Concept
Excessive Force
Self-defense and defense of others
Excessive Force
A defender decides in seconds, and some defenders decide wrong. When the force a defender applies, or the confinement a defender imposes, goes beyond what the privilege allows, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 71 says what follows.1 It gives three answers, each aimed at a different party or a different moment in the confrontation:
- The defender is liable for only so much of the force or confinement as is excessive.2
- The other person's liability for any invasion of the defender's interests of personality that he caused is not affected.3
- The other person has the normal privilege of self-defense against the defender's use or attempted use of excessive force or confinement.4
Each rule rejects a blunter alternative. If one excessive blow stripped the defender of the whole privilege, the defender would pay even for the protective force, and the person who started the fight would profit from the overshoot. If the defender's excess cancelled the first wrongdoer's liability, an attacker would owe nothing once the victim struck back too hard. If the first wrongdoer lost every right to resist, a small wrong at the start of a quarrel would turn his body into fair game. Dividing responsibility part by part avoids all three results. The subsections below take the rules in order, beginning with how much the defender owes.
Liability for the Excess
A defender's response to an attack rarely consists of a single act. It unfolds in stages, and § 71(a) sorts them: the defender is liable for only so much of the force or confinement as is excessive.5 Force that met the conditions taught in the earlier sections (it answered a threatened contact, rested on a reasonable belief, served a defensive purpose, and stayed within reasonable limits) remains privileged even when the defender later goes too far, and the defender owes nothing for the harm it caused. The surplus is the only part that costs him.
The apportionment follows from what justifies the privilege. The privilege extends only to acts done to protect the defender from a presently threatened aggression, and not to acts done as punishment or in retaliation for a past one.6 The part of a response that protected carries that justification with it. The surplus has none, so it is intentional harm like any other, and a later overreaction cannot reach back and make the earlier force wrongful.
Excess takes two forms, and § 71(a) treats them alike. The first is timing: the defender keeps using force after the threat has ended. The second is degree: the defender uses force while the threat lasts but more than the threat justified, as when force suited to a blow threatening substantial harm is used merely to prevent an insulting touch.7 Deadly force against a threat of nondeadly force is the starkest example of degree, because a threat of nondeadly force does not authorize it.8
Timing excess shows most clearly when privileged force comes first and surplus second. In the Restatement's illustration, A strikes B with a whip, and B by reasonable force disarms A. B is not privileged thereafter to inflict a similar beating on A.9 The disarming answered a threatened aggression and falls inside the privilege, however much it hurt A. The beating answered nothing, because A was already disarmed, and B is liable for it. Germolus v. Sausser reached the same result on similar facts: the defendant grabbed a whip away from the plaintiff and then knocked him unconscious with it, and once the battery was no longer threatened, the privilege ended and the original victim became liable for battery.10 A California criminal appeal states the principle in general terms. If a person attacked defends so successfully that the attacker cannot inflict injury, or the danger has otherwise ended, nothing justifies further retaliation, and the jury there could find that the defendant kept beating his attacker long after the attacker was disabled.11 The tort treatise puts the same limit as a bar on violence after the other is subdued, disarmed, or helpless, or has clearly withdrawn from the fray, because only defensive force is permitted.12
Apportionment trims liability only where some part of the response was privileged. In the Restatement's snowball illustration, a small boy hits B in the eye with a snowball, causing severe pain, and B is not privileged to beat the boy either as punishment or as a warning against similar misconduct.13 The snowball was a completed act. No contact remained to be warded off, so no stage of the beating was defensive, and B answers for all of it.
For degree excess, the measure is what a reasonable person in the emergency would regard as permissible in view of the danger, remembering that the other's conduct forced a rapid decision. The test is not what a calm observer, after the emergency has passed, would see as having been enough.14 A defender who used somewhat more force than hindsight suggests was needed therefore has no excess to answer for if the amount was reasonable in the moment.
The plaintiff recovers only for the damage the excessive force caused.15 Two conclusions tempt on a mixed fact pattern, and both are wrong: that the defender wins outright because the plaintiff attacked first, and that the defender loses outright because the encounter ended in an excessive blow. Section 71(a) produces a split result in which the early stage is privileged and the late stage is not.
Retaliation fails at step two, and disproportion fails at step three, so an act must pass both to stay privileged. A failure at one stage leaves the earlier stages untouched, which is the point of the rule. What the excess does to the other person's own liability is the next question.
The Original Wrongdoer's Liability
Section 71(b) gives the second consequence: the other person's liability for any invasion of the defender's interests of personality that he may have caused is not affected.17 The clause reaches the battery, assault, or confinement that started the encounter. The first rule limited the defender's liability to the surplus. This one adds that the first wrongdoer's own tort survives the defender's overreaction, so one encounter can leave two people liable to each other, each for a separate wrong.
