Concept
Mechanical Devices and Animals
Defense of property: land and chattels
Mechanical Devices and Animals
An owner who is away cannot speak to an intruder, watch what happens, or stop when the intrusion ends, so some owners leave something behind to act for them: a wire, a trap, an electrified fence, a dog. The law treats each as the owner's own force, delivered without the owner's judgment, and it tightens its limits as the danger to the intruder rises.
The mildest case is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 84. An actor may use a device not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to protect possession of land or chattels from intrusion, and is not liable for bodily harm the device does to a deliberate intruder, if three conditions are met.1 Using such a device must be reasonably necessary, the particular device must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the device must be customary or its use made known to probable intruders. The next subsection takes the first two conditions, and the one after takes the third.
Devices and animals share a defect: they cannot do what the earlier conditions assume a person will do. The privilege to use force against an intruder turns on a request to desist unless a request would be useless or substantial harm would come before it could be made,2 and a device can neither make the request nor judge whether it was needed. It cannot tell a burglar from a lost child or a firefighter answering an alarm, because it responds to whoever arrives. It cannot stop when the intruder gives up. Each gap removes a safeguard that protects people with a right to be present, so the law places the cost on the owner, who chose the risk and was absent when it came due.
The working principle is that an owner may not do indirectly what the owner could not do in person. Section 85 applies it to the most dangerous devices: a device intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm or death is privileged only against an intruder whose intrusion is, in fact, one that the owner, were the owner present, would be privileged to prevent or end by inflicting that harm.3 Spring guns, concealed traps, and vicious animals calculated to cause death or great bodily harm are used at the possessor's risk.4 Deadly force in the owner's presence requires a reasonable belief that the intruder is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to a person the owner may protect,5 so a device that kills an intruder who threatened no one falls outside the privilege, however plainly that person was trespassing.
The result is a ladder of tests. A device unlikely to kill or seriously injure receives a qualified privilege with conditions of its own. A device likely to do so is measured against what the owner could lawfully have done in person. Animals sit on the same ladder, because a possessor may use a dog or other animal for protection to the same extent a mechanical device may be used.6 The first rung is the nondeadly device, since the animal rule borrows its measure from the device rules.
Nondeadly Device Test
Section 84 relieves an owner of liability for bodily harm that a nondeadly device does to a deliberate intruder, and it conditions that relief on three requirements.7 This subsection takes the first two: using such a device must be reasonably necessary to protect the land or chattels from intrusion, and the particular device must be reasonable under the circumstances.8 The first step asks about the kind of protection, and the second asks about the specific device the owner installed. Because the third condition, custom or warning, follows in the next subsection, an owner who passes both steps here has not yet finished.
The privilege runs only to a deliberate intruder, a person who intrudes on purpose, and that limit follows from what a device cannot do: it cannot tell a thief from a lost child or a firefighter answering an alarm. The rule therefore settles liability only toward the person who chose to intrude. When a device meant to deter an intruder harms a third person instead, the Third Restatement decides whether the owner's conduct was privileged by combining its device section with its negligence section, so long as the case meets the intent requirements of an intentional tort.9 A neighbor's child who wanders into the yard, or a delivery driver who takes a wrong turn onto the property, cannot be answered by pointing to § 84, and the owner's care in choosing and placing the device becomes the question.
The first condition asks whether a device of this kind was reasonably necessary to protect the land or chattels.10 The question concerns the kind of protection; the particular device comes later. Given what is guarded, how likely an intrusion is, and what milder measures would accomplish, was it reasonable to turn to something that can hurt a person at all? An owner who stands at the gate may be forgiven a misjudgment made in seconds, but an owner who installs a device decides in advance and at leisure, so no emergency excuses a poor choice. A device that hurts someone also adds nothing unless the property is actually exposed and a lock, a fence, lighting, or a gate would not have done the job.
Even when some device is justified, the particular device must be reasonable under the circumstances.11 This second step measures the device the owner chose against the need it served: how much harm it can do, how strong it is compared with the threat, and where it sits relative to the people likely to meet it. A person on the scene can ease off when an intruder gives up, but a device delivers the same harm to whoever triggers it, whatever that person is doing. A choice harsher than the threat required therefore counts against the owner at this step.
