor must believe the occupant has no claim of right, so an occupant the owner believes to hold a claim sends the dispute back to a court. And for land the actor must also believe the situation urgent. For chattels the Code asks only about claim of right and permits recaption at any time if the actor believes the person against whom force is used has none.25 The extra requirement for land fits the reason land is treated differently, which is that land does not disappear while the owner waits.
The Code keeps its own request requirement as well. Force is justifiable under the Code only if the actor first requests the person to desist from interfering with the property, unless the actor holds one of the beliefs that the Code lists as excusing the request.26 Which rule governs depends on what the question supplies. A stem that says only that the jurisdiction makes forcible recovery of land a crime calls for the immediacy rule, while a stem that invokes the Model Penal Code opens the second alternative, and an answer should then test both beliefs.