The two liabilities coexist because they rest on different acts. The first wrongdoer's attack was complete, and unprivileged, the moment he made it. The defender's response came afterward, and whatever part of it exceeded the privilege is a new invasion that cannot excuse the old one after the fact. If the excess cancelled the first tort, a person could commit a small invasion, provoke an overreaction, and owe nothing. Keeping each liability intact removes that payoff.
The standard example shows both liabilities at once. Goliath advances on David intending only to tear David's jacket, and Goliath commits an assault. David answers with a pitchfork. The threat to David was of nondeadly force, which does not authorize deadly force in self-defense, so David exceeded the scope of his privilege and is also liable to Goliath.18 Goliath started the confrontation, and David became liable by overreacting. Each answers for his own act, and neither judgment erases the other.
The clause preserves liability only where the other person actually committed a tort. Consider a case with no first tort.
Students make two opposite errors on this point. One treats the defender's overreaction as excusing the first wrongdoer, as though the attacker had become a pure victim. The other treats the first wrongdoer's conduct as excusing the defender's overreaction, as though provocation licensed any response. Section 71(b) rejects the first. The limits on the defender's force reject the second, because they measure force against what the defender correctly or reasonably believes necessary and not against the other person's wrongdoing.19 The sound answer finds two torts and two possible liabilities and analyzes each on its own terms. What the first wrongdoer may do when the defender's force exceeds the privilege is the next question.
Defending Against Excessive Force
Section 71(c) gives the third consequence: the other person has the normal privilege of self-defense against the defender's use or attempted use of excessive force or confinement.21 The first two rules leave one question open. The defender owes for the surplus, and the first wrongdoer still owes for the first invasion, but must that wrongdoer stand still and absorb the surplus while the claims are sorted out afterward? The third rule says no, and two phrases carry the answer. 'Normal privilege' means the ordinary conditions of self-defense govern the wrongdoer's response exactly as they govern anyone else's. 'Use or attempted use' means the privilege arises when excessive force is threatened, as it does against any imminent attack, and not only after the force lands.22
The reason lies in what the excess is. Force beyond what the defender may use is force the defender has no privilege to use, so as to that surplus the defender stands like anyone else who intentionally hurts another. The person facing it meets exactly the kind of unprivileged contact that the privilege of reasonable defense exists to ward off.23 The first wrong has its own remedy, since the wrongdoer stays liable for it, so the law has no need to strip him of protection in order to answer what he did.
Return to Goliath and David. David answered a jacket-tearing advance with a pitchfork, and because the threat was only of nondeadly force, the thrust exceeds his privilege.24 Goliath now faces the use of excessive force. Under § 71(c) he may defend himself against the thrust even though his own conduct began the quarrel.25 The encounter leaves each man liable to the other, Goliath for the assault and David for the excess.
Had David used only a reasonable nondeadly push, the result would reverse. A push is a privileged way of warding off the advance, so David commits no battery.26 A person may not defend against force the other is privileged to inflict, so Goliath has no privilege to resist the push.27 He may retreat or accept it, and if he does more, he is liable and David is not. The one exception, a privilege that rests on a reasonable mistake of fact the actor did not cause, belongs to the later discussion of resisting privileged force. Section 71(c) revives the wrongdoer's privilege against the excess alone, and it gives him no more power to resist privileged force than anyone else has.
Because the privilege is the normal one, the normal limits govern Goliath's response. He may defend only against an excess he reasonably believes is about to be inflicted, and he may use only proportionate force: a thrust at his body justifies far more than a shove would.28 If he answers with deadly force, the conditions for deadly self-defense apply, including a reasonable belief in the danger that justifies such force.29 The Restatement's retreat rule applies as well: a person attacked with deadly force must retreat, if she may do so safely, before responding with deadly force.30 A Goliath who can retreat in safety therefore may not use deadly force, and one with no safe retreat may. If he answers with more than the situation allows, the surplus is a new excess, § 71(a) charges him with it, and David acquires the normal privilege against it in turn.
Courts do not uniformly give the original aggressor this protection. In criminal cases, most jurisdictions hold that self-defense belongs only to a person free from fault, so an initial aggressor has no privilege even when a minor provocation is met by a grossly excessive response.31 On that view the aggressor's only choices are to run if possible, to forgo self-defense and be killed, or to fight back unlawfully and face homicide charges if he kills the attacker.32 A few states let a nonlethal aggressor regain the privilege when he meets an excessive, life-threatening response, provided he first exhausts every reasonable means of escape.33 An answer should state the Restatement rule and flag the stricter criminal rule where the facts invite it. The next section takes up provocation and aggression more generally.
Two shortcuts each skip a step. Treating the original wrongdoer as an outlaw skips step four, and treating the defender's overreaction as though it cancelled the first wrong skips step one. An answer that reaches the right result without walking all five steps has usually missed a liability.