Concept
Defense of Others
Self-defense and defense of others
Defense of Others
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 76 lets one person take up another's defense. The actor may defend a third person from a harmful or offensive contact or other invasion of the third person's interests of personality under the same conditions and by the same means that would justify defending himself, so long as he correctly or reasonably believes two things.1 The first is that the circumstances give the third person a privilege of self-defense.2 The second is that his intervention is necessary to protect the third person.3
The privilege is borrowed. Absent mistake, the rescuer stands in the third person's shoes and acquires that person's privilege of self-defense, with the same rights and limitations, so a rescuer can have no privilege where the person defended has none to lend.4 Section 76 therefore raises three questions, taken in order below: whom the privilege protects; what the rescuer must believe about the third person's privilege, and what follows when he is wrong, a point on which courts divide; and when intervention is necessary.
Who May Be Defended
Section 76 attaches no condition to the identity of the person defended. Its requirements concern the actor: he defends under the same conditions and by the same means as in self-defense, and he correctly or reasonably believes that the third person holds a privilege and needs protection.5 That silence reflects a change in the law.
Early English law gave the master of a household a privilege to defend his family and servants against attack, and most of the decided cases have involved relatives defending one another or master and servant, as in Frew v. Teagarden, though the privilege is not so limited.6 The criminal law followed the same path. Its older approach allowed the defense only to a defender in a status relationship with the person protected, a close relative or in some cases a servant or employee, and most jurisdictions have dropped that limit.7 Tort courts likewise once generally allowed the defense only when the person in jeopardy was a member of the defendant's family, and that is no longer required.8 The modern view, consistent with the Good Samaritan principle, is that one may come to the defense of any third person.9 A kinship test would make a bystander establish a relationship before stopping an attack, which is the opposite of encouraging rescue.
Reported cases show the privilege at work, mostly in family settings. McCullough v. McAnelly held privileged a father who shot one of three boys who kept attacking his son after being warned, and Boyer v. Waples held privileged a defendant who shot a man who had threatened the defendant's family and was seen at night holding what looked like dynamite but proved to be a flashlight.10 Lopez v. Surchia marks the limit: the defendant shot a boy who was fighting with the defendant's son on the front lawn, and the force exceeded the privilege.11
The limits on force travel with the privilege. The rescuer may not use any means intended or likely to cause bodily harm or confinement in excess of what he correctly or reasonably believes necessary for the third person's protection.12 Force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm requires a reasonable belief in the further facts that § 65 lists, and the rescuer must hold that belief about the person he defends.13 Deadly force may not be used to save another from nondeadly force, and even nondeadly force must not be obviously in excess of what is needed.14
A fact pattern in which the defender is a coworker, a neighbor, or a stranger therefore receives the same analysis as one in which a parent protects a child. An answer that denies the defense for want of a relationship applies a rule the law has abandoned. The live questions are what the defender reasonably believed about the victim's privilege and the need to act, and whether his force stayed within the limits that bind a person defending himself.
The Third Person's Privilege
The first belief § 76 requires is that the circumstances give the third person a privilege of self-defense.16 The condition exists because the rescuer borrows the privilege: when nothing has been misread, he stands in the third person's shoes with the same rights and limitations, and a privilege the third person lacks cannot be lent.17 Trouble comes when a rescuer arrives in the middle of an encounter, sees only part of it, and misjudges who deserves protection.
Goliath and David show the problem. Goliath began the quarrel with nondeadly force, and David answered with deadly force; by overreacting, David became a batterer himself and would be liable to Goliath for the injuries his excess caused.18 Lancelot then arrives, sees David attacking Goliath, takes David for the wrongdoer, and uses deadly force to stop him. Lancelot is wrong about who started things. Whether his reasonable error protects him is a point on which courts divide.
One line of authority treats the intervenor as stepping into the shoes of the person defended. The defender assumes the risk that he is mistaken and is privileged only if, and to the extent that, the third person was, so a rescuer who turns out to have helped the aggressor is liable.19 The cases cited for this approach include Robinson v. Decatur and State v. Wenger, a criminal prosecution of a bystander who struck a plainclothes officer making a lawful arrest, in which the Ohio court cited tort law for the rule that the defendant had a privilege only to the extent the person he defended would have had.20 The logic is derivative. The rescuer's right comes from the person defended and should reach no further, and the person struck may have done nothing to earn the blow.