The barbed-wire fence in Quigley v. Clough is the standard example of a device that passes both steps. A trespasser who deliberately climbs such a fence and is scratched has been hurt by a device unlikely to cause serious harm, and the Model Penal Code likewise treats nondeadly mechanical devices such as spiked fences as justifiable means of protecting property.12
The fence and the contraption differ at both steps at once, which is why the two conditions deserve separate attention. An owner can pass the first and fail the second, as when repeated night thefts justify some protection and the owner chooses something far harsher than a customary fence. An owner can also fail the first and never reach the second, because even a mild device guarding property that needed no device at all is unjustified.
Students most often stop at the trespass, reasoning that a person hurt while committing a wrong has no claim. The privilege is conditional, and the owner who relies on it must establish both steps. A second error collapses the steps into one question and asks only whether the device was a reasonable one, which overlooks that an owner with no need for any device fails the first step even with a mild one.
Custom or Warning
The third condition of § 84 asks what a probable intruder could have known about the device before meeting it: the device must be one customarily used for such a purpose, or reasonable care must be taken to make its use known to probable intruders.14 The two halves are alternatives, so showing either one satisfies the condition. 'Probable intruders' fixes the audience a notice must reach: the people likely to come onto the land or toward the object. Section 84 privileges the owner only when all three conditions are met, so an owner whose device was necessary and reasonable still loses the privilege if neither alternative can be shown.
The condition answers a gap noted at the start of this section. A person at the gate can ask an intruder to leave before using force, and a device cannot, so notice supplies a substitute in advance. A conspicuous warning does the work of the request, and an intruder who climbs past it has disregarded it much as an intruder disregards a spoken demand, which means the intruder took the risk with open eyes. Custom works differently. A familiar protective measure, such as a fence topped with barbed wire, tells a person what to expect from it, so the hazard is one the intruder could anticipate and avoid. An unusual device offers no such expectation, and the intruder who meets it is ambushed by a hazard nobody had reason to foresee. The two halves reach the same end by separate routes: the person who meets the device has had a fair chance to know what it is.
The halves overlap in the barbed-wire fence from the last subsection, which gives notice by its very appearance, so its custom and its warning are the same fact. Loomis v. Terry supplies the contrast: the owner gave no warning of the device and was held liable. In both cases the device was meant to hurt someone who entered, and what moved the result was whether the person who met it had any way of knowing what it was.
The standard for notice is reasonable care directed at probable intruders, so a sign counts only if it is placed where a person approaching as an intruder would approach is likely to meet it. A notice tucked behind a building, or posted only on a side of the lot no one approaches, leaves the owner in the position of the second orchard. Jurisdictions describe the practical result in the same terms: some permit nondeadly devices such as electric fences, provided proper warning is posted.15
Warnings have a limit, and it is the one students most often miss. For a device not likely to cause serious harm, notice is part of the privilege. For a device likely to kill or seriously injure, the possessor is liable for any harm the possessor would not have been privileged to inflict if personally present, in most cases notwithstanding posted warnings of the device or animal.16 A warning removes surprise, and surprise is the complaint that custom and notice answer. It adds nothing to the justification for the harm, because a human life ranks above property even when the intruder was told in advance what would happen. The owner-present benchmark in § 85 states the resulting limit: a deadly device is privileged only to the extent the owner, if there, could lawfully have inflicted the same harm.17 A few states relax the ban on deadly force after clear notice, a point the animals subsection returns to, but that is an exception and applies only when the question supplies it.
Two errors follow from separating the halves of this principle. One treats a posted sign as the intruder's consent, so that a warning rescues even a lethal device. The other drops subsection (c) once the device has been found necessary and reasonable, and so grants a privilege to an owner who never gave the intruder a chance to know. On a nondeadly device, ask whether the device is customary or reasonable care was taken to announce it; on a deadly device, ask first what the owner could have done in person.