The Restatement and other courts hold the opposite: a reasonable mistake does not negate the rescuer's privilege.21 This rule puts the risk of error on the person struck. Its practical case is that a bystander has seconds to act and cannot investigate who started a fight, so a rule that demands he be right turns every rescue into a wager. The rescuer's belief is measured as any self-defense belief is, by the circumstances he knew or should have known, judged by a person of ordinary firmness and courage.22
The two views diverge on Lancelot. Under the Restatement he is privileged, because David's attack reasonably appeared to be a battery on Goliath. Under the shoes view, everything turns on whether Goliath himself held a privilege. As the initial aggressor, Goliath had none against David's first reasonable response, but David's deadly force went beyond what the situation warranted, and the person facing excessive force has the normal privilege to defend himself against it.23 If Goliath had no chance to retreat, he could answer with deadly force, and Lancelot shares that privilege. He therefore prevails even under the stricter rule.24
The criminal cases show what the shoes view costs a rescuer who acted in good faith. People v. Young was decided when the Act-at-Peril rule was the majority rule, and its dissent used the doctrine of mistake of fact to challenge the outcome; most jurisdictions have since abandoned the rule.25 The arrest cases show why the rule is harsh. A person lawfully arrested has no privilege to resist, because one may not defend against force that the other is privileged to inflict, so a bystander who intervenes for the arrestee has nothing to borrow, however reasonable his belief that the arrestee was being beaten.26
The hard cases under either view arise when the rescuer reasonably believes the third person is in jeopardy and the person is not, as when the apparent victim and the apparent attacker were only engaged in horseplay.27
An answer should state the split and run the facts under both views. First ask whether the person defended in fact held a privilege of self-defense. If so, the rescuer is privileged under either view, provided his force stays within the limits that bind the person defended. If not, because that person was the aggressor, was resisting a lawful arrest, or faced no attack at all, the shoes view makes the rescuer liable, and the Restatement protects him if his belief was reasonable. Last, check whether the aggressor's own privilege revived, as Goliath's did when David used excessive force, because a revived privilege rescues the intervenor even under the stricter view.
Necessity of Intervention
The second belief § 76 requires is that the actor's intervention is necessary for the protection of the third person.29 Because the rescuer acts under the same conditions as the person defended,30 necessity means here what it means in self-defense: as a rule, force is a last resort.31 Force is excused because it protects, so the excuse disappears when the threat has ended or when a lesser step would protect just as well. Three demands follow.
The first demand is a threat that is still pending. The privilege reaches only acts done to protect the actor from a presently threatened aggression, and it does not cover acts done to punish a past aggression or to warn against its repetition.32 In the Restatement's whip illustration, A strikes B with a whip, B disarms A by reasonable force, and B may not then beat A in return.33 A rescuer who arrives after the disarming stands no better than B. The criminal law agrees. In a California case applying CALJIC 5.52 and 5.53, the jury could infer that the defendant kept beating his attacker long after the attacker was disabled, and the court stated the principle that when the attacker is rendered incapable of inflicting injury, or the danger has otherwise ended, no justification remains for further retaliation.34
The second demand looks to the future. The actor may not use force so long as there is a reasonable likelihood that the other will abandon his aggressive purpose or that the actor will have a later opportunity to protect himself.35 A rescuer who has time to act more safely therefore may not skip ahead to force.
The third demand is that force wait on reasonably safe alternatives. An attack that rests on a mistake the rescuer knows about and can correct in time is one the attacker will likely abandon once the mistake is cleared up, so the correction comes before the tackle. Both qualifiers matter. The alternative must be reasonably safe, and the time must actually exist; a bystander need not stake the victim's safety on a shout when a club is already swinging.
Because § 76(b) turns on what the rescuer correctly or reasonably believes, necessity is judged from the scene as he perceived it. A rescuer who reasonably thinks the attack is continuing keeps the privilege even if the person defended had matters in hand, while a rescuer who sees that the danger has ended has no reasonable belief to rely on. The standard is a person of ordinary firmness and courage, judged by the emergency as it appeared at the time.36
The first two steps concern timing, and the next two concern alternatives and need. Showing only that the person defended was an innocent victim satisfies the first condition of § 76 and leaves necessity untouched.