Deadly Devices and Spring Guns
Section 85 governs a device intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm or death, and it sets a single measure: the owner is not liable for that harm to an intruder only when the intrusion is, in fact, one that the owner, were the owner present, would be privileged to prevent or end by intentionally inflicting such harm.19 The questions that decide a nondeadly device (necessity, reasonableness, notice) do not decide this one. The comparison is between what the device did and what the owner could have done standing at the spot, and it takes its content from the deadly-force privilege, which requires a reasonable belief that the intruder, unless expelled or excluded, is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the owner or to a third person the owner may protect.20 An owner holding a gun at the door of an empty shed has no such privilege, so a wired gun at the same door has none either. The device stands in the absent owner's shoes and receives no more privilege than the owner could have exercised in person; the few jurisdictions that permit deadly devices at all do so only on that measure.21
The words 'in fact' make the standard demanding. An owner on the scene is judged by how things reasonably appeared. In Keep v. Quailman, a man with a reputation for shooting people suddenly put his hand in his pocket, and the defendant, believing a revolver was coming, struck him on the head with a cane; the court held that the jury should have been told the defendant was liable only if he lacked reasonable grounds to fear an immediate attack.22 An absent owner forms no belief about whoever arrives, and § 85 does not ask for one. It asks what the intrusion actually was, so liability turns on who happens to trigger the device, a fact the owner cannot know when setting it.
The exception is narrow. Deadly force is privileged, if apparently necessary, to prevent a felonious intrusion of the dwelling house or a felonious attack on the house itself, but in such cases the privilege is crime prevention rather than property protection, and deadly force is not proper just to protect uninhabited realty or personal property.24
The same gun at the same doorway would shoot a letter carrier who stepped through an open door, and the letter carrier would recover, because the owner could never have shot a person delivering mail.
The harsh feature of the standard is that the owner carries the risk of every arrival. Whoever sets a deadly device decides in advance, without knowing who will come, and the person who triggers it has no chance to explain or to be asked to leave. The harm falls as readily on a child or a firefighter as on a burglar. In State v. Green, a spring gun set in an unoccupied building to protect furniture killed a man who broke the lock out of curiosity, and the owner's manslaughter conviction was affirmed. Where a jurisdiction permits a deadly device on the in-person measure, an occupant whose device kills or injures a firefighter answering an alarm is strictly liable for the unlawful use of deadly force.25 A posted warning does not rescue the owner in most jurisdictions, because the measure is the owner's privilege in person and a sign does not enlarge it.26
The rule has a history that explains its severity. In Hott v. Wilkes (1820) a court held that a landowner who placed spring guns on the land to keep off poachers was not liable to a trespasser who was shot, and the decision drew a storm of public disapproval that led Parliament to make the setting of such devices a crime.27 Bird v. Holbrook (1828) overruled Hott and held a spring-gun setter liable to a trespasser, and most American courts, along with § 85, have followed Bird.28
Katko v. Briney put the question where the owner's case is weakest. The primary issue was whether an owner may protect personal property in an unoccupied, boarded-up farmhouse against trespassers and thieves with a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious injury, and the court said it was not concerned with a person's right to protect home and family.29 Public outcry over the decision produced 'Briney Bills' in several state legislatures.30 The reaction ran in favor of the owner, as the disapproval of the 1820s had run against the owner who set the guns, and the doctrine has held to the Bird line through both. Section 85 leaves only a narrow opening for the owner whose device strikes an intruder the owner could have met with deadly force in person.
The Model Penal Code closes even that opening. Section 3.06(5) rejects the common-law measure and treats a deadly man-trap as never justifiable, because the measure does not prescribe a workable standard of conduct: liability depends on fortuitous circumstances, namely the intentions of the trespasser who happens to be killed or seriously injured by the device.31 The objection follows from timing. An owner must decide whether to set the device before knowing who will arrive, so a rule that sorts outcomes by the arriving person gives the owner nothing to act on, while a flat prohibition does. The Code's general limits on deadly force also deny the justification to an actor who knows he can avoid the necessity of using it with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right.32 A spring gun can neither retreat nor surrender anything.
A dissenting opinion shows a third way of thinking, and it should be read as a dissent, which states no rule of the case. The dissenter acknowledged the often-repeated statement that personal rights are more important than property rights, but where the owner had stored valuables and the evidence could support a finding that the installation was meant only as a warning to ward off thieves and criminals, he saw no compelling reason to find liability as a matter of law from the device alone.33 The contrast with § 85 lies in what is weighed. The dissent would send the owner's evidence of purpose to the factfinder, while § 85 asks only about the owner's privilege in person against the actual intruder.
Three approaches to a deadly device therefore sit side by side, and an answer should say which one the question supplies:
- Section 85 measures the device by the owner's privilege in person against the actual intruder, so a device is privileged against an armed attacker of an occupied dwelling and actionable against a letter carrier.
- The Model Penal Code treats a deadly man-trap as never justifiable, whoever triggers it.
- The dissent would let a factfinder weigh evidence that a device protecting valuables was meant only as a warning.
The usual exam errors each substitute the wrong inquiry for the in-person comparison. One asks whether the owner meant the device to kill or only to scare, another asks whether a warning was posted, and a third asks only whether the injured person was a trespasser, yet § 85 turns on none of those. The opposite error treats the rule against deadly force for property as a flat bar on every deadly device, which overlooks that § 85 privileges a device against an intruder whose entry into an occupied dwelling would have justified deadly force in person. Where the question names the Model Penal Code, that opening is gone.
Animals as Protection
A possessor of land or chattels may use a dog or other animal to protect possession from intrusion to the same extent the possessor may use a mechanical protective device.35 The rule supplies no separate test for animals. It sends the analysis back to the device rules in the preceding subsections, so every limit on a wire, a trap, or an electrified fence limits a guard dog as well. Which limit applies depends on what the animal is likely to do, because the device rules sort devices by that same question.
An animal receives the device rules for the same reason a device needs them. A dog left in a yard acts on its own after the owner has gone. It cannot ask an intruder to leave, it cannot tell a thief from a lost child or a firefighter answering an alarm, and it does not stop when the intruder gives up, so it has the three defects that led the law to constrain devices. Vicious animals calculated to cause death or great bodily harm are listed with spring guns and concealed traps as means used at the possessor's risk.36 Without the animal rule, an owner who wanted more protection than the device rules allow could swap a mechanical guard for a living one, since a trained dog can do much of what a spring gun does. Treating the animal as a device closes that route.
The classification therefore comes first. If the animal is not intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm, § 84 governs: using such an animal must be reasonably necessary to protect the property, the particular animal must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the animal must be a customary means of protection or reasonable care must be taken to make its presence known to probable intruders.37 If the animal is intended or likely to kill or seriously injure, § 85 governs, and the owner is privileged only against an intruder whose intrusion is, in fact, one the owner, were the owner present, could have met by inflicting that harm.38
A different animal produces a different answer under the same fence and the same signs.
The result would reverse only if the intrusion were one the owner could have met with deadly force in person, such as an armed attacker forcing entry into an occupied dwelling.
The signs mark the line between those two scenes. For a nondeadly animal, notice is one of the conditions that create the privilege, because an intruder who sees the warning has been told what to expect. For a deadly animal, a warning removes surprise but does not enlarge the owner's privilege, so in most jurisdictions even posted warnings do not protect an owner who could not have used that much force in person.39 A few jurisdictions go the other way when clear notice has been given, most often where a vicious dog is the means, and Hood v. Hood is one place to see that argument. Unless the question supplies that rule, the general rule controls.
Two mistakes follow from skipping the classification step. One treats every dog as an ordinary guard animal and every sign as a rescue, which gives the owner of a dog trained to maul a protection that only a nondeadly animal earns. The other treats every animal bite as deadly force, which overlooks that a customary guard dog behind a fence with signs can satisfy § 84. Because the animal takes the device's privilege, it also takes that privilege's boundary: the privilege answers a deliberate intruder, and harm to a child or firefighter who is not one is analyzed separately.